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The purpose of this study is to examine the legal j usti­
fica tion for the trial held at Nuremberg, Germany, of the leading 
German Naz is. The wisdom of the tr ial , i ts possible future 
effects , i ts fa irness or unfairness are not primarily the con­
cern of this thesis. An exhaustive study of these questi ons 
would require a much more ambi t i ous e ffort than this one proposes 
to be. Here the question is--did there e xist b efore the cre a t i on 
of the Charter of the Tribunal , recogni zed interna t i onal law 
on wh ich each of the counts of the Indictment agai nst the Naz is 
could properly b e  b ased? 
Early in my study I ga ined the impression tha t adequa t e , 
recogni zed interna t i onal law existed for the charges of war 
crimes and crimes aga inst humani ty, but I felt tha t no custom 
nor convention existed to sustain the counts or conspiracy 
and crimes against peace. Therefore , I concluded that the 
firs t two counts of the Nuremberg Indictment were b ased on 
!! post facto law. As my study progressed and I read the 
opinions of many learned j urists and pub l icists and consi dered 
trends b e tween World War I and World War I I ,  I decided that 
reasonab ly sound b ases existed for these counts also , if we 
b ear in mind the following things : (1) unti l  a world govern-
ment is crea ted with an ade qua t e  legislature , we must continue 
to depend upon custom , conventi on, and the crystalli zati on of 
interna ti onal thinking for the crea tion of interna t i onal law; 
iii 
( 2) a great many resolutions , a mul tila teral trea ty and the 
think ing of many pub lici s t s  c ombi ned in c ondemn ing aggres s i ve 
war as an interna tional c rime before 1939 ; an d ( 3 ) for c ustom 
to dev e lop there must be a firs t  p rec edent and in terna ti onal 
law m us t  grow in the same mann er a s  did the A nglo-Saxon c omm on 
law. 
Sinc e none of the acc used Germans los t hi s li fe by be ing 
c onvic ted s olely on co unts one or two , I am c onvi nc ed that the 
Nuremberg trial was the fa ire s t  mann er p os sib le for dea ling 
wi th the Naz i leaders . 
Materials us ed in this s tudy are of Am eric an and B ritish 
origin and the Judgmen t and Op inion of the Tr ibu nal whic h 
tried the N az is .  
In va luab le assi s tanc e  has been rendered by Dr. R uth 
Step hens of the U niversity of Tenn e ssee  Hi s tor y  and P olitica l 
Sc ienc e  De par tments. Dr. Step hens sugg e s ted the subj ec t an d 
ai ded in sugges ti ons for c oll ec tion of ma teria ls and orga ni­
z a tion. The writer is indeb ted to Dr. J. W e s ley Hoffmann, 
Chairman of the Hi s tory Dep artment and Dr. s. J .  Folmsbee 
for reading the thesis and sugge s tin g  c hanges .  
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CHAPTER I 
PRECEDENTS FOR NUREMBERG 
There is wide divergence of opini on as to the legality 
of the trial a t  Nuremberg of the Nazi leaders. For the firs t 
time the leaders of a de feated, aggressor state have b een called 
to the prisoner's do ck to answer charges for a ct s  commi tted 
in conne ct ion wi th war. History ha s no pre cedent for such a 
trial and it is difficult t o  deduce from i nt erna tional law as 
i t  exis ted in 1939 principles on whi ch some of the charges 
can be b as ed .  
There are pre cedents in the history o f  the United S t a t es 
for the war crime s count of the Nuremberg indictment . During 
the American Revolut ion a trial devel oped from an incident 
conne c t ed wi th the Battle ·of Sara toga. A c erta in Colone l David 
Henley, the offi cer in charge of guarding the surrendered troops 
of General Burgoyne at Cambri dge , Massachus etts, was court­
mar tialed for a t t a cking a Bri t i sh soldier , Sergeant Re eves. 
C olonel Henley had b ecome inc ensed at some insulting remarks 
of Reeves and "pinked the brea s t "  of the Bri t isher. 
General Burgoyne demanded tha t Henley b e  b rought t o  
trial, al though there were n o  well-e s tab l ished precedents or 
laws of war cover ing thi s so-called crime. Henley's only 
de fense was a bri e f  wri tten sta tement, in whi ch he di d not 
r e cognize the lega l i ty of the charge s made by Burgoyne. He 
2 
was not "consc ious ot having fa iled in his duty to hi s country 
under trying circumstances" and was "pertectly wi lling to accept 
the decision of the court" so consc ious was he ot having 
"ac ted throughout with humanity. " The trial ended with 
Henley ' s  acquittal. General Heath 1n charge ot the court­
martial expres sed a wish that th1s trial would not establ ish 
a precedent for the ruture .1 
Out ot the War Be tween the States , there arose three 
oase s--C oleman� Tenne s see , �.� Johnson, and Freeland ·XL 
Wi lliams , which were also concerned with war crimes. The f irst 
case was conc erned wi th a crlminal act ,  and the other two 
cases wi th c iv il act ions. 
In Coleman� Tennessee , a Union soldier, Coleman, was 
charged w1th hav ing committed murder in Tennessee,  while serv­
ing there during the rebellion. By a court-martial he was 
convicted and sentenced to  death. For s ome reason the sentence 
never was carried into effect . After Tennessee was res tored 
to s tatehood , Coleman was indicted and brought to trial for 
the same offen se.  To the indic tme nt he  pleaded his c onvic tion 
before the court-mart ial , but the plea was over-ruled and he 
was tried, convicted, and se ntenc ed to death. On writ ot 
error the case was brought before the Uni ted States Supreme 
1 Samuel c. Wi lliams , •colonel David Henley, " East 
Te nnessee Historical Soc iety's Public ations ,  XVIII , 1946, 
pp. 4-7. 
Court which held, "The State Court had no right to try h1m 
�or the of�ense, as he, at the time of the action, was not 
amenable to its laws." 
Thus the United States Supreme Court declared that 
officers and soldiers of the Army of the United States were 
not subject to the laws of the enemy, nor amenable to his 
tribunals for offenses committed by them during the war. They 
were answerable to their own government, and only by its laws, 
as enforced by its armies, could they be punished.2 National 
sovereignty was the order of the day and the Supreme Court 
closely adhered to it. This ruling of our highest court is 
interesting in view of the numerous post-war trials of German 
soldiers in countries occupied by Ge�any during World war II. 
The second case., 122!, !.!. Johnson, concerned an officer 
of the United States army, who was hailed before a Louisiana 
court, for injuries resulting from a military order. This 
court continued in existence during the military occupation 
of the state by the forces of the United States. Before it, 
the plaintiff·brought charges against a United States brigadier­
general for authorizing a military company to seize certain 
personal property belonging to the plaintiff. The United 
States Supreme Court held that the State Court had no juris­
diction, and that its judgment was void.3 
2 Col�man v. Tennessee, 97 u. s. Retorts (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Olf!Ce, 878), pp. 509-10. 
3 � � Johnson, 100 � � Reports, p. 158. 
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The third case, Freeland � Williams, was concerned with 
a broken contract. Here the Supreme Court decided that civil 
war did not impair the validity of a contract within the mean­
ing of the Constitution of the United Statea.4 
Thus, in two cases, the highest court in the United 
States upheld the extra-territorial right of a nation over 
its troops when those troops invaded enemy territo�, and in 
the third, a contract remained a contract regardless of war. 
After the victory of the United States over the confed­
eracy, some felt the Confederate leaders, principally Jefferson 
Davis and Robert E. Lee, should be brought to trial before 
United States courts. On order of the United States Government 
Davis was seized and tmprisoned in Fortress Monroe, Virgin1a. 
A United States District co�t of Virgi.nia indicted him tor 
treason as did a District of Columbia court. The United States 
Court of Appeals which included Virgin1a added to the charge 
ot treason that of conspiracy and other high crimes and mis• 
demeanors. Eventually each or the indictments was dismissed 
and Davis was released on bond of $100,000. Two of his bonds­
men were Horace Greeley and Cornelius Vanderbilt. The general 
amnesty proclamation of President Johnson in 1869 released 
Davis from the threat of any further action.s •T.he Federal 
government did not wish to try h�. It could not run the 
risk of having its charge of treason turned into a legal vind1-
-
4 Freeland � Williams, 131 � � Reports, pp. 405-6. 
5 Armistead c. GordonL Jefferson Davis (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1918), pp. <Go4•'/5. 
5 
cation of secession; fo� such would p�obably have been the 
issue."6 Public opinion also played its part. At ti�st the 
No�th �ega�ded Davis as a political oftende� of the wo�st pos­
sible characte�, but this attitude changed to a feeling of 
s�pathy as the No�the�n p�ess ci�culated the sto�y ot the 
placing of i�ons on Davis' ankles. 7 
• 
The 1mp�isonment of Davis �esembles that of Napoleon 
Bonapa�te in that it was based upon an executive action �athe� 
than a judicial p�ocess as used against the Ge�man leaders 
at N�embe�g. 
The fi�st comp�ehensive codification of the laws of land 
warfare came f�om the Hague Conventions ot 1899 and 1907. Thus 
to� the ti�st time the civilized wo�ld in peacetime set down 
and ratified rules which s�ould be binding on belligerents. 
These principles became the legal basis fo� the trials which 
were proposed after World Wa� I ,  and the war crimes count of 
the Nuremberg indictment. 
The Paris Peace Conference, at its plenary session of 
January 25, 1919, c�eated a commission to inquire into the 
�esponsibility for the outbreak of the war and to suggest 
appropriate punishment for those found guilty. The commission 
was composed of fifteen members, two from each of the Great 
Powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, 
and Japan) and five elected from among the powers with special 
6 Allen Tate, Jeffe�son Davis (New Yor�: Milton, Balch 
and Company, 1929}, p. 366 • .  
7 Frank H. Alfriend, The Life of Jefferson Davis (Chicago: 
Caxton Company, 1868}, p. 63.,-;- - -
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interests; those chosen being Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania, 
and Serbia. 
The Commission was charged to inquire into and report 
upon the following points: 
l. The responsibility of the authors of the war. 
2. The facts as to the breaches of the laws and customs 
of war committed by the forces of the German Empire 
and their Allies, on land and sea, and in the air 
during the present war. 
3. The degree of responsibility for these ofrences 
attaching to particular members of the enemy 
forces, including members of the General Staff, 
and other individuals, however highly placed. 
4. The constitution and procedure o� a tribunal appro­
priate for the trial of these offences. 
5. Any other matters cognate or anc illary to the 
above which may arise in the course of the enquiry, 
and which the Commission finds it useful and 
relevant to take into consideration. 8 
On March 29,  1919, this Commission made its report to 
the Peace Conference. In Chapter I of the Report, re�pons1-
bility for the war was placed first on Germanr and Austria, 
and secondly on Turkey and Bulgaria. In arriving at this 
decision, the Commission went into great detail, ferreting 
out speeches, memoirs, reports of conferences, mobilization 
orders, etc. of Germany and Austria, and later Turkey and Bul-
8 "Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference 
by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the 
War and on Enforcement of Penalties, " American Journal· of 
International Law, XIV, pp. 95-6. --
7 
garia- prior to the actual begi nning ot hostilities. 
The Commission drew these conclusions as to war reapon-
sibili ty: 
1. The war was premeditated by the Central Powers 
together with their Allies_ Turkey and Bulgaria, 
and was the result of acts deliberatel7 com­
mi tted in order to make it unavoidable. 
2. Germany_ in agreement with Austr1a•Bungar,., delib· 
erately worked to defeat all the manr conciliatory 
proposals made by the Ententt Powers and their re­
peated ettorts to avoid war. 9 
These conclusions suggest that the thinking of the Commission 
was a�1lar to that of Justice Jackson �en he formulated t he 
oonspiraor charge tor the Nuremberg trial. 
Along with this , the violat ion ot the neutrality of 
Belgium and Luxembourg was stipulated in this conclusions 
"The neutrality ot Belgium_ guaranteed by the treaties of the 
19th Apr il- 1839, and that of Luxembourg, guaranteed by the 
treaty of the 11th May, 1867, were deliberately violated by 
Germanr and Austria-Hungary. nlO 
Chapter II was concerned·w i th violat ion ot the laws and 
cust oms of war by the Central Powers. By means of documents 
collected from Belgium, Greece , Italy, Serbia, Poland, Roumania, 
9 !2!!!•, P• 107. 
10 !M!!·. p. 112. 
8 
and Armenia, and other states, numerous instances were set 
down in which the Central Powers waged war by barbarous and 
illegal methods in violation o� the established laws and cus­
toms and the elementary laws ot humanit7, as set down by the 
Hague Conventions and other international documents. 
Some thirt7-two di��erent violations ot these laws are 
set down in the Report, among them being the following: murder 
and massacres, putting hostages to death, torture ot civilians, 
rape, deportation of civilians, pillage, imposition ot collec­
tive penalties, deliberate bombardment of hospitals, and man7 
others. The Report is very specific in enumerating the exact 
crimes with which the Central Powers were charged.ll 
Personal reaponsibilitJ ot German leaders is dealt with 
in Chapter III. The Commission was of the opinion that there 
was no reason wh7 rank, whether it be high or low, should in 
an7 circumstance protect the holder o� it from responsibility 
when that responsibility had been established be�ore a properlJ 
constituted tribunal, going so �ar as to say that tb1a extended 
to heads of states. The question o� immunity o� a sovereign 
o� the state is one of practical expedience in municipal law, 
and is not fundamental; even though in some countries, a sovereign 
is exempt trom prosecution in a national court ot his own 
countrJ the position from an international point of view is 
11 Ibid., PP• 112-5 • ........... 
9 
quite diffe rent . The Report s tipulated that the vindication 
ot the laws and cus to� ot war and the laws ot humanity which 
had be en violated would be incomple te it the Kaiser and other 
ottenders le s s  highly place d were not brought to trial and 
punished. In view ot this reasoning, the following conclus ion 
was drawn: "All pers ona be longing to enemy c ount ries, howe ver 
high their pos ition may have bee n, wi thout distinctio n ot rank, 
inc luding Chiefs ot States , who have been guilty ot offe nces 
agains t the laws and customs ot war or the laws ot humanitJ 
are liable to cr1minal proaecution. •l2 
Chapter IV was conce rned with the constitution and pro­
ce dure ot an appropriate tribunal. The Commission pre sented 
two clas ses ot c ulpable acts tor adjudications "(a) Acts which 
provoked the world war and accompanied its inception, (b) Vio­
lations ot the laws and cus toms ot war and the laws or humanitJ. " 
In the firs t  clas s the Commiss ion considere d acta not strictl7 
war crimea, but ac ts which provoked the war or accompanied it s 
inception, ror example , the invas ions of Belgium and Luxembourg. 
A war of aggression was condemned by history and reproved by the 
cons c ienc e of mankind in the wording ot this portion ot the 
Report . Furt her, any inquiry into the authorship ot the war 
s hould extend over events that had happened during manJ yeara 
in various European countrie s . 13 Conclus ions drawn trom the 
12 �., pp. 116•7 . 
13 �·· p. 118. 
Chapter on (a) part are as followas 
1. The acts which brought about the war should not 
be charged against their authors or made the 
subject o� proceedings before a tribunal. 
10 
2. On the special head of the breaches ot the 
neutralitJ ot Luxembourg and Belgium, the gravitJ 
ot these outrages upon the principles ot the 
law ot nations and upon international good faith 
is suoh that they should be made the subject 
ot a formal condemnation by the Conference. 
3. On the whole case, including both the acta which 
brought about the war and those which a ccom­
panied its inception, particularlJ the violation 
ot the neutrality ot Belgium and LuxemboUPg, 
it would be right tor the Peace Con terencei in 
a matter so unprecedented, to adopt specia 
measures, and even to create a special organ in 
order to deal as they deserve with the authors ot 
such acta. 
4 . It is desirable that tor the future penal sane­
tiona should be provided tor such grave outrages 
against the elementarr principles ot international 
law.l4 
The Comadssion expressly counseled against holding a 
trial for the so-called authors or the war, and hoped that 
such specitic cases as violations ot neutrality would call for 
special action by the Conference. However, it was thought 
that such unprecedented acta demanded unprecedented measures, 
and that a special organ would be helpful in dealing with 
such outrages tor t.he tuture, but the 1mpl1oation 1a there 
not to use � post tacto leg1alat1on tor these ottensea. 
14 Ibid. 1 P• 120. -
11 
Part 4 was very de s irable. and if the Peace Confe re nc e had 
followed its s ugge st ions . as we ll as Parts 1 ,  2. and 3, the 
que st ion of the retroac t iv ity ot Nuremberg would not have 
arisen. 
Under (b) part of Chapter IV, those outrage s against 
Allied c ivilians and soldiers by me mbers of the German armed 
force s .  c ivil or mil itary author i t ie s ,  without distinc t ion 
ot rank, including the he ads of s t ates. should be made the 
subjec t of a s pecial inquiry, be fore a high tr ibunal compo s ed  
o t  the Big Five Powers and Be lgium. Greec e .  Po land. Portugal, 
Roumania. Se rbia. and C z e ehoslovakia. l5 Chapter IV c l osed 
with these conc lus ions: 
The C o mmis s ion has cons e quently the honor to rec o mmend: 
1. That a high tribunal be c ons t i tuted as abo ve set 
out . 
2 . That it s hall be provided by the tre aty o t  peace . 
3. That e ach Allied and As s oc i ated Government adopt 
such le gislation as may be necessary to s upport the 
jurisdic t ion of the internat ional c ourt . and to 
as s ure the carrying out of i t s  s entenc e .  
4. That the five s tates repre sented on the Pro ee c ut i ng 
Commi s s ion shall jointly approach neutral govern­
ments .  w ith a view to obtainlng the s urrender tor 
trial of pers ona within their territories who are 
charged by such s t ates with violat ions ot th!6lawt and c ustoms o f  war and the laws o f  humanity.  
15 Ibid •• PP• 121-2 • 
.......... 
16 Ib id. ,  pp . 123-4. Part 4 was primarily c oncerned w ith 
Kais er WilEi!m II, who had fled to Holland . The note of the 
Ne therlands ' Government with re gard to this matter pointed out 
that Holland had been a re fuge for pol it ical e xiles for centuries, 
and there fore re fused ext�adit ion. 
12 
Annexed to the C o mmis s i on Report was doc umentary evidenc e  
t e rmed a " Summary ot Example s o f  Offence s  C ommit ted b y  the 
, 
Authoriti e s  or Force s  of the Central Empire s  and Their Alli es 
Against the Laws and Customs of War and the Laws of Humanity. • 
All in all the fin dings and rec ommendat ions of the Commi ss ion 
we re just and sane, and should have been tulfil�d to the le tter, 
but such was not the case. Part s  of the rec ommendat ions were 
accepted, and othe r parts we re relegated to oblivion. 
The _Treaty of Versa illes by Part VII, Articles 227•30, 
c ontained provisions for arraigning Wilhe lm II and those per­
sons accused of ha ving violated the l aws and customs of war. 
In Article 227 Wilhelm was c harged with a " supreme offence 
against internat ional morality and the sanc t i t y  ot treat ies . "  
A spe cial tribunal was called tor, to be composed of repre­
sentat ives of the Bi g Fi ve Powers. In i t s  decision the tribunal 
would be " guided by t he  hi ghest motive s of internat ional policy• 
. 
and its duty would be to t1x ade quate punishment . Not onlJ 
was Germany to ac quiesce in the trials of her former le ader s, 
but also she was to furnish anr doc ume nt s  and informat ion ot 
eve ry klnd which t he  All ies thought necessary t o  ens ure the 
full knowledge of the iaor tminat ing ac ts. l7 
1 7 Lawrenc e  Mart i n, The Treat ies of Peace ,  1919-1923 
(New York :  Carnegie Endowment for Internat ional Peace ,  1024), 
I, PP• 121-2. 
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In purs uanc e  of Articl e 228,  lis ts of accus ed pers ons 
were prepared by the l eading All ies , from which a joint l is t  
was d rawn up and pres ent ed t o  Germa� on February 3 , 1920. 
One res erv a tion s t ipul ated th at it di d not c ompris e " all the 
authors of the innum erabl e c ri mes c omm i tted during the c ours e 
of the war by the Germ ans. " The l is t  c ontained app rox ima tel y  
nine h undred n ames .l 8  
U pon rec e ipt of the l is t  in G ermany, the peopl e  unani­
m ousl y  denounc ed it and ev erywhere it was s ugges te d tha t th e 
s urrender of the war c riminals b e  refus ed.  Ev en th e pol i tic al 
parties s tood toge ther on this iss ue , and publ icl y c o� de� ed 
the All ied l is t. This rec eption of the l is t  in Germany s o  
impress ed the All ies ,  th at the propos al of Germa ny to try 
thos e ac cus ed of war c rimes b efore the Supreme Cour t  of the 
R e ic h at L eipzig was aec ept ed.l 9  
Wh en the All i es acc epted th is s ugges tion, it meant they 
woul d  refrain from partic ipa ting in th e trials in any mann er 
18 Shel don Gl uec k, W ar Crimi nals: T heir Pros ec ution 
and Punilbm ent '(N ew Y ork: -xn opr , 1944), PP• 23-4. Fr ance 
aii ignatid 334 pers ons which incl uded General Stenger , C rown 
Princ e  Augus t W il he 1m , Count Bisma rc k  ( grands on of the I ron 
C hanc ell or) , and M arshal von Hindenbur g .  Great Britain add ed 
97 names , and among these we re Grand Adm iral von Ti rpitz ,  Vic e­
Adm iral Sc hee r ,  and Baron von der Lanck en for th e s hooting of 
Nurs e E dith C avell. Bel gium l is ted 334 Germ ans ,  es pec ially 
v. on Betbm ann-Holl weg . Pol and, R ouma nia ,  It al y, and Y ugosl av i a 
s ubm itted v arious nam es ,  while the Uni ted States s ubmi tted none. 
19 �·· pp. 25-7 . 
14 
aDd leave complete reapons ib ilitJ to the Governme nt of Germany. 
However, Great Br itain was very helptul with sugges tions .as 
to the manner for conducting the trials, and took deposit ions 
from Brit ish witnesses . Br itish witnes ses tes tified before 
the court.20 The British Solic itor General, Sir Earnest Pollock, 
even went to Germany tor the triala. 21 
or the rorty-flve names submitted on the Allied "sample " 
list to Germany, thirteen were dec lared to be dead or the ir 
whereabouts unknown. The others were in Germany available 
tor trial. 22 Throughout the spring of 1921, preparat ions were 
made for the trials . The Reichstag on May 4 adopted a bill 
providing for the trial of the acouaed named in the lis t . 23 
Finally, on May 23, 1921, the first trial began--that or Cor­
poral Heynen, who was indicted for the mi streatment of BritiSh 
prisoners of war at Herne Camp in We atphalia.24 
Corporal ( also listed as sergeant) Heynen was a minor 
otfic1a1, who at the beginning of October, 1915, was called 
to the first Muns ter prisoners• camp, in order to take com­
mand of the new pr isoners' camp to be organized at Shaft Five 
ot the Frederick the Great mine near Herne . There we re placed 
20 !!! !2£! Time s ,  February 13, 1921, p .  9 .  
21 Ib id . , May 13, 1921, P• 3 • ......... 
22 �., February 13, 1921, p .  9 .  
23 �·· May s, 1921, p . 3. 
24 �·• May 24, 1921, p .  19 . The cases brought by the 
British Government were to be taken up first, pos sibly because 
of the aid given by the British. 
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under htm two hundred and forty pris oners of war, two hundred 
Englishmen and forty Russ ians· . 'l'hel'e was no complaint .t'l'om 
the Russ ians as they were occupied with agr icultural work. 
The Bl' itish prisoners were to wol'k in a colllerJf a 
th ing which they declared they would not do, because they looked 
upon such work as helptul to Germany in her conduc t ot the 
•ar .25 Sixteen of the Br itish ex-prisoners gave tes t1mony 
betol'e the court that the accused oons istentlJ ill•treated 
them, beat ing them with .tists, s t icks, and a l'itle butt26 
as well as us ing insulting language to some or the prisoner s . 27 
The German pl'osecut ing counsel called a number or Ger• 
man witnesse s, who showed cons iderable ret icence about teat1-
fling. Little effort was made to refute the great mass ot 
Br it ish evidenoe . 28 The de.tense baaed ita case on the grounds 
that Heynen was constantly beset with difficulties, due to 
the host ile attitude or the British prisoners, who were said 
to have been generally unruly, to have cons tantly organized 
mutinies, and to have falsely reported themselves ill . 29 When 
. 
on the witne s s  stand in his own defense, Heynen admitted the 
truth or mos t  or the charge s ,  and expres sed pride in having 
-
25 "Judgment in the Case of Karl Heynen, " American 
Journal � International �. XVI, pp . 675-6. 
26!!! X2t!
-
Times, May 25, 1921, P• 4. 
27 "Judgment ot Heynen, " loc. cit., p. 674 . --
28 New � Time s, May 2s, 1921, p .  4. 
29 . - - -�., May 27, 1921 ,  p .  1. 
lived up to and exemplified the high standards of Prussian 
military service.30 
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In summing up the evidence against Heynen, the prose­
cuting attorney demanded that the accused be sent to prison 
tor two years. In a review ot the testimony, he declared 
that while prisoners ot war "could not be handled with kid 
-
gloves" the application of violence and the use ot offensive 
epithets were not warranted. Heynen was shown to have exceeded 
the requirements of his position as guard in twenty-eight 
instances.31 
The court found Heynen guilty on fifteen charges ot 
ill-treating subordinates, and on charges ot having treated 
subordinates contrary to the regulations, and sentenced htm 
to ten months ot 1mprisonment.32 
The penalty was called inadequate in the British House 
ot Commona33, but Pollock, the British Solicitor General, 
made the comment that the President ot the Court, Dr. Schmidt, 
showed remarkable fairness in conducting the tr1al.34 
30 Ibid., P• 16. 
-
31 �·· p. 1. 
32 "Judgment ot Heynen," �· ill_., p. 674 . 
. . 
33!!! � T�es, May 27 , 1921, p. l. 
34 Ibid., May 24 , 1921, P• 19. 
-
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There were various repercussions to the trial in Germany. 
The Republican press on the whole supported the trial. One 
Republican newspaper. Vorwarts, said that it was not a sub­
ordinate that they would like to see on trial but: 
Among those wholesale war criminals, we c ount those 
men whose vi olent minds conce ived and issued the orders 
to des troy whole villages, drown mines, and out down 
fruit trees .  Not the hands which executed these 
orders should be made respons ible, but the heads which 
conce ived them. Foremost ot all, the originators ot 
the Belgian deportations should be placed betore the 
Court ot Justice in order that an inextinguishable 
spot on Germany's honor should not be condoned. It 
is bad enough that no German public prosecutor has 
yet had the courage and init iative to put these men 
in the defendants' box . 36  
The reactionary press was of the opinion that Heynen was 
wrongly convicted, because he only obeyed orders inseparable 
from war .36 
Captain Emil Muller was the next German ottic ial to be 
tr ied at Leipzig. In March, 1918, the accused c ommanded the 
II Company ot the Geleenkirchen Lands trum Battalion, and in 
thi� capac ity, he was, in the beginning ot April, placed in 
command ot a camp for English pr isoners of war at Flavy-le­
Martel prison camp, which was located in the Department ot 
the Aisne, France . 37 Muller was charged,with ill-treatment 
35 �-- Kay 28, 1921, p .  3. 
36 Ib id . ,  P• 3 • 
........... 
37 "Judgment in the Case of Emil Muller, " American Journal 
ot International Law, XVI, p .  685. On the opening day ot the 
�ial, the President of the Court had this to say: "We shall 
now witness a terrible picture ot war excesses and shocking 
atroc ities which has deeply impressed me . "  Quoted trom the 
!!! � Times, May 28, 1921, p.  3. 
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ot prisoners,  such as s triking and kicking them, ordering them 
to be bound to posts, and mistreating and compelling sick 
prisoners to work. He was further charged with us ing insult­
ing language to the prisoners and of tolerating his subor­
dinate officers who mis t�eated prisonera .38 
The Court found Muller guilty of ill-treating aubor• 
dinates in nine instances; for having tolerated such 111-treatment 
in one instance; for having dealt w1th subordinates in tour 
ins tances contrary to regulations ; and tor having insulted 
subordinates in two ins tances . As a result he was sentenced 
to six months ot imprisonment . 39 
In giving ita reasons tor the dec is ion, the Court had 
this to say of Muller : nit mus t  be emphasized that the ac• 
cused has not acted dishonorably, that is to say, his honor 
both as a citizen and as an otticer remains untarnished, " 
. 
and in the same paragraph: "His c onduct has sometimes been 
unworthy ot a human be1ng. "40 
The British Government was outraged at the lightness 
ot this sentence and the London Daily News said this of the 
Muller trial: 
38 �., PP• 688·92. 
39 Ibid. , p. 685 • 
........... 
40 Ibid . , p. 695. His honor remained unsullied, and 
yet his conduct was unbecoming a human being ; a peculiar 
quirk ot the German mentality or concept ot hono�. 
The serious part or the proceedings in the Leipsic 
court ia not that a typical German militarist of 
high rank should run amuck. but that the tribunal ap­
pointed by the German Government to try the cas e  
should decide atter finding Muller guilty of crimes 
that would disgrace a Hottentot that justice would 
be met by sending this tine flower of Kultur to jail 
tor six months --a sentence about equal to that passed 
upon a sneak thitf found guilty of s tealing a watch 
and chain. • • • 
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Nevertheless ,  Pollock re iterated his faith in the Court , which 
he declared could be regarded with the fulle st  contidence.42 
The next case tried was that of Robert Neumann, a s oldier 
who was charged with ill-treating prisoners of war at the prison­
era• camp at the chemical factory, Pommerensdorf, and also ot 
insults to pris oners ,  during the period from March 26 to Decem­
ber 24 , 1917. In this trial a great deal of evidence was heard. 
Twenty-five English witnesses ,  all former prisoners at the 
Pommerensdort camp, were examined orally before the Court , and 
four others at Bow Street Police Court in London.  Bes ides this,  
fourteen German witnes s e s ,  some former sentries and officials 
at the chemical factory, were examined. 
Numerous ins tances ot c ruel and inhuman treatment were 
proved against Neumann, but also evidence was produced to the 
effect that no prisoner was struck without cause . The retusal 
41!!! !2£! Ttmes, May 31, 1921, p. 17. 
42 Ibid., P• 17 • 
.......... 
on the part of some Engl ish pri s oners to work see� to have 
been the chief cause of Neumann's offenses.43 
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The accused was found guilty of ill-treating subordinates 
1n twelve cas es, and insulting a subordinate, and was sent enced 
to six months of imprisonment.44 In deciding the cas e the 
Court took into consideration tha t the accused ac ted �rom no 
di shonorable mot ives in hi s dealings wi th the prisoners placed 
under htm, but was actuated solelr by a de sire to do his duty . 45 
The next trial was particularly s ign i�ioan t, and had to 
do wlth the doctrine of super ior orders . It concer ned Commander 
Karl Neumann of the Submarine u. c. 67. He was charged wi th 
having torpedoed the English hospi tal ship, Dover Cas tle ,  
wi thout warn ing and with having sunk her wi th exceptional 
brutality on May 26, 1917 . When torpedoed, the ship had sick 
and wounded on board and was o n  her war to take them �rom 
Malta to Gibraltar . 
The ac cused admi t ted s inking the Dover Castle and as 
his defense used the plea that he acted under superior order s. 
The German Government's memoranda o� January 29 and March 29, 
19171 were submitted on behalf of Neumann. These documents 
43 "Judgment in the Case ot Robert Neumann," American 
Journal ot Interna tional Law, XVI , pp. 696-8 . The Engilsfi 
wltne s s , :Benaon, in his examination in London frankly admitted 
that he never saw anyb ody struck without cause. 
44 Ib id. , P• 697 • 
........... 
45 Ib id . ,  p .  703 • 
.......... 
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s tated that Germany would not e nt irely repudiate the lOth 
Hague Convention, which had to do with enemy hos pi tal ships , 
but was compelled to res tric t the navigat ion of such ships , 
b e cause she felt tha t the All ies were us ing the ir h?s pital 
ships not only to aid wounded, s ick, and shi pwrecked persona, 
but also for military purposes , and that they (the Allie s )  
were thereby violat ing the C onvention. In the se cond me morandum, 
it was anno unc ed that henceforth, as re gards the Mediterranean, 
only s uoh hos pital ships would be protec ted, which fulf illed 
certain c onditions . The hos pital ships had to be r e ported 
at lea s t  s ix we eks previous ly, and were t o  kee p  t o  a given 
course on leav ing Greece . After a reasonable period of grace, 
a ll other e ne my hos pital s hips in the Mediterranean would be 
r egarded as ves s els ot war and sub se quently attacked. 
These orders were communicated to all Ger man submarine 
commanders in the Med iterranean area , and as such Neumann rece ived 
knowle dge of thes e  memoranda. The Dover Cas tle did not fulfill 
the certain c ond it ions s et down, and as a re sult was torpedoed . 
Enough time was given however , be tween fir ing of t he t wo tor­
pedoe s ,  for the wounded to be trans ferred to a de s troyer accom­
panying the s hip. Only s ix member s o t  the crew died as a 
result of the s ink1ng. 46 
46 " Judgment in the Case of Commander Kar l  Ne umann , "  
loc. oit. , XVI, PP• 704-706. 
--
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The Court found Neumann innoc ent of the charge s ,  and 
based its decis ion on the following reasoning: It is a mili­
tary princ iple that the subordinate is bound to obey the orders 
ot his super iors , and as the German Admiralty was the highest 
service author1ty over the accused, he was duty bound to obey 
its orders in service matters. So far as he did that, he was 
tree from criminal respons ibility. Under international law 
a subord inate may be held re spons ible, ( 1) it he has gone 
beyond the orders given him, and ( 2) if he acts in conformity 
with orders when he knows that his superiors have ordered 
him to do acts which involve a civil or military crime or 
misdemeanor. In both cases Neumann was shown to have stayed 
within the law. In the first plac e, he had not gone beyond 
his orders because he could not give warning to the ship, as 
it was escorted by two wars hips, and no part icular brutality 
was involved in the sinking, as one and one-halt hours elapsed 
between the tir1ng ot the first and second torpedoes . In the 
second place, Neumann knew of the memoranda or the Ger�n 
Government concerning illegal use or hospital sh ips, and there­
tore , he regarded his ac tion as a legit imate reprisal . He 
made no secret of the s inking, not only report ing it to his 
superiors, but also adm1tting it at the trial. He would not 
have done this had he considered that his ac tions were illegal . 47 
47 Ib id., PP• 707-8 • 
........... 
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The onlJ German ac cused by Belgium in the sample list 
was a c ertain Max Randohr , who was charged with having ill• 
treated and impr isoned Belgian children at Grammont in 1917. 
The Court acquitted htm on June 11, 1921.48 
The f irst French case to be tried was tha t  of Lieutenant 
General Karl Stenger, and along with htm, Major Benno Crusius, 
on charges of murdering pris oners of war . General Stenger 
c ommanded a br igade of the Fourteenth Ar� Corpa , 49 and was 
held responsible ror is suing two orders on August 26 , 1914 , 
which cons t ituted the main bas is for the French charges : 
(a) Beginning with today, no more prisoners will 
be taken . All pr isoners, whe ther wounded or 
no t ,  mus t be des troyed; 
(b) All pr isoners are to be killed; the wounded 
whether armed or no t ,  des troyed ; even men 
c aptured in large organized units are to be 
put to death. Behind us no enemy mus t  remain 
alive .SO 
Major Crus ius was brought to trial on the allegation 
that he carr ied out the General's orders . This was done 
on the basis that German law does not exonerate a subord inate 
from re spons ibility on the ground or superior orders it he 
knows the carrying out of such orders involves the committ ing 
ot a crtme . 51 
48 !!! � Ttmes , June 12, 1921 , p. 3. 
49 Ibid . ,  June 29 , 1921 , p. 17 • 
........... 
50 Glueck, �· �., P• 24. 
51!!! � Times, June 27 , 1921, p. 15 . 
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Fifty-tour witnesses were subpoened to testify in this 
trial, among them, several former active generals and well­
known military personnel. The charges resulted trom the German­
French battles around Saarburg in August, 1914. Crusius was 
charged with having passed down the orders ot Stenger to other 
otticers and the troops, and ot having carried out the orders 
by shooting some French prisoners. 
The French Government was represented by a Commission 
at the trial, and also aided in transporting witnesses, such , 
as those who testified from Alsace. 52 The bombshell that 
reverberated throughout the trial was Crusisu1 test1mony that 
Stenger did give the orders mentioned above, saying: "No pria­
oners, no pardon will be given, none asked." Testifying on 
behalt of Crusius, a Doctor Sernau said that the Major was 
sent home a nervous wreck, and had repeatedly told him that 
"his soul collapse was ohietly due to the ghastly scenes 
witnessed on the battlefield incident to General Stenger's 
order to shoot wounded men and prisoners.•53 
General Neubauer, battalion commander under Stenger, 
was called to the witness stand, and under oath said that his 
respect tor his old commander was such that it was quite pos­
sible he would not be able to tell the t�uth.54 
52 Ibid., June 29, 1921, p. 17. 
- . 
53 Cyril Brown, "General Arraigned as War Criminal," 
!!.'! � ...,T...,im..-..e_s, June 30, 1921, p. 19. 
54 Ibid., P• 19. 
-
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Several former Alsatian s oldiers who s erved under Stenger 
te s t ified, descr ibing the horrors of the battlefie lds when 
sergeants and privates, s ome agains t the ir own wills, had been 
forced to carry out Stenger's orders . Karl Kleinhaus, former 
s oldier under Stenger , gave the mo s t  damning test imony when 
he said that Stenger not only gave the orders, but was pers onally 
re spons ib le for the death of certain prisoners. Eugene Oberdorf, 
another of Ste nger's s oldi ers , descr ibed the murder of three 
French pris oners behind a b arn, to keep the ma j ority of Stenge�•s 
officers from witne s s ing the ac t . 55 
Crus ius wa s found guilty of manslaughter , and s entenced 
to two years impr is onment.56 Stenger was acqui t t ed. The atmo s-
. 
phere ot the Court which made poss ible the acquittal was partly 
the result ot long years ot German mili tary autocracy, and mus t 
have been partly due to the "Us ages ot War," a handbook ot the 
German General Staff for the guidance of German officers , which 
make s it perfectly clear that wh ile pr is oner s  under the c ircum­
stance s in which the Fre nch were placed "need not be killed, 
ye t one mus t not s trive offic iously to keep them alive.n57 
The Court disregarded much of the e videnc e submi t ted aga�nst 
55 !!! � Time s, July 2, 1921, p. 3. 
56 Ibid . , July 7, 1921, P• 2 .  
-. 
57 Pe rcy s. Bullen, "St enger's Acquittal," New York Times, 
July 14, 1921, p. 14. --- ----
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Stenger on the theory that such orders on the General's part 
were unbelievable, and that even if they had been given, the 
subordinates receiving them should never have taken them at 
face value.58 
French opinion, both official and unofficial, was out­
raged at the acquittal of Stenger. As a result the �ench 
Commission was recalled . 59 French observers called the trial 
a farce, with hearsay evidence, anybody's opinion, third-hand 
statements, and facta alike presented without protest trom 
the prosecuting or detendlng attorneys. Stenger and Neubauer 
frequently interrupted the proceedings, without being recognized 
by the Court President, inaert1ng their opin1ona or calling 
some witness a liar, as was done in the case ot one Alsatian. 
The President of the Court addressed Stenger as •Excellency,• 
and some ot the Judges• volunteered remarks about the duties, 
rights, and habits of officers and soldiers of the German Army 
were likewise distasteful t o  the French.so 
The acquittal of Stenger was followed by those ot Generals 
von Schack and von Kruaka, who were charged with having caused 
through negligence, an epidemic of typhus among war prisoners 
in the camp at Murderawehren, near Casael .6l 
59 "Acquittals that Convict Germany," � L1terarz Distfi­
July 23, 1921, p. 11. 
59 !!! !2£! Times, July 10, 1921, P• 1. 
60 Ibid . ,  July 3, 1921, p .  14. � 
61 Ibid . ,  July 10, 1921, p. 3. Three thousand French 
prisoners were said to have died from the diaeaae or from the 
effects of ill-treatment and brutality. 
The last trial of any tmportance at Leipz ig was that 
ot Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt, charged in conjunc t ion with 
Captain Patzig (who could not be round) of s inking the Br itish 
hospital ship, Llandovery Castle, and the machine-gunning ot 
the survivors in lite-boats .  At the time of s inking, the ship 
was returning from Halifax to England, after taking wounded 
Canadian soldiers home . On the re turn voyage, she had on 
board a total of two hundred and titty-eight pers ons , all 
medical personnel. There were pos itively no combatants on 
board, and in particular, no American aviators or munitions 
ot any kind. 62 
On the evening of June 27 , 1918, the Llandovery Cas tle 
was sunk in the Atlantic Ocean, about one hundred and sixteen 
mile s southwest of Ireland, by a torpedo from the U-Boat 86 . 
Ot the persons on board only twenty-five were saved . As we 
have see n earlier, such sinkings were in direct violation ot 
the Tenth Hague Convention. Captain Patzig, act ing on suspic ion 
that the s hip carried American aviators, dec ided on torpedoing 
the ship against the advice ot Dithmar and a witnes s ,  Popitz . 
The ship sank in about ten minutes ,  but a cons iderable number 
ot lite-boats were lowered and manned . Some t ime after the 
sinking, the U-Boat surfaced and approached the life-boats , 
in order to ascertain whether the Llandovery Castle did have 
airmen or munitions on board. 63 
- . · - 62 n jud8ment in Case ot Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt, 
American Journal .£! International �. XVI, p. 709. 
63 Ib id. , PP• 710-2 • 
........... 
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Atter giving be low deck orders to the crew, Patzig with 
Dithmar , Boldt, and first boatswain ' s mate Me is ser , who bad 
s ince· died, remained on deck, and fired upon the life-boats. 
Various witnes ses at the trial , former pers onnel ot the sub­
mar ine and survivors from the sunken ship, tes t ified to the 
t ir ing on the lite-boats .  Patzig seemed s o  worried afterward, 
that he exac ted a pledge from his me n not to reveal the happen­
ings of June 27 . As a result of this pledge , both Dithmar and 
Boldt refused to tes tify, but rather extolled the glor ies ot 
their former commander . 64 
The Court tound Dithmar and Boldt guilty ot homic ide , 
and sentenced them to four years tmprisonment . Along with 
thia Ditbmar was ordered dismissed from the service , and Boldt 
was forb idde n the right to wear an officer ' s  uniform . 65 The 
aftermath of this trial was that after Boldt had served about 
three months i n  the Hamburg jail, he escaped ; the suspic ion 
be ing that he was aided by the wardena . 66 
The Allied miss ion sent to the Le ipzig trials wi thdrew 
in protest at the outcome ot the twelve teat case s .  The French 
and Belgians , part icularly, were indignant at the results, 
64 Ibid . , pp . 714-6 . 
-
65 Ib id. p .  709 . _ ,  
66 !!! 1££! Time s ,  November 24, 1921, p .  20. 
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and rega�ded the trials as a wholesale miscarriage of just ice . 
In Januarr, 1922, a commiss ion of Allied jurists , who had 
investigated the Leipzig trials unanimously recommended to 
the Supreme Counc il ot the Alli ed and Ass oc iated Powers that 
it was usele s s  to le t the German Court cont inue . 67 
Bickerings , a des ire to return to normalcy, and other 
things de terred the Allies from pres s ing war criminal trials 
further, and so the whole idea or holding such trials was 
given up . Various persons in the Allied world looked very 
differently at the outcome or Le ipzig. Briand, French Foreign 
Mini ster, called the trials a tarc e . 68 A typical British 
view was expressed by Claud Mullins , an observer at the trials . 
He respected Dr . Schmidt, Pres ident ot the Court highly, and 
thought that the Court was tair . He even went so tar as to 
say tha t he would be willing to be tried by Dr. Schmidt on 
any charge, even one which involved his word agains t that 
ot a German. 69 
American public opinion generally was of the view that 
the trials were a travesty on jus t ic e ,  and the majority ot 
persona telt that the entire German nat ion was on trial and 
67 Glueck, £2• �·· p .  32 . 
68 !!! � Times,  July 14, 1921 ,  p .  2 . 
69 Claud Mullins , "The War Criminals ' Trials , "  The 
Fortnightly Review, OX, P •  420. ---
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not just a sample few. The inconsis tencies of the trials 
were pointed out , espec ially in compar ing the eases  ot Stenger 
and Lieutenant Neumann. Ne�nn was releas ed on the grounds 
that the gui lt lay leas with the subordinates than with those 
who issued the orders --thus this same princ iple would have 
condemned Stenger . But ins tead, Stenger wa s acquit ted, and 
his subordinate , Crus ius , was impris oned . 
Another view was expres sed by the Pitt sburgh l£!! when 
it said : "The trial • • •  est�blishes a valuable precedent 
and should tend to make army officers in future conflicts a 
little more cauti ous about violat ing the rules or c ivili zed 
wartare . •70 
The Baltimore American took a sane view ot the trial s :  
"An impartial effort by the Germans to fix the gui lt of their 
count�en is contrary to the laws or na ture ; the pot cannot 
s incerely call the kettle blac k . n71 
With the coming ot World War II and subsequent German 
atrocities , a great les son was learned from Le ipzig. The 
Un ited Nat ions could not trus t any nat ion to try i t s  own 
leadera . To a nat ion its leaders may be heroe s ,  whi le to 
the out s ide world they may be cr iminals . Too, it tr ials were 
70 "Acquittals That Convic t Germany, " l££• �. , p. 11. 
71 "German Justice , "  Literarz Dise s t ,  xLIX, June 25 , 
1921 , P • 10. 
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t o  be held at all, they had t o  be held qui ckly, be fore evidence 
was lo s t ,  wi tne s s e s  died or disappeared, and pub lic demand 
for such trials c ooled . The Le1pz i g  triala als o  warned against 
any pr ocedure except an honest and fair one . 
CHAPTER II 
PRELUDE TO NUREMBERG 
Early in World War II , those governme nts allied against 
Hi tler, later called the United Nat ions , began to formula te 
the ir war and peace aims . One of the foremo st of these aims 
was the prosecution and punishment of persons charged with . 
war crimes . This moveme nt gained momentum when Hitler over­
ran a large part ot Europe . 
The earliest statement by an offic ial was the pronounce­
ment concerning such prosecut ion by Pre s ident Eduard Benes 
of the Czechoslovakian Government-in-Exile in Apr il, 1941, in 
which he declared : 
An essential c ondition ot a peac e based upon really 
moral pr inciples will be a de termined ce nsuring ot the 
barbarity and criminality ot the totalitarian regime s ,  
and an ac tual, and a s  far a s  possible , general, cor­
rection of all the injurie s which have been done to 
individuals and nat ions , and the polit ical puni shment 
of those who are respons ible for this war . l 
Perhaps , Benes had in mind the type of punishment admini s tered 
to Napoleon Bonaparte when he was banished to st . Helena . 
In September , 1941, General Wladyslaw Sikorski , the 
Polish Prime Minis ter, made the following comment on German 
outrages in Poland : "The perpetrators ot those crimes must 
1 Eduard Bene s ,  "The New Central Europe , "  Journal ot ........ ..... ...... -Ce ntral European Aftairs , I, April, 1941 , p .  4 .  
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be punished as they deserve . The day will c ome when Hitler ' s  
hangmen will pay tor these crimes . "2 Leaders of the small s tates 
were thus the f irst to demand that war criminals be brought 
to jus tice of some sort . 
Even before the entry of the United State s into the war , 
President Roosevelt declared in October , 1941 : 
The practice ot executing scores of innocent hos tages 
in reprisal tor isolated attacks on Germans in coun­
tries temporarily under the Nazi heel revolts a world 
alread7 inured to suffering and brutality.  • • • 
These are the acta of desperate men who know in their 
hearts that they cannot win. Prighttulnes s  can never 
bring peace to Europe . It only sows the seeds ot 
hatred which will one daJ bring teartul re tribut1on. 3 
Winston Churchill echoed this sentiment in the same 
month when he denounced the Nazi butcherie s in France : "These  
c old-blooded execut ions of innoc ent people will only recoil 
upon the savages who order and execute them. • • • Retribution 
tor these crimes must henceforward take its place among the 
major purposes of the war . "4 
-
Support of Great Britain and the Uni ted States tor the 
prosecut ion ot war crtmes heralded the approach of Nuremberg 
and assured Europe ' s  oppressed peoples that their oppres sors 
would be held accountable for their acts . . .. . .  . . . . . . .  : � � .. ·::·.� ·�  . . . .. . 
2 War and Peace Aima , Special Supplement to No . I to 
the Unite�at!Ons Review;-January 30, 1943, p. 31 . (Here­
after cited as War and Peace Alma . ) - - -
3 �. , p .  31. 
4 Ib id. , p.  31. 
-
: · · ·· : . : :· · ·� . . .. 
. � · · ·  ' 
The first Inter-Allied ac tion concerning the prosecution 
or war criminals came in Janua�, 1942 , when representatives 
of the Government-in-Exile of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Free 
France, Greece,  Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
and Yougoslavia met in London and framed the Inter-Allied 
Resolut ion on German War Crimea . The Res olut ion contained 
among ita statements the followi ng : 
3.  The undersigned representatives • • •  plac e amongst 
the ir princ ipal war alma punishment through the 
channel of organized just ice ot tho se guilty and 
respons ible for these ( lis ted before 1n the text) 
crimea , whether they have ordered them, perpetrated 
them or in any way part ic ipated in them. 
4. The unders igned representatives determine • • • 
that ( a) those guilty and respons ible, what ever 
their nat ionality, are sought to�, handed over to 
justice and judged ; (b) that sentences pronounced 
are carried out . o  
Various delegates, commenting on the Res olution, were of 
one voice in praise of ita _ acceptance .  w. Sikorski, the Polis h 
delegate said : 
The Declaration resolutely turns international law in 
a new d1reotion. • • • It expresses the princ iple of 
united repression of ac ts whic h normally would be con­
sidered crimes  against the ' c ommon law • if they had 
been committed in peace time, and which will not re st 
unpuni shed on the pretext that they were c ommitted in 
wartime . 6 
-
5 "Allied Resolution on German War Crime s, " Inter­
Allied Review, II, JanuarJ 15 , 1942 ,  p. 2 .  
6 Inter-Allied Review, II, February 15 , 1942,  p. 33 . 
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The words of H. Pierlot, Belgian delegate , emphas ized 
the just character of the Resolution: 
They ( the Nat ions s igning the Resolut ion )  are entering 
into a mutual agreement to apply just sanc t ions to war 
crimea . No matter how severe the nece s s ities of war 
may be , c ivilized nat ions have nevertheless recognized 
and proclaimed rules which every bellige�ent ought to 
obey • • • •  7 
General de Gaulle , French member ot the conference, 
remembering the Le ipzig trials had this to say of the Resolution: 
"We demons trate our f1� intention to see to it that al l  the 
guilty p�ties • • • should not be allowed to evade their jus t  
punishment a s  did those o f  the other w� . nS 
E.  Tsouderos ,  Greek delegate , thought of the Resolution 
in terms ot the superior orders doc trine : "Henceforth, butchers , 
gaolers Liic� and looters of every kind will no longer be 
allowed to individually elude their responsibilities on the 
spec ious pretext that they were ac ting under orders from above . "9 
The Royal Yugoslav Government-in-Exile set forth its 
c onvict ion to retain this Resolution as one of i ts chief war· 
aims : •The culprits should be certain • • • that they will 
have to expiate all the ir crimea after the day of vic torr • 
• • • We place definitely among our war aims juat punishment 
tor these crimes . nlO 
7 · Ibid, 
-
8 Ib id. , 
- . . 
9 Ib id. , 
- . 
10 Ibid. , 
-
P• :3:3 . 
p . 33 . 
P• 3�. 
P• 34 .  
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J .  Beoh, Luxembourg delegate , was the tir s t  to sugges t  
using national law a s  a bas is for trying certain war cr1minals . 
He thus gave utterance to the implications of others when he 
said: "The guilty will be liable to the laws of the countries 
wherein their cr ime bas been committed. • • • The repre ssion 
ot such cr1me must be organized on an internati onal bas i s . nll 
T .  Wold, Norwegian de legate, expressed the feeling that 
unless the Nazis were brought to trial western civilizat ion 
would perish: " It will be quite impos s ible to maintain com­
munities b ased on freedom and respect for · law it the Naz i  
criminals do not meet their doom and receive the punishment 
they deserve . •l2 
-
The governments ot Great Britain, the United States , 
and the Soviet Union, approved the Resolut ion and sent repre­
sentatives to sit. in on the negotiations . Much ot this Reso­
lut ion and the statements of the delegate s framing it were 
incorporated in the Moscow Declaration on Atroc itie s  which 
Britain, the United States ,  and the Sovie t  Union proclaimed 
in November , 1943. 
The first official Russ ian sentiment on punishment for 
war crimea was expres sed in Apr il, 1942, in these words ot 
. .  
11 Ibid . ,  P •  34 . 
-
12 Ib id. , P •  35 .  
-
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Molo tov : "The Hi tle� Gove�nment and its accomplices will not 
escape the stern �espons ibility and deserved punishment for 
all their unheard-of crimes committed against the people s ot 
the Union of Sovie t Soc ial1at Republics and against all freedom­
loving peoplea . "l3 
Uni ted States offic ialdom made its voice heard through 
ae•eral prominent commentators on the sub jec t .  In May, 1942, 
Adolf A. Be�le , J� . ,  As sis tant Secretary of State, made a speech 
in which he hinted at trying German organiza tions : "The indi­
vidual Ge s tapo agents , Blac k Troopers , and othe�s • • • must 
be held to account . " He also advocated the jus t treatment of 
those Germans who had treated their conquered peoples wi th 
mercy : "Acc ount should also be taken of those occasional 
instances in Which the Germans in occupying countries have 
behaved with honor and �espect • • • •  The fate of these me n 
mus t be determined by their own deeda . nl4 Sumner Welles,  
� 
Under-Secretary of State ,  voiced his opini on in the same months 
"Voices ot the men who w ill make our victory poss ible wi ll de­
mand that justice be done, inexorable and swift ly to those 
· individuals • • • that can truly be held ac countable tor the 
catastrophe into which they have plunged the human race . nl5 
13 War and Peace Aims , I, P •  32 .  
- - -
l4 ' Ibid. , p .  32 . 
- -
15 �· · p .  32 . 
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New outbursts of Naz i  feroc i ty in Poland invoked the 
following comments by eminent Poles . Sikorski said : "The 
perpetrators of these crimes must be brought to account ; this 
princ iple mus t become the guid�ng policy of the Allies, nl6 
� 
and on the following day the . Polish Minister of Informat ion, 
Stanislaw Stronski, declared : "It is the inflexible deter­
mination ot all the world • • • that f�ll retribution must and 
will be executed for each and every crime committed. nl1 
Jan Masaryk, a prominent Czech, speaking in June on the 
anniversary of the German destruc t ion of the town or Lidice ,  
voiced the determination o r  the C zech people : "Those who were 
guilty or those crimes shall be punished according to the law 
of God and man. nl8 
On July 17, Pres ident Roosevelt again vo1ced his con­
victions : "The American people not only sympath1 ze with all 
victims of Nazi crime s ,  but will hold the perpetrators or the se 
crimes to s tr ic t  acc ountability in a day or reckoning which 
will surely come , nl9 and on the following August 21, he stated 
the official governmental view of the Nazi war crimes,  which 
was a repetition of the views of Bech of Luxembourg: 
16 Ibid. , 
-
17 Ibid . ,  
- - . 
18 Ibid. , 
19 Ib1d. , 
-
P •  32. 
p . 32 . 
p .  32 . 
P •  33. 
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It i s  the purpose of the gove�nment of the United States 
• • • to make app�opriate us e of the informat ion and 
evidence in respec.t to these barbaric crimes of the 
invaders. It seems only fair that they should have 
this warning that the time will come when they shall 
have to stand in courts ot law in the very countries 
which they are now oppre ss ing and answer for the ir 
acta . 20 
With the sentiment of the Allied world overwhelmingly 
in favor of bringing the Nazis  to the bar of justic e ,  Great 
Britain and the United states, together with other governments 
aet up a oo�saion for gathering evidence to be used against 
the Nazis.  Speaking on October 15, 1g42 , Roosevelt proclaimed 
to the world : 
I now declare 1t to be the intent ion of this Government 
that the succes sful close ot the war shall include pro­
vis ion tor the su�render t o  the United . Nations of war 
criminals • • • •  With a view to establishing �esponst­
b ility ot the guilty individuals through the c ollec tion 
and asses sment ot all available evidence,  this Govern­
ment is  p�epared to cooperate with the British and 
other Governments in establi shing a United Nat ions 
Commiss ion for the Invest igation of War Crimes . 
The numbe� of persons eventually found guilty wi ll 
' undoubtedly be extremely small compared t o  the total 
enemy populat ions. It is not the intention ot this 
Government or ot the Governments as s oc iated � h  us to 
resort to mass reprisals . It is our intent ion that 
just and sure punishment shall be me ted out to the 
�ingleaders respons ible tor the organized murder ot 
thousands ot innocent persona and the c ommiss ion ot 
atroc ities which have violated every tenet ot the 
Chris tian taith. 21 
20 F�anklin D .  Roosevelt , "Statement by the Pres ident , "  
Department 2! State Bullet in, VII, August 22 , 1942 , P• 7 10. 
. . 
21 Inter-Allied Review, II, October 15 , 1942, p .  2 34 . 
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Sir John Simon, Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, s igni­
f ied British adherence to e s tablishing the War Crimes Commission, 
when he s tated in a debate in the House of Lords on October 8 : 
If, there is go ing to be,  atter the victory ot the 
United Nations, due punishment ot these abominable 
war crimes • • • there are two prerequis ites without 
which no tribunal for dealing wi th war crimes can 
effectively act • • • •  The one is the recording ot 
evidence, and the other is securing the pr esence of 
the accused at the trial . 
Firstly, then, as to the collection ot the necessary 
evidence . The proposal is  to set up with the least 
poss ible delay a United Nations Commission for the 
Investigation of War Crimes . The Commission will 
investigate war crimes against nationals of the Uni ted 
Nations, recording the testimony available, and the 
Commission will report from t ime to time to the govern­
ments of �hose nations cases in which such crimes appear 
to have been c ommitted, naming and identifying wherever 
pos s ible the persona respons ible . The Commiss ion should 
direct ita attention in part icular to organi zed atroci­
tie s • • • whether as ring-leaders or as  actual perpe­
trators, for atroc it ies . 
Our object • • • .  is not to undertake or encourage mas s  
executions but t o  fix these horrible crimes upon those 
enemy individuals who are really respons ible , and who 
ought to be dealt with as criminals in respect to them • 
• • • It is  only the carrying out with c omplete impar­
tiality of some such sys tem as this that we could con­
tribute to prevent what would otherwise be s till further 
massacre s ot s till more people. • • .22 
With the exception ot the Soviet Union, all the European 
Allies together with the governments of Australia, South Africa, 
New Zealand, India,  China, and the United States were represented 
22 Sir John Simon, "Statement by the Lord Chancellor , "  
Inter-Allied Review, II, October 15 , 1942, pp . 234-5 . 
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on the Commi s s ion. No t only was the Commi s s ion inter ested 
in gathering evide nce and inve s t igating al l cases referred 
to it by any of the United Nations , but als o n ami ng, where 
pos s ible , those whom the Commi s s ion cons idered re spons ib le for 
atroc itie s . 23 
Roosevelt , speaking aga in 1n Oc tober, 1942 , made i t  
perfectlr clear that the United Nations did not c ontemplate 
justice !a ma s se aga ins t the German s : "We have made 1t en-
� 
tirely clear that the Un i ted Nat i ons seek no mas s repri sals 
aga ins t the populat i ons of Germany • • • •  But the ring leaders 
and the ir brutal henchme n must be named, and apprehended and 
tr ied i n  acc ordanc e  with the judic ial proc e s s  of criminal law. n24 
Molotov re iterated the offic ial Rus s ian view on Oc tober 
14 when in an offic ial pronouncement he stated the followi ng : 
The Sovi et Government • • • declares �or t he whole 
world to hear • • •  that the criminal Hi tler ite govern­
ment and all its ac c omplices mus t  and shall pay the 
deserved severe penalty tor the crimes committed by 
them against the peoples of the Sov iet Un ion and 
against al l freedom-loving peoples . 
The Soviet Government appr ove s and share s le gitimate 
des ire • • • to insure that those gui lty of crime s are 
turned over to just ice and tha t sentences that w ill 
be pas sed be carried into effec t .  The Soviet Govern­
ment 1 s  prepared to support prac t ical measures towards 
this a im taken by the All ied and fr iendly governments . 
• • • 
23 Anthony Eden ,  " Spe ech in the House of Commons , " War 
� Peac e A!!!• VI , October 15 ,  1945 , p .  15 . ---
24 !!£ � Peac e !!!!• I, P• 34. 
The Soviet Gove�nme nt cons ide� e it ne ces sa�y that any 
one of the leade�s of fasc i s t  Ge�many • • • be brought 
to trial without delay before a spec ial mil i tary trib­
unal and punished wi th all the severi ty of cr1m1nal 
law . 25 
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In Oc tober , 1942, the Polish Government-i n-Exile in 
London pas sed a Decree Conc erning Puni shme nt of German Cr imes , 
which inc luded these provis ions : 
1. C�tminal respons ib ility attache s to those pers ons 
belonging to the German Re ich or to s tates allied 
or c o nnec ted with i t  • • •  tor all cr ime s commi tted 
after August 31, 1939. 
2 .  All ac ts co� t ted in v iolat ion or internat i onal 
1-w • • • will be puni shed by impr is onment . 
3. Punishment inflic ted will be increased to lite 
impri s onment . or death penalty it such ac tion caused 
death, e tc . 
4 .  Pers ons giving orders tor cr iminal ac t s  will be 
equally sub j ect to pufti shme nt with the pers ons 
pertor�ng such ae ts . 6 
Thus Poland, the first vlct 1m of the war , by le gi slat ion placed 
the trial of German war cr1minals on the agenda for immediate 
ac t ion at the clo se of the war . Thi s document sets down those 
to whom respons ib ility is attached, and is valuab le trom thi s  
. 
s tandpo i nt .  Unila teral ac tion by Allied governments in deal-
ing wi th those perpetrat ors of crime s on the 1r own s o il has 
been looked upon with favor, not only by laymen, but by the 
25 v. Molo tov, " stat ement on War Crime s , "  Int er-All ied 
Revie�, II, October 15, 1942, p .  236. 
26 Polish Decree Conce rning Puni shme nt ot German Crime s ,  
!!£ and Pe ace Aims , I,  p .  36 .  
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internat ional lawyers and publicists who contend that there 
is a firm legal bas is for thi s type of trial under existing 
internat ional law. 
The year 1942 was ended with the adopt ion of the Jo int 
Declaration of the United Nat ions on Jewish Wrongs . This document 
was proclaimed on December 17 , and in the final paragraph are 
found these words : "They ( the United Nations ) reaffirm their 
solemn resolution to insure that those responsib le for these 
crimea shall not escape retribution, and to pres s on with the 
necessary pract ical measures to this end. "27 
Showing that the work of the United Nations War Crtmes 
Co�ss ion was progress ing, H . Pierlot, Prime Minister of the 
Belgian Government-in-Exile, broadcast the following speech to 
his nation: 
The inve s tigation procedure has begun. The Fact Find­
ing Commiss ion • • •  is already drawing up a list of 
the guilty and setting forth their misdeeds . All 
attempts on their part to escape punishment will be 
in vain. Germany will not be big enough to hide them. 
As for the neutral countries , the new international 
law will not allow them to retuse extradition, and 
they will realize, moreover, that it 1s in their 
interest as well as ours to cooperate in securing 
the establishment of a true order in human soc iety, 
based on law and legality . 28 
27 Joint Declaration by the United Nat ions on Jewish 
Wrongs , Uni ted Nations Review, III, January 15, 1943, p. 1. 
28 !!£ � Peace A!!!• II, December 1, 1943, p.  23. 
And so we see that as early as 1943, the neutral c ountrie s were 
be ing warned that the refuge give n  by Holland to Kaiser Wilhelm II 
after World War I must not be extended t o  Ax i s  le aders . Thi s 
pos i tion was re iterated by Pre s ident Ro osevelt on July 30 whe n 
he dec lared : 
I f i nd i t  difficult to believe tha t any neutral country 
would give asylum to or extend prote c t i on t o  any of them. 
I c an only say that the Government ot the Un it ed Stat es 
would re gard t he ac t ion by a neutral government in 
afford ing asylum to Axis leaders or their tools as 
inc ons is tent with the pr inciples for which t he Un ited 
Nat i ons are f i ghting. • • . 29 
The first c oncerted Big Three ac t i on toward t he pro s e cu­
tion of war cr iminals came at the Moscow C onf erence , composed 
of repres entative s ot the Un ited States , Britain, and the 
Sovie t  Un ion, which sat from October 19 to 30, 1943. 30 Out 
of this Conferenc e came the Mo scow Declarat ion on Atroc i t ies ; 
two important provi s ions of this Declarat i on were : 
• • • Tho se German offic ers and men and members of the 
Naz i  Party who have been responsible for or have taken 
a c o nsent i ng part in the above atroc i t i e s ,  massacre s ,  
and execut ions wi ll b e  se nt back t o  the c ountries in 
which the ir ab ominab le deeds were done in order that 
they may be judged and puni shed acc ordi ng to the laws 
of the se liberated countrie s and ot the tre e  govern­
ments whi ch will be erec ted there in . 
The above dec laration is w ithout pre jud i c e  to the ease 
of German criminals , whos e  offenses have no part icular 
29 !!£ � Peace !!!!• III , April 30, 1944 , p .  26. 
30 Ib1d. , p .  465 • ............ 
geographical localizat ion and who wi ll be punished 
by joint dec 1 s 1on of the government s of the All 1e s . 31 
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An Anglo-Saxon c oncept of jus t ic e  of long s tandi ng was 
incorporated into the dec larat ion--re turning the ac cused for 
tr ial to t he scene of his cri.- . The persona charged with 
� . 
crimes in oc c upied countries would be tr ied by t�e local author­
itie s  for localized offenses or atroc ities against persons , 
or property, usually of c 1vil1ans of countries formerly oc cup ied 
by Germany. 32 At the same t 1me th1 s is a denial of a long­
e stablished prac t ic e  or grant ing armies extra-territorial 
priv ileges . 
Echoing the sent iment of the dec laration, Marshal Stalin 
made the following statement on November 6 on the anniversary 
of the Oc tober Revolutions : "our people will not forgive the 
German fiends tor thes e crime s . We shall make the German crimi­
nals answer for all the ir misdeeds • • • •  "33 
Sir John Simon, speaking in the House of Lords on Dec ember 
7, 1943 , admoni shed the Uni ted Nat ions to be very careful in 
the trial of war criminals when he said : "Let us s train to do all 
that we can to punish crime where we find i t  but , first and 
31 Statement Signed by Pre s ident Roosevelt , Prime Min1 ster 
· churchill, and Premi er Stalin Regarding Atroc i t i e s ,  Con�es s ional 
· Rec ord, 78 Congre s s , 1 Se s s ion (Washington : United !ta es 
Government Print ing Office , 1943) , v, 89, pp . 8920-1. 
32 Department of Stat e ,  Tr ial of War Criminals ( Washi ngton : 
United States  Government Printing Otf!Ce;-!945) , p .  2. 
33 !!t � Peace !!!!• III,  p .  28 . 
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las t ,  let us be sure that the actual indiv idual i s  proYed to 
be gui lty of the c rime with Which he ia charged . n 34 
. 
The year 1944 saw further German atroc i ties c ommi tted, 
ac companied by mo re Allied prot e s t s  and warnings . The Be lgian 
Government-i n-Exile in answer to new Nazi outburs ts is sued the 
following off ic ial s tatement on January 18 ot that year s "This 
s i tuation compels us onc e more to warn the German authori ties 
• • • that the brutalities inflic ted on Belgians • • • will 
be the sub jec t ot adequat e  penalt les • • • •  n35 The Norwegian 
Mini ster ot Jus t ice , Te rje Wold, as early as January 25 1  advo­
cated the e s tablishment of an international c ourt to try the 
Na z i s  betore the final vic tory was achieved : 
Es tabli shment of interna t ional c our ts is indispe nsable 
and they mus t  be set up before the armi s t ic e ,  because 
numerous difficul t i e s  which attach to the es tabli lh• 
ment of such courts will take time to re s olve , and 
we cannot de lay the trial of war crtmi nals in an t ic i ­
pating the ir ere c t i o n. One o f  the obs t acles to be 
surmounted i s  c ompos i t ion ot c our ts • • • •  This cannot 
be done unless repre sentative s of the Un ited Na t i ons , 
armed with their governme nts ' authority, me e t  toge ther 
in order to reach the neces sary dec is ions . 36 . 
Thus not only was an int ernational c ourt advocated, but the 
pre senc e of all Uni ted Nat ions members in its founding was 
urged . As it developed only the Big Four part ic ipat ed in 
the Nuremberg trials . 
34 Ib id. , p .  29 . 
-
35 Ib id � , IV, P •  18 . 
-
36 Ib id . P •  18 . _ ,  
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In March, 1944, Roosevelt is sued another- warning t o  the 
Axis when he said : 
It is therefore fitt ing that we should aga in proc laim 
our determinat ion that none who part icipate i n  the se 
tao ts of s avagery shall go unpuni ahed . • • • That 
warning applies not only to the leaders but als o  to 
the tunc t ionaries and subordinates in German7 and in 
the satelli te countr ies • • • • All who share the gui lt 
shall share the puni shment . S7 
The same month, Anthony Eden made the followi ng speech in the 
Hous e ot C ommons : "His Majesty ' s Government • • • can only 
repeat the ir de te s tation ot Germany ' s  cr imea and the ir deter­
minat ion that all thos e guilty ot them shall be brought to 
jus t ioe . " 38 Roosevelt in his me s sage to Congrea s  on June 12 
-
repeated hia de termination to puni sh the guilty : " • • •  We 
have made c lear our determi nation to punish all part ic ipant & 
in the se ac t a  of savagery ( speaking or ill-treatment ot 
minoritie s ) . •S9 
. 
C orde ll Hull gave another warning to neutral governments 
in Sept ember, 1944 : 'The Department is continuing to impre s s  
. 
upon those governme nts whose policy has not ye t been clearly 
s tated the importance wh ich it attache s t o  the taking or ade­
quate measures to insure that Axia war criminals do no t find 
asylum in the ir countries . n40 
37 Ib id . , p .  19 . 
-
38 Ibid. ' P• 19 . 
-
39 Ib id . 1 P • 20. -
40 Ibid . 1 
-
v. p. 14 . 
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The following day, Ter j e  Wold of Norwar, dec lared that 
the war cr tm1nals should not be treated in a manner that had 
the odor of a vic tor ' s  revenge : "It is imp or tant to br lng 
the war crtmlnala into court and to punish them, not as a 
victor ' s  ac t ot ve ngeance against the conquered , but because 
ot those goals and ideals tor which we are fighting thi s  war . 
• • 
The s tatement s and sent iments of the Allied world came 
into fruition in 1945 . In sumadng up the views ot Roosevelt , 
Jo1eph c .  Grew, UAder-Secretary of State, made the followi ng 
remarka s 
Officers of the Department of State • • • have worked 
out propoaala tor the realizat ion of the ob ject ives 
s tated bJ the Pres ident . • • • Tbe7 provide tor the 
punishment ot German leader• and the ir as soc i ate s for 
the ir respons ib ility for the whole-broad crtminal enter­
prise devised and executed with ruthle s s  di sregard 
of the very foundation of law and morality, inc luding 
offens e s  wherever commltted agains t the rule s  ot war 
and against minority e lements_ • • • and individuala . 42 
The same day, Johan Nygaardavold, Norwegian Prime Mini s ter, 
made the following comme nt regarding s uperior orders :  "He who 
i ssues the order to start war i s  jus t as l iable to punishme nt 
as the one carrying out the ordera . ••3 
41 Ibid . , P• 15 .  Wold doe1 not give the remedy, however, 
to keep the-irials from be ing ac ta of vengeance, and as to the 
goal1 and ideals of this war , he does not enumerate concre tel7 
what ther are . 
42 United Nat ions Review, V, P •  109 . 
43 !!.£ e . Peace !!!!!.• VI, P • 15 .  
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On February 11, the Declaration ot Yalta was publi shed , 
and in it are the following words which re itera ted the Mo scow 
Declaration or 1943 :  " I t  i a  our inflexible purpose t o  • 
bring all war cr iminals to just and sure puni shment . "44 
-
• • 
In Kay, 1945 , the first c oncrete act ion was proposed 
when Pre s ident Truman, who had succeeded Roosevelt 1n April, 
made the tollowlng pronouncement s 
• • • Jus t ice Robert H. Jac kson • • • has accepted 
de s ignat ion as Chiet ot C ounsel tor the United States 
in preparing and prosecuting the charge s of atroc ities 
and war crimes against such or the leaders or the 
European Axis Powers • • •  as the Uni ted States may 
agree with any ot the Uni ted Nat ions to bring to trial 
betore an internat ional mili tary tribunal. 
Pursuant to the Moscow Declaration ot November 1, 1943, 
all war criminals ,  agains t whom there is suffic ient 
proof or pers onal participat ion in spec ltic atroc i t ies , 
are to be returned to the countries where their cr imes 
were c ommitted , to be judged and puni shed bJ the se 
countries themselves • • • •  
There are lett , however, the cases ot other war criminals 
• • • part icularlJ the major war cr iminals and the ir 
princ ipal agents and accessorie s ,  whose offenses have 
no part icular geographi cal locali zat io n .  
I hope and expec t that a n  internat ional military tribu­
nal will soon be organized to try this s ec ond category 
or war cr1mlnals . It w lll b e  Jus t ice Jac ks on ' s  respon­
s ib ility to represent the United St ates in preparing 
and pres enting the case against these criminals before 
such mil itary tribunal . 
It i a  our ob jec tive to e s tablish as soon as poss ible 
an internat ional mil itary tr ibunal ; and to provide a 
trial proc edure which will permit no evas ion or delay-­
but one which is in keeping with our tradit ion of tair­
nes a  towards tho se accused ot cr1me . 45 
44 12!a· v, p. 105 . 
45 Ibid . ,  PP• 17-8 • 
......... 
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Thi s a c t i on showed and empha s i zed tha t the interna ti onal court 
wa s to be a military trib una l ;  howe ver ,  i t  wa s to try civil 
a s  well as mi litary pers onnel . 
De veloping thi s de claration, Judge Samue l I .  Rosenman, 
repre senting Pre s i dent Truman, laid proposals b e fore Bri t i sh, 
French, and Rus s ia n .  delega t e s  on Ma y 10 at the San Franc i s co 
Conference call ing for the e s tabli shment of an Int erna t i onal 
Military Trib unal . Comment ing on Judge Ro s enman ' s  mi s s ion, 
the Sta t e  Depar tment s a id tha t the purpose wa s not only to 
arrange the trials of ma j or European war crimina ls b ut. a l s o  
to adop t procedur e . The s tateme nt continued tha t propos a l s  
were • t o  organi ze a machinery and s e t  up a procedure whi ch 
will as sure a jus t and expedi t i ous trial to ' the ma jor indi-
viduals and to the organiza tions a c cused of a tro ci tie s and war 
crimes in Europe , b ut one whi ch will permi t no eva s i on, undue 
delay or di latory tactica . •46 
The Amer ican pol icy hi t a snag whe n the Bri t i sh Govern-
� 
ment came out with a stat ement fa vor ing execut i ve a c t i on f or 
s uch me n a s  Grand Admiral Doenit z and Goering ,  b a s ing i t s  eon­
elus i ons on the fa ct tha t interna ti onal law did no t de al wi th 
heads of s ta t e . 47 To br ing the British into line , Jacks on, 
46 !!! � Time s ,  May 1 1 ,  1945, p .  13.  
47 Ib id. , May 17 , 1945 ,  P .  1 .  
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accompanied by prominent American juris ts , went to London to 
confer with Br itish government heads and as he said, to com­
ple te arrangeme nt s •ror examinat ion of tmportant witne s se s ,  
documents , report s ,  captured orders ,  and other evidence that 
might be used in the tr ial or the major war criminals before 
an international mil itary tribunal . n48 
The success of his mi s s ion was revealed on May 30, when 
Prime Mini ster Churchill announced in the House or Commons the 
appointment of Attorney General Sir David Maxwe ll Fyfe as the 
Br it ish representat ive to work with Jacks on . BY this appo int­
ment the Bri tish Government abandoned its earlier des ire to 
deal with the major war cr �inals by execut ive dec ision ins tead 
of by trial. 49 Report ing to Pres ident Truman on June ? ,  Jackson 
out lined the bas ic fea tures of the plan or prosecution on which 
he was prepar ing the case or the Un ited States . As t o  the 
necessitJ tor holding the trial Jac kaon said this : •The American 
. 
ease is be ing prepared on the assumpt ion tha t an inescapab le 
reapons ib ilitJ rests upon this c ountry to c onduc t an inquiry • 
into the culpability of those whom there 1 s  probable cause to 
accuse of atroe itie s . n50 
48 1 Ibid . , Kay 23, 945 , p .  13 • 
......... 
• • 
49 Dana A .  Schmidt , "Briton Appointed to War-Crime Body, • 
!!! !2£! Times , May 30, 1945, P •  12. 
50 Department of State , £2• �. , pp . 2-3 . 
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As to the defendants , Jackson wished not only to accuse 
a large number of individuals and offic ials who were in authoritJ 
in the government ,  in the military es tablishment ,  inc luding 
the General Staff, and in the financ ial, industr ial, and economic 
life of Germany, but also proposed to establish the criminal 
character ot several voluntary organizations such as the Ges tapo 
and the Schutzs taffeln. 5l Commenting on the Naz1 mas ter plan, 
Jac kson said:  
Our case agains t the major defendants is  concerned 
• • • not with individual barbarities and pervers ions . 
The groundwork of our cas e must be fac tually authentic 
and c onst itute a well-documented hi s t ory of what we 
are convinced was a grand, concerted pattern to incite 
and commit the aggress ions and barbarit ies which have 
shocked the world.52 
The legal charges were set down in three parts ,  name ly : 
( a )  Atroc ities  and offenses against persons or propertr 
const ituting violati ons of Internat ional Law, inc lud­
ing the laws, rules ,  and c ustoms of land and naval 
warfare • • • •  
(b ) Atroc ities and offenses , including atroc ities and 
persecutions on rac ial or religious grounds , co� 
mitted since 1933 • • • •  
(c ) Invas ions of other countr ies and init iat ion of 
wars of aggress ion 1n violation of International 
Law or treat 1ea . 53 
51 �. , P • 4 . 
52 Ib id . , 
___..... P• 5.  
53 Ib id . , 
.......... PP• 7-8 • 
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In comment ing on the third charge , Jackson gave several 
internat ional agreement s as bas is tor his theory regarding 
aggre s s ive war . Foremo s t  was the Briand-Kellogg Pac t ot 1928 
o� which Germany was a s ignatory. Other agreements included 
the Geneva Prot ocol or 1924, s igned by forty-eight governments 
which declared that a war ot aggres s ion was an international 
crime , but this never became law because or British rejection; 
Res olut ion or the Eighth Assembly ot the League ot Nations in 
1927 ; and the Res olution or the Sixth Pan-Amer ic an Conference 
ot 1928, which used the s ame wording as the Geneva Protocol. 54 
As to the duration ot the trial, Jackson des ired that 
the rec ord be made c omplete and accurate ins tead or sacrific­
ing Justice tor speed, saying that it was more 1mportant that 
world op1n1on support the trials rather than condemn them. 
Ending his report, Jackson said :  "The trial mus t  not b e  pro-
. 
trae ted in duration by anything that is obs truct ive or dila-
tory, but we must see that it is fair and deliberat ive and not 
discredi ted in t imes to come by any mob ap1rit . n55 
Supplement ing the cooperation between the Brit ish and 
the Americans , a c onfere nce was called at London to incorporate 
Rus s ian and French sanc t ion to the war trials . Jackson and 
Maxwell pyre c onst ituted the American and Br it ish representatives 
54 Ibid. , PP • 9·10 • 
........ 
56 �. ,  PP • 11-12 . 
while the Sov ie t Un ion s e nt I .  T .  Niki tche nko and France , 
Robert Folco . Definite limitat ions were set on the ext ent 
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to which the accused Na z is would be per-mit ted t o  summon heads 
of other gove rnments as witnes ses . Ribbentrop, Goering, He s s ,  
and others would not be privile ged to demand a parade of heads 
ot other governments , including Allied Governme nts , before 
the court to support the ir cl aims of extenuat ing c 1rcums tancea . 56 
By July 7, the Four Powers were in ac c ord upon three 
princ iples : ( 1 )  the ac cused should be enti tled to a fair 
hearing ; ( 2 )  the accused should have the right to introduce 
evidence, etc . on the ir behalf ;  and ( 3 )  the tr1als s hould 
not be sub je c t  to dilat ory delays through ob struc t ionist tac­
tics on the part of the defendants . 57 
By the middle of the month anothe r ob s tac le had been 
overc ome . The United States and Br itain agre ed to the Rus s ian 
and French sys tems by which the test imony of a defendant is 
mandator7. In exchange for this c once s s ion, Anglo-American 
proc edure , by which the accus ed is presumed t o  be innoc ent 
unt il proved guilty, was accepted by Rus s ia and France . 58 
56 !!! � Times , June 25 , 1945 , P• 7 .  
57 Ibid . , July 7 , 1945 , p .  5 • 
........... 
5S Charles E .  Egan, 8War Cr iminals Mus t  Take Stand, " 
!!! � Time s ,  July 14, 1945 , p. 4.  
At the end of JulJ, it  looked as if the negot iations 
would never end, and Jac kson presented an ultimatum to the 
Four-Power Committee , stating that unless  the deliberat ions 
were completed in a week, the United States  would withdraw ; 
giving the hint that hi s country might hold a trial or ita 
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own, as the major port ion of the high Nazis were in American 
hands . The main stumbling block was Jackson ' s  own ins istence 
upon the points that aggres s ive war be des ign�ted as a crime 
and that the code drafted by the Committee define aggress ive 
warfare . Perhaps , Rus sia was afraid that if this were included, 
her own aggress ive act ion dur ing the t1rst Russo-Finnish W ar  
should be aired in internat ional cirolea . 59 
In addit ion to his ultimatum, Jackson vis ited Potsdam, 
the seat or a Big �hre e Conference , to present his views that 
the war crime negot iat ions had become too protracted . 60 The 
result was a joint statement issued by the Big Three which said s 
The three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring 
these criminals to swift and sure justic e .  They hope 
that the negot iations in London will result in apeedJ 
agreement be ing reached £or this purpos e,  and they 
regard it as · a  matter ot great importance tha t the 
trial or those major oriminala should begin at the 
earliest pos s ible date . The firs t l i3t of defendants 
will be published before September 1.61 
59 Charles E. Egani "Jackson May �it Over Lag in Trials , "  
!!! !2£! Times, July 31 , 945 . P •  5 .  
60 Clifton Daniel, "Big Three Aid on Trials Gained bJ 
Jackson , " !!! X2£k Times , August 3,  1945 , p�  6 . 
61 New York Times,  August 3, 1945 , p.  8. - - .;;..-;;;;,;;..;;. 
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Thi s de claration, as well as Ja cks on ' s ultima tum, speeded 
up the London negotiat ions , and the day foll owing the Big Three 
s ta tement i t  wa s announced tha t Nuremberg was to be the s cene 
of the trial . I t  wa s to b e  held in the former German Palace 
of Jus t i ce , and the war cr imina l s  w�re to b e  held in the Nuremb erg 
muni cipal j a il dur ing the trial . 62 Thi s c i ty wa s s elected a s  
the s i t e  o f  the trial not only b e ca us e i t  ranks high i n  the 
hi s tory of the Na z i  Party , b ut more importantly b e cause i t s  
court hous e wa s s i tua ted wi thin a large compound, wi th tunne l 
conne c t i ons b e twe en the pri s on and the s c ene ot the tria l . 63 
Addit ional reas ons aros e from the fa ct that Nuremb erg wa s in 
the Ame rican z one of occupa tion and many of the Na z i  leaders 
had s urrendered to Ameri can force s .  In answering the queri e s  
o f  newspapermen, Ja cks on s a id :  "The idea i s  no t to put on a 
show but to hold a trial . "64 
On Augus t 8, the Agre ement for the Es tab l i shment of a n  
Interna ti onal Mil itary Trib unal wa s pub l i shed, tog e ther with 
the Charter of the Interna tiona l Military Tribunal .  "It i s  
no s e cret that thi s protocol repres ented in i t s  ma j or cont ent 
the propos al s  put forward by Jus t i ce Ja cks on on b ehalf of the 
United Stat e s . "65 
62 Ib id . , Augus t 4 , 1945, P •  1 .  
63 John H .  Crider, "Ameri cans DoUb t Tria l s  by September 1 . " 
New York Time s ,  Augus t 5, 1945 , P •  12 .  
- -
64 � � .-T.-i_m .... e .... s ,  Augus t 2 1 ,  1945, p .  1 1 .  
65 Herbert We s chler , " The I s s ue s  o f  the Nur emb erg Trial , "  
Politi cal S c i ence Quar t erly, LXII , P• 12 . 
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The Agreement contained the following Articles : 
Article l••There shall be es tablished atter consultation 
with the Control Counc il for Germanr an 
Internat ional Military Tribunal tor the trial 
ot war c riminals whose offenses have no 
part icular geographical location whether 
they be accused individuallJ or in the ir 
capac ity as members ot organizat ions or groups 
or in both capac it ie s . 
Article 2·-The c onstitution, jurisdiction and functions 
ot the International Military Tribunal shall 
be those set out in the Charter annexed to · 
this  Agreement, which Char ter shall form an 
integral par t of th1s Agreement . 
Article 3--Each ot the signatorie s shall take the nec­
essary s teps to make available for the inves­
tigation ot the charges and trial the ·major 
war criminals detained by them who are to 
be tried by the International Military 
Tribunal. The s ignatories shall also  use 
the ir best endeavors to make available tor 
investigat ion ot the chargee against and the 
trial before the Internat ional Military 
Tribunal such ot the major war cr1m1nals aa 
are not in the territories ot any ot the 
s ignatoriea.  
Article •··Nothing in  this Agreement shall pre judice 
the provis ions es tablished by the Moscow 
Declaration concerning the return of war 
criminals to the countriea where they com­
mitted their crimes . 
Article 5••Any Government of the United Nations may 
adher. to this Agreement by notice given 
through the diplomatic channel to the Govern­
ment of the United Kingdom, who shall inform 
the other signatory and adhering Governme nts 
of each such adherence .  
Article 6·-Nothing in this Agreement shall pre judice 
the jurisdic tion or the powers ot any national 
or occupation court established or to be 
es tablished in any All ied territory or in 
Germany for the tr ial of war cr iminals . 
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Art icle 7--This Agreeme nt shall c ome into force on the 
day of s ignature and shall remain in force 
for the period of one year and shall c on­
t inue thereafter� sub jec t t o  the r ight of 
any s ignatory to give � through the diplomat ic 
channel, one month ' s  not ice of intention to 
terminate i t .  Such terminat ion shall not pre• 
judice any proceedings already t·aken or any 
findings a�5eady made in pursuance of this 
Agreement . 
Attached to the Agreement was the Charter or the Inter­
national Military Tribunal .  This Charter is  divided into sec t ions 
as follows : 
I .  Cons t itut ion of the International Mi litary Tribunal 
Art ic le l·· · . .  There ahall be e s tablished an 
International Military Tribunal tor the 
just and prompt trial and puni shment or 
the major war criminals of the European 
Axis . 
Art icle 2--The Tribunal shall c ons ist of four members , 
each with an alternate . One member and 
one alternate shall be appointed by each 
or the s ignatories . The alternates shall, 
s o  tar as they are able , be present at all 
sess ions • • • •  In case of illness ot any 
member of the Tribunal or his inc apac i ty 
for s ome other reas on to fulfill his 
funct ions , hla alternate shall take h1a 
place . 
Art icle 3--Ne ither the Tribunal, ita members or the ir 
alternates ,  can be challenged by the prose­
cut ion, or by the defendants or the ir 
counsel. 
66 Department of State,  �· !£!• , P• 14 . 
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Ar t icle 4-- ( a )  The pr es ence ot all tour members 
ot the Tr ibunal or the alternate tor any 
absent member shall be ne ces s ary to 
c ons titut e the quorum. 
( b )  'l'he members ot the Tribunal shall 
• • • agree among them. e lve s upon the 
s e le ct ion trom the ir numb er ot a Pre s i ­
dent • • • •  
( c ) • • •  The Tribunal shall take dec i s io ns 
by a majority vote and in case the vo tes 
are evenly divided, the vote ot the 
Pre s ident shall be dec i s ive &  provided 
always that convic t ions and sentence s 
shall only be imposed by aff irmat ive 
vot ea ot at leaa t three membera ot the 
Tribunal. 
Article 5--In case of need and dependiDg o n  the 
numb er of the mat ters t o  be tried, other 
tr ibunals may be set up . 
II . Jurisdic tion and General Princ iples 
Art icle 6-·The Tribunal • • • ahall have the power 
to try and punish pers ons who • • • coa­
mit ted any ot the following crLmes : ( a ) 
Cr ime s aga inst peace • • • •  (b ) War 
crimes • • • •  ( o )  Crimes agains t humanity. 
• • • 
Article 7- -The ottio ial pos i t io n  ot defendant s ,  
whe ther a s  heads ot s tate or re spons ible 
offic ials in governme nt departmen t s ,  shall 
not be cons idered as tre e ing them from 
respon s ibility or mit igating puni shme nt . 
Article s--The fac t that the defendant ac ted purauant 
to order ot hi s governme nt or ot a super­
ior shall not tree him from respons ib ility, 
but may be cons idered in mi tigat ion ot 
puni shment • • • •  
III . Commi ttee tor the Inve s tigat ion and Pros ecut ion ot Major 
War Criainala 
Article 14•-Each s ignatory shall appoint a chief 
prosecutor . • • • The chiet prose cutors 
shall ac t as a committee tor the followi ng 
purpose s :  
( a )  To agree upon a plan ot each ot the 
chiet prosecutors and his statt, . 
( b )  To settle the tinal des ignation ot 
major war criminals • • • , 
( c ) To approve the indictment • • • , 
( d )  To lodge the indic tment • • •  Wi th 
the Tribunal, 
( e ) . To draw up and recommend to the 
Tribunal • • •  rules ot procedure . 
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Article 15--The chief prosecutors shall • • • also 
undertake the following dut ies : 
( a )  Investigation, collection and pro­
duction • • • ot all necessary evidence,  
( c ) The preliminary examination or all 
necessary witnesses and of the defendant s ,  
( d )  To ac t as prosecutors at the trial . 
• • • 
IV. Pair Trial tor Defendants 
Article 16-·In order to ensure fair trial for the 
defendants the following procedure shall 
be followed : 
( a )  The indictment shall include full 
particulars spec ifying in detail the 
charges against the defendants • • • • 
( b )  During any preliminary examination 
or trial ot a defendant he shall have 
the right to give any explanation rele• 
vant to the charges made against h1m. ( �) A prelLminary examinat ion or a defen­
dant and his trial shall be c onducted in, 
or translated into , a language which the 
defendant understands . 
( d )  A defendant shall have the right to  
conduct his own defense before the Tribunal 
or to have the assistance or counsel. 
( e )  A defendant shall have the right 
through himself or through hi a counsel 
to present evidence at the trial ln sup­
port ot his defense ,  and to cross -examine 
any witness  called bJ the prosecution. 
V. Powers of the Tribunal and Conduct ot the Trial 
Article 17--The Tribunal shall have the power 
( a )  to summon witnesses • • •  , 
(b ) to interrogate any defendant,  
( c )  To require the produc tion ot docu­
me nts • • • , 
{ d )  To adminis ter oaths • • • 1 
( e ) To appoint offic ers for the carrying 
out ot any task. • • • 
Art icle 18--The Tribunal shall 
( a )  Conf ine the tr ial s t ric tly to an 
ex� edi tious hearing • • •  1 
{b ) Take s tric t  measure s to prevent any 
ac tion which will cause unreasonable 
delay . • • • 
Article 19- -The Tribunal shall not be bound by tech• 
nical rules or evidenc e • • • •  
Article 21--The Tribunal shall not require proof ot 
fac t s  of c ommon knowledge . 
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Article 22--The permanent seat of the Tribunal ahall 
be in Berlin . • • • The first tr ial shall 
be held at Nurnberg .  • • • 
Artic le 23--one or more ot the ohi et pro secutors may 
take part in the prosecut ion or each trial . 
• • • 
Article 24- -The proc eedings at the trial shall take 
the following c ourse s  
( a ) The indi c tment shall b e  read in c ourt . 
( b ) The Tr ibunal shall ask each defendant 
whe ther he pleads "guilty" or •no t gu ilty. " 
{ c )  The proaecution shall make an opening 
s tatement . 
( d ) The Tribunal ahall ask the prosecut ion 
and the defense what evidenc e they wi sh to 
s ubmi t to the Tribunal, and the Tr ibunal 
shall rule upon the admiss ib ility of any 
such evidenc e . 
( e ) The wi tne s se s  tor the prosecution shall 
be examined and after that the witne sses 
tor the defense • • • •  
( f )  The Tribunal may put any ques t ion to 
any witne s s  and to any defendant at any 
t ime . 
( g ) The prosecut ion and the defense shall 
interrogate and may cro s s -examine any 
witness es and any defendant who give s t e s t i ·  
mony. 
( h )  The defense shall address the court . 
( i )  The pro se cution shall addre s s  the 
court . 
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( j )  Bach defendant may make a s tatement t o  
the Tribunal. 
( k )  The Tribunal shall deliver judgme nt 
and pronounce sentenc e .  
Art icle 25- ·All ottic ial doc ument s  shall b e  produc ed, 
and all court proc eed ings c onduc ted in 
English, Pre nch, and Rus s ian, and in the 
language of the defendant . , . . • • 
VI . Judgment and Se ntence 
Article 26- -Tbe judgment ot the Tribunal as to the 
gu ilt or the innoc ence of any defendant 
shall give the re asons on which it is 
based, and shall be f i nal and not sub­
ject to review . 
Article 27--The Tribunal shall have the r ight to 
impo s e  • • • death or such other puni sh­
me nt as shall be de termined to be j ust . 
Art icle 29- -In oaae ot guilt, sente nce shall be carr ied 
out in acc ordanc e w i th the orders of the 
Control Counc il tor Germany, which may 
at any time reduce or otherwi se alter the 
se ntenc es , but may no t increase the 
s everity. • • . 67 
Thus the greatest ob s tac le s toward trying the ao-called 
war criminals were surmounted .  While legal pr inc iple s might 
be cons idered shaky , neverthe le ss the cooperat ion among the . 
Big POur mar ked a gre at s tep forward in international collabor­
ation. Speaking on this point, Jac kson said that thi s was the 
tira t time that tour nat ions with such ditterent legal sys tems 
had tr ied to knit the ir ideas tor a " jus t cr imi nal procedure 
into a cooperat ive trial . " This involved a merger of the 
67 Ibid . , PP • 15-21 • .......-. 
cont inental and Anglo-American legal systems , but tended to 
follow more the c ontinental pattern, s ince thi s  was the one 
which Germany employed and unders tood . 68 
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Speaking of the right of the Big Four to try the German� , 
Jackson said r 
Experience has taught that we can hardly expect them to 
try each other . The scale ot their attack leaves no 
neutrals in the world . We ' must summon all that we 
have of dispass ionate judgment to the task of pa t iently 
and fairly presenting the record ot thes e  evil de eds in 
these tr ials . It must be made clear to Germans that 
the wrong tor which the ir fallen leaders are on trial 
is not that they lo st the war , but because they s tarted 
it . 69 
In the same document, Jac�son made the following c omment 
as to the precedent that was to be es tablished : 
We have taken an important s tep forward in thi s ins tru­
ment in fixing individual respons ib ility of war mongering, 
among whate ver peoples ,  as an international crime . We 
have taken another in rec ogniz ing an internat ional 
accountability for persecutions , exterminations , and 
crimes against humanity when ass oc iat�d wi th attac ks on 
the peac e of the international order . 70 
Thus ,  by the fall of 194� certain matters bad been agreed 
upon by the FOur Powers . From 1939 to the format ion of the 
International Military Tribunal in August ,  1945, the trend ot 
thought in the Allied world was overwhelmingly in favor of trying 
the Naz i  leaders . While various Allied leaders had different 
68 United Nat ions Review, V, September 15 , 1945 , P• 224 . 
69 Ibid. , P •  224 • 
.......... 
70 �. , p .  224 . 
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viewpoints as to the way in which the Nazis should be dealt 
wi th, they were o� one vo ice in c ondemning Naz i  atroc i t ie s , and 
�or puni shment at some �uture date . Bene s, ot C zechoslovakia, 
later supported by Great Br itain, de s ired poli tical puni shment , 
while others such as Wold o� Norway advocat ed the e s tablishme nt 
o� an internat ional court tor trying the Germans . The lat ter 
view became the view whi ch the Uni ted Stat e s  took and pushed 
vigorous ly . 
It was de termined that internati onal law was to be 
ut ilized i n  the trials , as well as nati onal law . This was first 
voic ed bJ Beoh ot Luxembourg, then bJ Roosevelt , and tlnallJ 
in the Moscow Dec larat ion . It was dec lded that those Naz ie 
who had c ommitted crimea in oc cupied countrie s ,  would be returned 
to the scene o� the crimes and s tand trial under the laws ot 
those countries , while those guilty ot c r imes in no part icular 
geographical locat ion, would be tried by an internat ional court . 
As the war drew to a clos e ,  Robert H .  Jackson was appointed 
as Ch1 et Prosecut or tor the United State s ,  and with this appoint­
ment the ories became realities . Under him the crime s  with 
which the Naz i s  were charged were put on paper . He is credited 
with the first count--crtmea agains t peace- -and by thi s  he 
meant to get at the Naz i  master plan, and as such he charged 
the Nazi hierarchr with a conapiraor to wage a war of aggres s i on 
1n violat ion ot internat ional treat ies . In thi s  co�nt a war 
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ot aggres s ion was defined . The Br itish were more intere s ted 
in the sec ond count--war crtme•·-while the French and Rus s ians 
pushed to the thi rd- -crime s aga ins t humani ty. 
Jac ks on ' s  own ins istence on the consp iracy charge almo s t  
resulted in a break-down o f  the negotiations, but h i s  pre se nta­
t ion or an ul timatum to the othe r Powers , in Wh ich he threate ned 
Amer ican withdrawal, brought matters to a head . The reas on 
tor which the other three Powers gave in was s lmple--moa t ot 
the high-ranking Naz is ,  as well as a preponderance or the 
documen tary evidenc e was in American banda--ther efore it would 
have been s imple for the Uni ted States to hold a trial apart 
trom the others . 
The s e le c t ion or Nuremberg as the seat or the tr ial was 
als o Jacksonian . Good fac ilities and ide ological assoc iati ons , 
comb ined with the tac t that Nuremberg was within Ame rican juris• 
diction convi nc ed him that this c i ty was ideal as a s e tting 
tor the trial . The other na tions also gave in on thi s ,  and the 
plan came t o  frui tion in August ,  1945, when the Agreement Set ting 
up an Interna tional Mil itary Tr ibunal, wi th the attached Charter 
of the Tribunal, was procla imed to the world . 
CHAP'l'ER III 
THE LEGAL BASES FOR NUREMBERG 
In ac cordanc e wi th Ar t icle 14 or the Charter of the 
Internat ional M1litarr Tribunal, the four chief pros ecut ors , 
Jaokaon tor the Un ited State s ,  Franc o i s  de Menthon for Prance , 
Sir Hartley Shawcroa s for Br itain, and R. A. Rudenko for the 
soviet Un ion , together wi th the ir atatfs , me t and drew up the 
Indic tment against certain high-plac ed Germane . 
The different a t t i tude s ot the Big Pour we re s oon evi• 
dent in the negot iations draw ing up the Ind ictment- -Prench 
logic and pe t t i ne s s ,  Br i t ish pas s ion tor law and order, Rus s i an 
1nsorutab 1li tJ, and American r igbteousnea a . l Tb$ Russ lana 
were vltallr intere s ted in the trial ot militar i s ts and 1ndua­
trial i a ta . The French urged the trial of leading 1nduatrialla ts . 
The Brltiah were mainly intere s ted ln emphas izing broken treat 1 e a ,  
while the Americana adhered t o  their plan of punishi ng those 
reapons lble tor conspiracy to wage aggress ive war . As a result 
ot these dlfterenoes , three indic tme nts were drawn--one �enoh, 
one Br1 t lah, and one American . 
The Amer ican indictment with modif icat ions was f lnall7 
adopted . One agreement which made comproai ae poss ible was 
reached wlth Russ ia whereby two vote s ins tead ot tnree became 
1 E. o .  Hauser, "Backstage Battle at Nuremberg , "  The 
Saturdat Bven1Q6 lost '  January 1� , 1946, p .  ·1e. Sir Hartter 
sbiwcross replace ir David Maxwe ll Pyte because ot the Br l tiah 
Labor Partyt a  aainlng control of the Br it ish Government . 
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nec essary t o  indict a par t icular German. The French employed 
dilatory tac t ics in the negotiat i ons , throwing stumbli ng blocks 
in every path ·. This was particularly emphas ized in the Krupp 
case , when it was tound that Guatav Krupp von Bohlen uDd Halbach 
.. 
would be unab le to s tand tr ial, due to senile s often ing ot the 
brain . The Prenoh sugges ted that Bertha Krupp, the real head 
ot the tam1ly s ince Gustav took the name when marrying her, 
be indicted 1n his place . The Americans and Russ ians dissuaded · 
the French as such ac t ion would probably shock world opinion. 
The Prench were satisfied when theJ obtained Rus s ian and Bri t ish 
assurances that a subsequent tr ial ot German i ndustr ialis ts 
would be held . 2 
Atter much wrangling over the lis t ot those to be tried , 
the chief prosecutor• lodged the Indictment with the Tribunal 
on the. 6th ot October, 1945 : 
The Uni ted States of America, the French Republic, the 
United Kingdom ot Great Br itain and Northern Ireland, 
and the Union ot Soviet Soc ial ist Republic a 
Against 
Hermann Wilhelm Goring, Rudolt He s s ,  Joachim von R1bbentrop, 
Robert Ley, Wilhelm Ke itel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred 
Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Wilhe lm Fr ick, Julius Stre icher , 
Walter Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Gus tav Krupp von Bohlen und 
Balbach, Karl Doenit z, Er ich Raeder , Baldur von Schirach, 
Pritz Sauokel, Alfred Jodl , Mar tin Bormann, Pran� von Pape n ,  
Artur Seysa -Inquart ,  Albert Speer ,  Cona tantin von Heurath, 
and Hans Fritzsche, Individually and aa members ot an7 ot 
2 �. , P •  138. 
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the tollowing groups or O�sani zations to which They 
Respe c t ive ly Belonged, namely l Die Re icharegierung 
( Re ich Cab ine t ) ;  Das Korps der Poli t iachen Leiter der 
Na tio nalaoz ialistt aahen Deutachen Arbe 1 terpar te1 ( Leader­
ship Oorpa ot the Naz i Party ) ;  Die Schutza tatteln der 
Nat ionala oz 1al1s t 1schen Deutachen Arbeit erparte 1 ( c om­
monly known as the " ss• ) and inc luding Die S1cherhe ita­
dienat ( c ommonly known as the " SD" ) J  Die Gehe ima taat­
�ol tse i ( Secret State Police, commonly known as the 
Ge s tapo• ) ;  Die Sturmab teilunger der N .  s .  D .  A. P.  
( c ommonly known a s  the " SA" ) and the General st atr 
and High Command ot the German Armed Porces, Detendants . 
• • • 
So read the opening lines ot the Indictment agains t the 
leaders and princ ipal organ izat ions ot Naz i Germany who were to 
be tried at Nuremberg tor crimes against peac e ,  war crime s ,  
crimes agains t  humanity, and ot a common plan or conspiracy to 
c ommit those crime s ,  all as defi ned in the Charter ot the 
Tribunal . 3 
Let ua now take up the counts ot the Indictme nt o ne by 
one and determine it there is to be found in in ternat ional law, 
as 1t exi st ed betore World War II, legal bas es tor the se count s .  
This was not a primary tas k  ot the Tr ibunal for i t  was bound 
by the law as defi ned tn the Charter. 
Count one was concerned with the formula t i on or execution 
ot a common plan or conspirac y to commit, or Which involved 
3 Department ot State, Tr ial ot War Criminals , pp . 23·• · 
In hta refort to Pres ident Truman ot�uoe-7 , 1945, �ac kson said 
tha t our the American ) case agains t the ma j or defendants is 
c o nc erned wi th the Naz i  master plan, and not with individual 
barbarities and pervers ions which occurred independe ntly ot any 
c entral plan . Thua the c onapiraor charge became count one ot 
the Ind ictment . 
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the commi s s io n  ot , cr imea against peac e ,  war crime a ,  and crime s 
agains t human ity. As members or agenc ies ot the Naz1 Party, 
the defe ndant s and organizat i ons became a par t or the c onspiracy 
as the Party was the central - core ot the c ommon plan . 4  
The carrying out of the mas ter plan wa s accomplished 1n 
the following ways . ( 1 )  . The acquis i tion ot totalitarian c ontrol 
ot Germany , both pol i t ical and ec onomic , was the fir s t  s tep 
1n the achievement of the wholesale aggre s s ions whic� came 
later. Such thing• as democratic repre sentat ion in the Re ichs tag, 
tree pol1 t 1eal part ies ,  tree educat i onal system, freedom of 
apeeoh and pres s ,  were abolished ; and to s ee that they remained 
s o ,  the Re 1cha tag was reduced to impotence , the educat ional 
system was reshaped, the pre s s  was muzzled, and the formation 
ot terroris t organ izat ions was accomplished to make sure tha t 
Naz i  rule wa s  unqueationed .  Along wi th thi s ,  ant i-Semi t ism 
became the order of the day, with exterminat ion ot every Jew 
in Europe the ult imate goal. In order to gain economic aacen­
dency, labor union• were abol1ahed, Ge�n bus iness was mob 111zed 
tor war, German rearmament was begun, and one defendant , Goering, 
and later PUnk, was give n autocrat ic c ontrol over German e conomy . 5  
( 2 )  T.b e  ut ili zat ion ot a l l  Ge� an power tor tore 1gn aggre s s ion 
then followed . Aggress ion was init 1a ted by secret rearmament , 
4 l2!S• • PP • 25•6. 
5 Ib id . , pp . 27-�l • 
......... 
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taking Germany out or the International Disarmament Conference 
and the League ot Natio ns , and the rem111tar i zation ot the 
Rhineland, in violat ion ot the Versaille s  Treaty and the Rhine 
Pac t ot Local'no , as we ll as of a s tatement ot Hi tler on May 21, 
1935, that Versailles and Locarno would be respe cted. Then in 
March, 1938, Aus tria was invaded and annexed, followed by the 
se izure of a port ion ot Czechoslovakia in Oc tober, 1938, and 
the es tab lishment ot a P�r:otec torate over the remainde.t- in March, 
1939 . These aggres s ions were followed by war against Poland, 
the Uni ted Kingdom, Franc e ,  Denmark, Norway , Be lgium, the 
Ne therlands , Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece from 1939 to 
1941. Then on June 22, 1941, the Sovlet Union was invaded 1n 
violation ot a non-aggress ion pac t ,  tollowed by collaborat1op 
with Italy and Japan to wage aggre s s ive war against the United 
States in December ,  1941. 6 ( 3) The last pa rt of the mas ter 
plaD involved a conep lracy tor the accompli shment of c rime s  
agains t  humanitJ and war crimea i n  the c ourse ot the pl'eparation 
tor war and 1n the ac tual prosecut ion of the war , war cr imes 
be ing c ommi tted no t only aga in 1 t  the armed forc e s of the ir 
enemie s ,  but also against non-belligerent c ivilian p opulationa . 7 
Jaokaon called count one the c ommon plan as we ll as 
conapiracr, becauae under German law, the c oncept ot consp iracy 
6 Ib id . , PP • 31•6. 
-
7 �. , PP • 36•7 . 
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impl iea a s tealthy mee ting in the dead of night , in a s ec luded 
hide out ,  in Which a group of felons plot everr de tail of a 
spec ific crime . The Charter forestalls re s or t  to such narrow 
concepts of c onsp iracy take n from local law by us ing the addit i onal 
and non- techn ical term, "common plan . "  Omi tting ent ire ly the 
alternat ive term of "conspiracy• the Charter read s that " leaders , 
. 
organizers , instigators , and acc omplices partic ipating in the 
formulation or execution of a c ommon plan to c ommi t "  any ot the 
de scribed crtmes , "are re spons ible tor all ac ta performed by 
any pers ons in execution of such plan . •S 
A conspiracy may be defined as , "A comb inat ion of two 
or more pers ona by some c oncerted act ion to accompl1eh some 
criminal or unlawtul purpos e ,  or to accompl ish s ome purpos e ,  
not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawtul 
meana . •9 
According to Jackaon : 
The Charter c oncept of a c ommon plan really represent• 
the conspiracy princ iple 1n an international c ontext . 
A c ommon plan or conspiracy to s e ize the machinery ot 
a s tate , to commit crimea aga ins t the peace ot the 
world, to blot a race out ot existence , to ens lave 
mill ions , and to subjugate and loot whole nat ions can­
not be thought ot in the same terma as the plott ing ot 
8 Robert H .  Jac kson, "Concluding Addre s s , " World Repor�, 
Augus t 15, 1946, P •  38. 
9 Walter A .  Shumaker and Ge orge F .  Long1dort The Czcloeed1c 
� Die t i onarz ( Chioago t Callaghan and Company, 19i2�p. 104. ' 
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pe tty cr1me s ,  although the under111ng princ iples ar e 
applicab le . Little gangsters may plan which will carry 
a pia toi and which a s t iletto, who will approach a 
vio t lm from the front and who from behind, and where 
they will waylay him. But in planning a war , the pistol 
bec omes a Jehrmacht , the s t ile t to a Luft waffe . Where to strike a not a choice of dark al1eys , Sut a mat ter 
of world geography . The operation involve s the man1pu• 
lation of public opinion, the law of the s tate , the 
police power, indus try, and finance . The baits and 
blutts mus t be translated into a nat ion ' s  fore ign pollcJ . 
L1kew1ae, the degree ot stealth which po ints to a gu1ltJ 
purpose in a o on•piraoy must depend upon its ob jeo t .  • • • 
But s tealth is not an e s sent ial ingredient of such 
planning. Part s  of the common plan may be proclaimed 
from the houset ops , as ant i-Semi tism wa s ,  and parta ot 
it kept underc over , as rearmament tor a long t ime was . 
• • • The forms or thi s grand type ot c onsp iracy are 
amorphous , the means are opportunis t ic ,  and ne ither 
can divert the law trom gett ing at the sub s tanc e ot 
thinga . lO 
Very little c riticism has been given to th1a first c ount , 
and eminent authori ties have even supported it . Henry L. Stimson 
says tha t this count is the mos t  real i s t ic of them all, tor the 
Nazi crime is in the end indivi s ible . Each of the n�roua 
transgre s s ions was an interlocking part ot the whole gigantic 
barbar ity .  Bas 1cally, it is the three other c ount s that muat 
be c ons idered as the conspiracy charge is built upon them. ll 
However , an oppos ite view of this charge 1s taken by 
Charle s  E .  Wyzanski ,  Jr . ,  Judge of the United States D18 tr1ct 
Law, " 
10 Jackson, �· s!!· •  p .  �e . 
ll Henry L. Stimson, "The Nu�eaberg Tr ial : 
Pore 1sn Affairs , XXV, January, 1947 , p .  181. 
Landmark 1n 
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Court tor Maasachusetta,  who thinks that count one means to 
establish some addit ional separate substant ive otrense ot con� 
&piracy, � it as serts that the re is in international law 
a wrong which c onsis ts 1n ac ting together tor an unlawtul end, 
. 
and that he who joins 1n that act ion 1s liable not only tor 
what he planned, or part ic ipated in, or could reasonably have 
toreaeen would happen , but i s  liable for what every one of his 
tellows did 1n the course ot the conspiracy. He bases this 
belief on the content ion that almost as broad a doctr ine ot 
conspiracy exists in national law . But in transcribing it to 
the internat ional legal picture , where is the treat7, the cus ­
tom, the academic learning on which it is based! Was thia not 
a type ot 1crime" first described and defined e ither in London 
. 
or Nuremberg in the year 1945! He argues that aside trom the 
tac t that the notion is new, it is also fundamentally unjus t .  
The crime of conspiracy was or iginally developed in England 
by the Court or Star Chamber on the theory that any unliacenaed 
joint ac t ion or private persona was a threat to the public , and 
ao it the ac tion was in any part illegal it was all illegal. 
The s imilaritie s  ot the national law or conspiracy therefore 
s eem out of place in considering tor internat ional purposes 
the ettec t ot joint polit ical ac tion . In any government, there 
ex1sta among high ott1c 1ala a working agreement which members 
ot another group or poli t ical party c ould regard aa a conspiracy, 
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and s o  any member of the party in power could be regarded as 
a part ot the whole so-called "crime . "l2 
-
Count two ot the Indictment has been more ser ioualy 
cr itic i zed than all othe r c ounts combined . The charge of crimes 
agains t peace has been the chief targe t ot the majoritJ ot the 
crit ics of Nuremberg. All the defendants were charged with 
partic ipat ing i n  the planning, preparation, ini tiation, and 
waging ot wars ot aggre s s ion, which were als o wars in violat ion 
or inte rnationa l treaties , agreements, and a s surance s . l3 
According to Jackson , the crime ot ma k ing unjus titiable 
war was the crime Which comprehended all lesser crime a . In 
thi s ,  he refuted the be liets ot the ninet ee nth and e arly twent ieth 
c enturies which generally taught that war-making was not illegal . 
Summarised by a s tandard authori ty, the atti tude was that both 
part ies to war are regarded as be ing iden t ical as t o  legal 
pos i t i on, and consequently as being posaeased ot equal ri ght s . l4 
Thi s  view, howeYer ,  was re jec ted by Jaokaon, who re turned 
to Grotiua , the £ather ot internat ional law, tor hls bas ta .  
Gro tiua taught that the re 1a a dis tinct ion between the just 
and the unjua t war-- the war or defense as opposed to the war 
ot aggre s s ion . Wr iting in 1625, he said : " • • • Those who . 
12 Charles E. IJzanski , Jr . ,  "Nuremberg--A Fair Tr ial? "  
!9! Atlantic , April, 1946, P •  69 . 
· 
13 Department ot State , .22• .2!!• ,  p.  37 . 
14 Ib id . , p.  a. -
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jo1n in a war that has been undertaken without cause worthy 
ot approval draw upon themselves the desert of punishment, in 
a degree proportionate to the injust ice which lies in their 
ac tion . "l5 
This idea of Grot ius was more or lea s  re-adopted atter 
World War I when the thinking ot the civili zed world condemned 
war of aggres sion as criminal, and as a result se�eral inter• 
national agreements along this line came into be ing throughout 
the twent ies . The Geneva Protocol ot 1924 tor the Pac ific 
Settlement ot Internat ional Diaputes ,  s igned by the delegates 
ot forty-eight states but never formally rat ified, asserted 
that "a war ot aggres1 ion cons titute• • • • an international 
crime . nl6 The Eighth Aaaembly of the League of Nations ot . 
1927 ,  bJ unantmoua resolution ot the torty-eight member s tates , 
1noluding Germany, dec lared that a war of · · aggres s 1on constitutes 
an international crime . l7 At the Sixth Pan-Amer ican Conference 
ot 1928, the twenty-one Amer ican Republic s unanimously adopted 
a resolut iob, which st ipulated that a "war ot aggres s ion con­
s t i tutes an international crime against the human spec iea . nl8 
15 Hugo Grot iua , De Jure Belli ac Pac i s  ( Oxford : Clarendon 
Press , 1925 ) ,  II, p .  600:- ---- --
. 16 Manley o .  Hudson, Internat ioQal Leiialat1o' (Wa1h1ngton 1 
Carnegie Endowment tor Internatlona� Peace , 931), I , p .  1�. 
17 Department ot State, �· i!!• •  p .  10. 
lB �. , p .  10. 
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The final culmination of outlawing wa�s of agg�ess 1on 
came in 1928, when representativ�s of fifteen nations , including 
Germany, Italy, and Japan, signed the Kellogg•Briand Peace 
Pac t ,  otherwiae known as the Pac t of Paris . Ironically enough, 
Germany was the first state to sign the Pac t ,  which was later 
adhered to by pract ically all s tates ot the civilized world, 
with the exception or the Soviet Union . In the wording ot the 
Pact we find that a 
The High Contrac ting Part ies solemnly declare in the 
names ot their respective peoples that they condemn 
recourse to war for the solution of internat ional con• 
trovera ies .  and renounce it as an ins trument of national 
policy in the ir re lations wi th one another . 
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement 
or solution of all disputes  or conflicts or whatever 
nature or of whatever origin they may be , which may 
arise among thtm, shall never be sought except by 
pac ific means .l9 
The great hue and cry over Nuremberg has arisen because 
eminent authorit ies have charged that the Big Four made ex 
-
�oat fac to law by. the terms ot t�e 1945 London agreement . Ex 
-
post fac to legislation declares ac ta cr1m1nal which at the 
time ot commission were 1nnocent.20 Such law ia prohibited 
by our Const itut ion and all democrat ic cons titut ions , and there-
tore legalists abhor applying it to a conquered people . Ex 
-
19 James Thayer Gerould, The Pact ot Paria ( New York : 
Wilson Company, 1929 ) ,  I ,  p. lB.�e-Jic�waa t!nally embraced 
by s ixty-three nations . 
20 Shumaker and Longadort, .22.. �· , p .  337 . 
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RO�t tao t o  la• is retroac t ive law. The question of the re tro­
ac tivity ot this c ount ot the Indic tment is beco�ng more and 
more academic , since foremo s t  legal author i t ies can be found 
who detend it as be ing perfectly jus t ified under exi s t ing inter­
nati onal law, while othe r equally famous authori t ies regard 
it as a farce of l�ga�ity. 
The p�inc ipal argument agains t count two is that the 
Par t s  Pac t w�s b inding, as is internat ional law in general , 
upon s tates and not individuals , and the refore to apply i ta 
provis ions to Goering, He s s , and the o thers i s  ridiculous . 
However t o  such men as Henry L.  Sttmaon, for.mer Secretary of 
Sta te ot the Uni ted States , the trial is a new judic ial pro­
c e s s ,  but i t  is not � 2o at fac to law. It 1s the enforcement 
ot a moral judgment da t ing bac k to the twenties . It repre sents 
a growth in the application of law that any student ot the 
Engliah c ommon law abould rec ognize as natural and proper, tor 
i t  ia jus t in thia manner that the common law grew. All case 
law grows by new dec is ions , and where those new dec is ions match 
the consc ienc e ot the communi ty, in this case the wor�d c om­
munity, they c ould certa inly be c ons idered legal. The charge 
that aggre s s ive war is an interna t ional cr ime is un sound only 
it the tam1 ly ot na t i ons doe s not believe tha t at the beginning 
of World War II it was illegal to wage such a war . To St 1ma on, 
the judgment of Nurembe rg reache s at the very core of international 
s trite , because a penalty is not merelr set for the c ommi ss ion 
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ot war crtmes,  but �or the ve ry act of war 1 taelt , except in 
the c aae of aelt-detenae . 2l 
Sheldon Glueck, Profe s s or ot Criminal Law and Criminology 
at Harvard Univers ity, goes into the wording of the Par ia Pact 
as  a proof that it was binding on individuals . He defines the 
word "condemn" in Artic le I as denoting a strong moral judgment 
ot d1aapprobat 1on, and therefore the applicat ion of penal 
sanc tions was perfectly justified. He further point s out that 
the moat ettec t ive recour se 1s not at all to be found agains t 
recalc itrant states,  but rather in the prosecut ion and punish­
ment ot individuals , i .  e .  parti es of a government and heads 
- -
of armed forces who have caused their states ruthlessly to 
trample upon all law in the ir lust of conques t  and aggress ion. 
We do not agree that when the part ies to the tre aty agreed ' to 
name aggre s s ive war aa illegal, it  necessar ily follows that 
ita violat ion constitutes an international crime . An internat ional 
contract cannot be clas sed as a penal statute and the remedy 
tor breach of sa id contrac t does not cons i s t  of pros ecuti on 
and punishment of those guilty, but rather o t  obtaining recom­
pense �or its breach. However , such means had been proved 
ineffec t ive in dealing with Germany after World War I, and 
s ince her ac t ions were so much worse in World War II, some 
21 St imaon, �· �· · p .  185 . 
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other me thod would have to be found to as sure a jus t  redre s s  
of grievance s ;  therefore the sugge s t ion or Glueck to deal wi th 
individuals of the s tate ins tead ot the state itaelt . 22 
The be s t  argument agains t this ooun t maintains tha t there 
was no in ternat ional cr iminal code as a bas i s  for bri nging 
the Nazis to tr ial, or an international ertminal c our t before 
which to try them. 23 Opponents of . e ount two can certa inly argue 
c orrec tly that the cr1m1nal code was drafted and the Tr ibunal 
e s tabli shed in 1945, and then individuals were brought before 
the court tor committing ac ts de s igna ted as crime s in the 
. Charter , whose or tminality at the time of c ommi s s ion is ques­
t ionable . As to the makeup of the c ourt, it was c omposed en­
tirely ot vic torious enemie s  of Germany. No t a neutral nor 
a German judge was among the group , and therefore the whole 
judicial pr ocess has the odor of the anc ient rule that van­
quished are at the mercy of the vict ors . 
There is even doubt as to the sinc eri ty of the Un ited 
Nati ons in holding that all wars of aggre s s ion are c rime s .  
Here c ould be c i t ed the Rus s ian at taoks on Finland and Poland 
in 1939 , and the Amer ican enc ouragement given to Ruaa ia to 
break ott relations with Japan, and subsequently en ter that 
22 Sheldon Glueck, The Nurember� Trial and Aggre s s ive 
�� ( New York : Knopf , 191!T, PP • !8- 3 .  . 
-
23 Glueck, !!! Crtminals : The ir Pros ecut ion � Punish­
me nt , p .  93 . 
-
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war on our s ide . 
A good proof that the Kellogg Pac t wa s inadequate as a 
bas i s for the Nuremberg tr ial is found in the words of Kellogg 
hims e lf ,  who gave hi s name to the treaty . He did not believe 
i t s  viola t i on to be cr1minal as we ll as illegal ; he left to 
the sovere ign s tate the right to de termine i ts own guilt or 
innocence when charged with violat ing the treaty : 
There i s  no,h1ng in the American draf t • • • which 
re s tricts or impairs in any way the r ight of s e lf­
defens e . That r ight is inherent in every s overeign 
state and is implic i t  in every treaty . Eyery nation 
is fre e at all t ime s and regardles s  of t·reaty prov i s ions 
to defe nd its t erri tory from attack or invas ion, and 
it alone is c ompetent to dec ide whe ther c ircums tance s  
require rec ours e  to war i n  s e lf-defense • • • •  24 
While the c la im  that Germany waged a war of s e lf-defens e 
was rather dubious , s t ill the right of s overe ignty gave to the 
s tate an amoral pos it ion, in which nati onal honor and vital 
intere s t s  were predominant over a condemnat i o n  of aggre s s ive 
war . Germany c ould argue that the United Sta te s by Lend­
Lease aid to Bri ta in prior to December, 1941, was waging an 
aggres s ive war against her .  So much of the bas i s  of this 
charge i s  hypocri t ic al when c on s idering what b oth s ides 1n 
the rec ent conflic t have done . 
So the que s t ion remains--may aggre s s ive war rightly 
be termed an internat ional c r ime ,  and is it wise and legal t o  
24 Glueck, � Nuremberg Tr ial � Aggre s s ive !!t, p .  20. 
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pro secute members of a sta�e ' s  government when that government 
makes aggres sive war? I� is up the reader to dec ide for him-
self. 
In Appendix C of the Indic tment , in addition to the 
international agreements aforement ioned, there is  a list ot 
treaties and agreements to which Germany wa s a party, and which 
she was charged with violat ing, with part iculars of violation 
in each cas e .  Following are a few of the vi olated agreements : 
HagueConventi ons of 1899 and 1907 for the Pacific Settlement 
of International Dispute s ,  Treaty of Versaille s ,  Treaty of 
Berlin of 1921, Locarno Pac t s  of 1925, Polish-German Non­
Aggres s ion Treaty of 1934, agreements between Germany and Aus tria, 
Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands , Czechoslovakia, Yugos lavia ,  
from 1935 t o  1939,  Munich Agreement of 1938 �  and the German-
USSR Treaty of Non-Aggress ion of 1939 . 25 
Count three was the war crime s charge as set down in 
; 
Art icle 6b of the Charter : 
Namely, violations of the laws or cus toms of war . Such 
violations shall inc lude , but not be limited t o ,  murder, 
ill- treatment or deportat ion to s lave labor or for any 
other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied 
territory, murder or ill-treatment of pris oners of 
.war or persons on the sea s ,  killing of hos tage s ,  plunder 
ot public or private property, wanton de structi on of 
citie s ,  towns or villages ,  or devas tat ion not justi-
fied my military neces s ity. 26 · 
25 Department of State , �· £!!. ,  pp . 82-9 . 
26 Ib id . ,  p .  16 . 
-
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Man£red Lachs o£ the Polish bar de£ine s a war crime as  
£ollows : 
A war crime is  any ac t of violence , qualified as crime 
commi t ted during and in c onnec t i on with a war under 
spec ially favourable conditions created by the war 
and f ac il itat ing its c ommi s s ion ; the ac t be ing direc ted 
against the other be lligerent s tate , or it s intere s ts ; 
aga in s t  its c i t izens or their interests ; against a neu­
tral s tate , its interes t s ,  i t s  c it iz ens , or the ir 
intere s t s , as well as agains t s tate le s s  individua ls 
or the ir intere a ts . 27 
Taking each o£ the charges named in the Charter under 
war crimes separately, the Indic tment c i te s  various inc ident s  
which were gross violations o£ the law or war . Under murder 
and ill-treatment o£ civilian populat ions in oc cup ied terri-
tory, many spec i£ic cases are named, with much documentary 
evidence to support the charge s ,  which are s hocking in the 
twent ieth century. The murders and ill-treatment were carr ied 
out by divers means , including shoot ing, hanging, gas s ing, 
s tarvation, gross-overcrowding in prison s ,  systematic under­
nutrition, brutali ty, and torture of all kinds . The de£endants 
interfered wi th religious services , persecuted members of the 
clergy and monas t ic orders , and expropr iated church proper ty . 
De liberate and sys temat ic genoc ide , � � the extermination 
of certa in rac ial and nat ional group s ,  wa s carr ied out in 
c ertain oc cupied territories ,  e spec ially among Jews , Poles ,  
and Gyps ie s . 
27 Man£red Lachs , War Crimes (London : Stevens and Sons , 
1945 ) 1  P• 100. ---
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C ivilians were sys temat ically sub jec ted to torture s of 
all kinds . with the ob j ec t  of obta ining informat ion . Many 
were subjec ted to "protect ive arre s t s " whereby they we re se ized 
and impris oned without a tr ial and wi thout ordinary protect ion 
of the law . 
In the concentrat ion �amps there were many pr isoners who 
were class if ied "Nacht und Nebel . " The se persons were cut ott 
ent irely from the outs ide world ; they disappeared without any 
trac e .and no announc ement of their tate was ever made by German 
authorities . 28 
Such murders and ill-treatment were contrary to es tabli shed 
internat ional law, par t icularly Article 46 of Hague Conve ntion 
IV of 1907 , respect ing the laws and customs of land warfare : 
nramily honor and right s ,  the live s of pers ons , and private 
-
property, as well as religious convictions and prac t ice , must 
be  respe c ted . "29 Not only this Convention, but the general 
principles of criminal law as found 1n all c ivili zed s tates 
were violated as well, not t o  men t ion the military code b ooks 
or the various states . 30 
28 Department of State , £2• £!l. , p .  39 . 
29 Jame s Brown Scott , Ed . , The Hague Conventi ons apd 
Declarat ions g!.� !,W! .!2Q.7. ( New York : Oxford Pre s s ,  1915 ) ,  
P • l23 . 
30 Departmen t  of State,  £2• �. , p .  39 . 
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Under the deportat ion for slave la bor of c ivili�n popu­
lat ions , the same Artic le 46 was invoked as a bas i s  for the 
charge , and numerous instances were c ited, of French, Danish, 
Be lgian, Dutch, Rus s ian, Yugoslav , and C zechos lovak pers ons 
who were depo rted fr om their homes to work in Germany or in 
defense works , fac tori e s ,  and in other tasks connec ted with 
the German war effort . 31 
The next charge was the murder and i ll-treatment of 
pri soners of war, and of other members of the armed forces 
of the countr ies wi th whom Germany was at war , and of pers ons 
on the high sea s .  The defendants were charged with carrying 
out the se crimes by denying the pris oner s adequate fo od, shelter , 
c lothing, and medical care and attention ; by forc ing them to 
lab or in inhumane conditions ; by torturing them and sub jec t i ng 
them to  inhuman indigni t ies  and by killing them. Members of 
the armed forces  of the c ountries  with which Germany was a t  
war were frequently murdered while i n  the ac t of surrender ing . 32 
�ese ac t s  were c ontrary to  Art icle s  4 ,  5 ,  6, and 7 
of Hague C onvent ion IV, and of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 6 of the 
Geneva Prisoners of War Convent ion of 1929 . 
31 Ib id . , PP • 46-7 • 
........... 
32 1£!£. , P •  48 . 
Hague Conventi on IV, Chapter II : Prisoners of War : 
Article 4 :  Pris oners of war are in the power of the 
hos tile Government , but no t of the individ­
ua ls or corps who capture them. They mus t  
be humanely trea ted . All their pers onal 
belongings , except arms , hors es , and mili· 
tary paper s ,  remain the ir property .  
Article 5 :  Pris oners of war ma y  be interned in a town, 
fortre s s ,  camp ,  or other place , and bound 
not to go beyond cer tain fixed limi t e ; but 
they can not be confined except a s  in indis •  
pensable measure of safety and only while 
the circums tances which ne ces sitate the 
mea s ures continue to exis t .  
Article 6 :  The State ma y  utilize the labor of pri soner s 
of war a ccording to the ir rank or aptitude , 
officers excepted. The tasks shall not be 
excessive and shall have no conne ction wi th 
the opera ti ons of the war .  ( Rather archaic 
wi th our "total war "  of today ) 
Article 7 : The Government into whose hands pri soners 
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of war have fallen i s  charged wi th the ir 
maintenance . In the ab sence of a special 
agre ement be tween the belligerent s ,  prisoners 
of war shall be treated as regards board, 
lodging, and clothing on the same footing 
as the troops of the Government who captur ed 
them. 33 
Geneva Convention of 1929 : 
Arti cle 2 :  • • •  The wounded and s ick of an army who 
fall into the hands of the enemy shall be 
prisoners of war,  and the general provisions 
of international law concerning pris oners 
ot war shall be appli cable to them. • • • 
33 Scott,  �· £!!• ,  PP • 108·10 . 
I 
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Art icle 3 : After each engagement the occupant of the 
field of battle shall take measures to  search 
for the wounded and dead , and to protect 
them agains t pillage and maltreatment . Whe n­
ever c ircumB tanc e s  permit,  a local armi stice 
or a suspens ion of fire shall be arranged 
to permit the removal ot the wounded remaining 
behind the line s .  
Art icle 4 :  Belligerents shall commun icate to each other 
rec iprocally, as soon as pos s ible , the names 
ot the wounded, s ick, and dead, collected 
or disc overed, together Wl th any indications 
which may as s is t  in the ir identification. 
They shall establish and transmit to each 
other the certificates of death. • • • 
Art icle 6 :  Mob ile medical formations, that is to say, 
those which are intended to accompany armies 
in the field, and the fixed establishments 
of the medic al �ervice shall be re�pected 
and protec ted by the belligerent s . � 
Much documentary proof also accompan ied these accusat ions . 
Americans were part icularly intere sted in these charges s ince 
they involved those Amer ican pris oner s ,  offic ers and me n, who 
were murdered in Normandy in the s ummer of 1944 ,  and in the 
Ardenne s in December 1944 , as well as ill-treatment in var ious 
German Stalags . 35 
Throughout the oc cupied territories the German armed 
forc es adopted and put into effect on a wide scale the prac t ices  
of taking, and of killing hostages from the c ivilian populat ions . 
34 Huds on,  �· �. , V, pp . 6-7 . 
35 Depar tment of Stat e ,  £E.• ill• ,  p.  49 . 
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These act s  we re in contravent ion of Article 50 of Hague Convention 
IV which st ipulated : "No general penalty, pecun iary or other­
wi s e ,  shall be inflicted upon the populat ion on ac count of the 
ac t s  of individuals for which they can not be regarded as j o intly 
and severally re aponsible . " 36 
The next charge under the war cr imes c ount was the plunder 
of public and pr ivate proper ty. The Germans , by documentary 
proof, were shown to have ruthle ssly exploited the people and 
the material resources of the c ountries they occupied , in order 
to strengthen the Nazi war machine , depopulate and impover i sh 
the rest of Europe , to enr ich themse lve s and the ir adheren t s ,  
and t o  promote German ec onomic supremacy over Europe . 37 These 
acti ons violated Art icles 46 to 56 inclus ive or Hague Convention 
IV, a brief summary or which follows : 
Art icle 46 : • • •  Private property must be respec ted • • •  
and can not be confiscated . 
Art icle 47 :  Pillage is formally forb idden .  
Art icle 48 :  If • • •  the occupant c ollec t s  the taxe s ,  dues , 
and tolls imposed for the benef it of the Sta t e ,  
he shall do so  • • •  i n  accordanc e w i th the 
rules or as s e s sment and inc idence 1n force • • • • 
Art ic le 49 : If, in addit ion to the taxe s • • •  the occu­
pant levies other money c on tr ibut ions • • • 
this shall only be for the needs of the army 
or administrat ion of the terr itory i n .que s t io n. 
36 Sc o t t ,  .2£• ill•. p .  124 . 
37 Depar tment or State , �· ill· I p .  50. 
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Article '51 : No contribut ion shall be colle c ted except 
under a written order,  a nd on the re spons ib ili ty 
or the c ommander- in chief • • • • 
Art icle 52 : Requi s i t ions • • •  shall not be demanded • • •  
except tor the needs of the army of occupat ion . 
• • • 
Art icle 53 : An army of occupat ion can only take posses si o n  
ot • • • the property or the State • • • and 
generally, all movable property • • • •  
Art icle 54 :  Submarine cables • • •  shall not be s e ized 
or de stroyed exc ept in the ease of ab solute 
nece s s ity.  • • • 
Article 55 : The occupying Sta te shall be regarded only as 
adminis trator or State propert ies • • •  and 
to adminis ter them in ac cordance wi th the 
rules of usufruct .  
Article 56 : The property of municipalit ie s ,  that of insti­
tutions dedicated t o  re ligion,  char ity and 
education, the arts and sc iences • • • shall 
be treated as private proper ty . All s e i zure 
of , des truct ion • • •  done t o  • • •  hi storic 
monument s ,  works of art and s c ienc e ,  is  tor­
b idden • • • •  38 
Numerous eas e s  of the theft of wor ks or art , the whole­
sale des truc t ion of hi storic shrine s ,  espe c ially in the Sovi et 
Un ion, looting of banks in occupied countries , e tc . ,  were set 
down . The exac t ion or c ollect ive penalt ies ,  in violation of 
of Article 50 or the Fourth Hague Convent ion, especially ot a 
pecuniary nature on the Jews , made up the next charge . Wanton 
des truc t ion of c it ie s ,  t owns ,  and village s ,  not jus t ified by 
military necess ity, and the conscription or c ivilian labor 
38 Scott,  �· �. , pp . 123-7 . 
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made up the next two charge s under war c r ime s . Var ious i n s t anc e s  
we re c i ted, violati ons of Art icles 46, 50 and 5 2  of the same 
Conven t i on, before lis ted in thi s  pape r .  Under the s e  charge s 
came the famous example of the des truc t ion of Lidi c e ,  Czecho­
s lovakia . 39 
The las t two charges involved the forc ing of civilians 
of occup ied t erritor ies to swear allegiance to Germany, and the 
German i zat ion of such terri torie s .  Di s t r ic t s  so treated inc luded 
Alsace -Lorraine , Be lgium, De nmark, Holland, Norway, and parts 
of the Sovie t Union .· Such ac t ions v i olated Art ic les 45 on the 
first charge , and 43, 46, 55 , and 56 of the s e c ond . Some of 
the s e  Art ic le s  have before been s ta ted, and following is a 
summary of those not s o  treat ed : 
Ar t ic le 45 : It is forb idden to c ompe l the inhab itant s 
of oc cup ied territory to swear allegiance 
to the hos t ile Power . 
Art icle 43 : The authority of the legi t imate power having 
in fac t pas sed into the hand s of the occupan t ,  
the lat t er shall take all the measures i n  
hi s power t o  re s t ore • • • public order and 
safe ty, while respec t i ng, unle s s  ab s olute ly 
pr evented, the laws in force in the c ountry . 40 
Very l ittle ,  if any oppos i t i on has ar isen t o  the count 
invo lving war crimes . Exis ting internat i onal law, as well as 
39 Departme nt of Stat e ,  .£.2• ill·• PP • 55-7 . 
40 Sc ott , .2.2• �· � p .  123 . 
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the general princ iples of criminal law makes these  charges legal 
in the eyes of the world . The only contradiction which might 
be cited is the fac t that Allied pers ons c ommitt ing l ike crime s 
against the Germans go unpunished . 
Count four , fos tered by Rus sia and Franc e, involved the 
murder and persecution of all who were or were suspec ted of 
being hos t ile to the Naz i  Party and all who were or were sus­
pected of being oppo sed to the c ommon plan referred to in count 
one . 41 In the Charter, crimes agains t humani ty were def ined 
as be ing murder, extermination, ens lavement, deportation, and 
other inhuman act s  committed against any c ivilian populat ion, 
before or during the war, or persecution on polit ical, rac ial , 
or religi ous grounds in execut ion of or . in connect ion wi th any 
crime within the jur isdiction of the Tr ibunal, whe ther or not 
in violation of the dome s t ic law of the country where perpetrated. 42 
These me thods and crimes const ituted violations of co nvent ions ,  
of internal penal laws , of the general princ iples of criminal 
law as derived from the criminal law of all c ivilized nat ions, 
and were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct . 43 
41 Department of State,  ££• £11. , p .  60. 
42 �· ·  p. 16 . 
43 �. ,  p .  60. As in count three ,  numerous instances 
of violations are enumerated . Wholesale exterminations of a 
race , c las sed as the crime of genoc ide , are related ,  such as 
the killing of 60, 000 Jews on the Dvina near Riga,  countless 
other thousands in Russ ia, the Balt ic region, and the wes t .  
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The only ser ious ob j ec t ion to thi s count aros e over the 
fact that Jackson had in mind, the punishment of the defendants 
for cr ime s c ommitted in Germany by Germans aga inst other Germans 
b efore the be ginning of the war, � � the German Jews , etc . 
Many ob j ec ted to this  broad interpretat ion, and Richard Law, 
Bri t ish Min is ter of State,  made the followi ng comme nt in the 
Hous e of C ommons on Apr il 18, 1945 :  "Cr ime s committed by 
Germans agains t other Germans are in a different category of 
war crime s and cannot be dealt wi th under the same proc edure . "44 
This was the v iew that many All ied leaders took, and fortunately 
for the good opinion of the wo rld , the charge of cr ime s aga inst 
human ity was limited by the Tr ibun� to include only ac t ivities  
pursued in connect ion with the cr ime of war . The ques t ion of 
the criminal accountability of those re spons ib le for whole sale 
pe rsecut ion before the outbreak of war in 1939 was eliminated 
from the jurisdict ion of the Tr ibunal, the effec t being a reduc­
t i on of the meaning of c r ime s  aga inst human i ty t o  a point whe re 
they bec ome prac� ically synonomous wi th war crimes . 45 
As regards legality of thi s  c ount, there is adequate 
legal bas is  for the prosecut ion of the defendant s by an inter­
nat ional tribunal . Murders and other cr ime s  commi tted were 
criminal under the law of all c ivilized s tate s ,  including the 
15 , 
44 Uni ted Nat ions Review : � !8£ Peace �� 
1945, P• 17 . -
45 St ims on, �· �. , p.  187 . 
VI , October 
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law of Germany. One wr iter put it this way, that princ iple s 
of cr iminal law generally accepted among the var ious state s 
are a proper sourc e of international law.  As ther e is no properly 
cons t i tuted German governme nt at present, it is perfec tly justi­
fiable under interna ti onal law that the oc cupying powers admin­
i ster the law of the land, and punish violators of that law.  
These defendants have commi tted cr imes aga inst German law, for 
which they were not prosecuted prior to the occupation, and 
are therefore sub j ect  to prosecut ion now .46 
Count four has c ome in for very little cr itic ism in this 
country, perhaps because this charge was not of primary c on-
cern to the American prosecutor. The only serious ob jection 
to the findings of the Tr ibunal on this count have been that 
offic ials of certain Allied Powers are guilty of the same charge s ,  
and therefore the odor of hypocrisy is  rank. 
Two matters which did not develop into obstac les in the 
trial were those que st ions involving the claim of immunity 
for heads of state s and the defense of superior orders . The se 
doc tr ine s had long been established, and probab ly arose from 
the doc tr ine of the divine r ight of kings . In dealing wi th 
the first,  Jackson said that we would not accept the paradox 
that legal respons ibility should be the least where power was 
the greatest,  and c i ted as an example the opinion of Lord Chief 
46 Herman Phleger, "Nurembe.tog- -A Fair T.toial, " .!!:1! Atlantic, 
April, 1946, pp . 64-5 . 
Just ice  Coke who said to King James of England that even a 
King is st ill under God and the law. 
93 
With the doctrine of the immunity of the he ad of a state 
usually is coupled another, that orders from a superi or pr o­
tect  those who obey them. The combination of the se two doc­
trine s could mean the respons ibility of no one . 47 As a result 
of thi s belief , the Charter contained the following provis ions : 
The offic ial pos iti on of defendants , whether as heads 
of state or respons ible off ic ials in government depart­
ment s ,  shall not be cons idered as freeing them from 
re spons ib ility or mit igating punishment . The fact · 
that the defendant ac ted pursuant to order of h1s govern­
ment or of a superior shall not free h1m from respons i­
bility, but may be c ons idered in mitigat ion of punishment 
if the Tribunal determines that just ice so requires . 48 
Very little cri tic ism has arisen over thi s portion of 
the Charter and after World War I the Commis s io n  on Respons ib ility 
drew up a very s imilar conc lus ion : "All persons belonging to 
enemy c ountries,  however high the ir pos ition may have been, 
without di st inction of rank, including Chiefs of State s ,  who 
have been guilty of offences aga inst the laws and c us toms of 
war or the laws of humanity are liable to criminal prosecut ion . "49 
A queer twis t given to this was the fact that in 1919 
the American members of the Commiss ion ins is ted that heads of 
47 Department of State,  �· £!!. ,  P• 3 . 
48 Ibid. , p .  17 • 
.......... 
49 Amer ican Journal g! Interna tional �' XIV, 1920, p .  117 . 
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s tate exerc is ing sovere ign rights are re spons ible to those 
alone who have confided such rights to them by e ither expres sed 
or implied cona ent . 5° Thus Jackson refuted the offic ial Amer ican 
position o£ 1919 and adopted the view s e t  down by the Commi s s ion 
as a whole, which was predominantly European in its or igi n .  
Thi s view has not be en seriously challenged by the Inter­
nat ional lawyers or public ists . Glueck is of the opinion that 
if a doc trine so contrary to reason and just ice has indeed 
been ac cepted a� uncondi tionally valid international law, it 
is high time that such an error were remedied . 51 Quincy Wr ight 
is of a like op inion, believing that the ac t of s tate contrary 
t o  law i s  not to be cons idered ita acts but act a  of the indi­
viduals commit t ing them. 52 This is a clear indication of a 
des ire to renounce the idea of absolute state s overe ignty and 
is  a movement in the direction of world government . 
Appendix A o£ the Indic tment is a s tatement of the indi­
vidual respons ibility of each defendant on trial . Goering was 
charged with all four counts of the Indictment , as were Ribbentrop, 
Hes s ,  Rosenberg, Frick, Sauckel, Speer, Funk, von Papen, von 
Neurath, Seys s- Inquart , Keitel, Jodl, and Krupp . The spec ial 
role of Goering in the economic pat tern was emphas ized, par-
50 Quincy Wright , "War Cr iminals , "  Amer ican Journal of 
International �� XXXIX, .April, 1945 , pp . 267-8. 
--
51 Glueck, !h! Nuremberg Trial � Aggres s ive !!!1 p .  58 .  
52 Wright , £2 •  £l!. , p .  269 . 
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ticularly as head of the Hermann Goering Industr ial Combine . 
The main portion of Ribbentrop ' s  re spons ib ility lay in the 
realm of fore ign affairs . The role of Hes s  was that of a 
psychological nature , because of hi s personal influenc e and 
his intimate connec t ion wi th Hitler . Ro senberg ' s responsi­
bility centered in the fact that he was the father of the entire 
spiritual and ideological training of the Naz i  Party, its 
philosopher . Frick was hailed part icularly for his part in 
er1mes against per sons in the oc cupied terr itories ; Sauckel 
tor forc ing inhab itant s of oc cup ied countr ies to work as 
slave laborers ; and Funk for the economic explo itation of the 
occupied s tates . The emphas is on Speer, Ke itel, and Jodl lay 
in their act ions ar i sing out of the war , particularly counts 
three and four, involving the ill-treatment of prisoner s of 
war and of the civilian populat ions of occupied countr ie s .  
Seys s -Inquar t ' s  part in the be trayal of Aus tria wa s set down, 
as were his cr ime s in the oc cupied countries , while the part 
of Krupp was his indus trial aid to the Nazis  and the abuse 
of human beings for labor in his plants . 
Kaltenbrunner was arraigned on counts one , three,  and 
four, with particular emphas i s  on his cr ime s under c ount four 
involved in the system of concentration camps . Frank was hailed 
on counts , one , three , and four , with his part 1n the adminis­
trat ion of the occupied terr itories playing a predominant par t .  
Bormann, tried !a absent ia, was also charged under the above 
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three c ount s ,  as was Ley, with emphas is in his case be ing 
plac ed on count s three and four relat ing to the abuse of human 
be ings tor labor . Raeder and Doen i t z  we re charged wit h  c oun t s  
one ,  two , and three , with the ir p art for crime s  ar is ing out 
ot sea warfare being promin ent . The part of Fri t z s che , arraigned 
under c oun ts one ,  three , and four , was s e t  down par t i cularly 
as being the Re ich Min i s ter of Propaganda and head of DNB , and 
for ant i- Jewish measure s and the ruthle ss explo itat i ons of 
the oc cupied terri tor ie s .  Schacht wa s ha iled before the Tr ibunal 
on count s one , and two , with emphas is on h i s  par t in financ ially 
aiding the Naz is . Schirach was charged with c ounts one and 
four , par ticularly anti-Jew ish measures under four ; and Stre icher 
also on c ount s  one and four , w i th emphas is be ing plac ed on 
the inditement to persecution of the Jews . 53 
Appendix B of the Indic tment was conc erned with the 
cr iminality of c ertain Ge rman groups and organi zat ions- - the 
Re ich Cab inet ,  Le adership C orps of the Naz i  Party, SS includ ing 
the SD, Ge s tapo ,  SA, and the General Staff and High C ommand 
of the German Armed Forc es . The se organizat ions wer e arra igned 
on all four c oun t s  of the Indic tmen t .  It the Tr ibunal found 
the organ izat ions to be criminal , charge s ·oould be brought 
aga ins t indiv idual members , wi th the ir s ub s equent tr iala . 54 
53 Department of Stat e ,  ££• �. , pp . 65-76 .  
54 Ib id . , pp . 78-81 . 
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The derendants at Nuremberg were part ies to one of the 
greates t  organized tragedies  that the world has ever seen-­
tragedy from the standpo int of what happened to countle s s  mil­
lions of people and was te in material and human resource s . 
There were three different avenue s opened t o  the United Nati ons 
when the defendants were captured--releas e ,  summary punishment , 
or trial . The c ommon vo ice of humanity would have prohibited 
release .  Doubtle s s  wide-spread, popular violence would have 
been inrlic ted upon the leading Naz is and many less er one s had 
thi s  c ourse been followed . Snmmary pun ishment had too much 
of the odor of the Nazi  brand of jus tice . Executive act i on 
such as used in bani shing Napoleon Bonaparte to  St . He lena , 
as baa been said above , was advocated by certain Englishmen . 
A trial, such as that held at Nuremberg was a fa irer dec is io n  
from the s tandpoint of the defendant s  and can b e  o f  use in 
building law and order in the future . 
In this  c onne ct ion a statement of Elliott Roosevelt 
in !! � � ]!  has interes t .  Roosevelt cla ims that in a 
t oas t at Teheran on the subject of the Naz i  leaders , Stalin 
said :  " I  propose a salute to the swirteat  pos s ible justice 
ror all Germany ' s  war cr iminals--justice  before a firing squad . 
I dr ink to our un ity in dispatching them as fas t  as we capture 
them, all of them, and there mus t  be at leas t  fif ty thousand 
of them. " According to Roosevelt , Churchill in agitat ion 
rose and said :  "Any s uch att itude is wholly c ontrary to our 
British sense of justice l The Br itish people will never s tand 
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for such ma s s  murder . I take this  opportunity to say that I 
feel mos t  s trongly that no one , Nazi or no , shall be summarily 
dealt wi th, before a firing s quad, w ithout proper legal trial, 
no matter what the known facts  and p roven evidence agains t 
h1m l"55 
For a tr ial to be fair and just three things are necessary: 
( 1 )  the defendant must be charged wi th a punishable cr ime ; 
( 2 )  he must have full opportunity f or defens e ;  and ( 3 )  he mus t  
be judged on the evidence by a properly pre s cr ibed judic ial 
body . We have shown that law exis ted to punish war crime s  
and cr ime s agains t human ity . We have summar ized the argument 
that a crys tallized world opinion supported the c ontention 
that the making of aggress ive war is an internati onal crime . 
The s ec ond requireme nt is  that the defendant mus t have 
adequate oppor tun itie s  for defense . In thi s ,  the Tr ibunal 
leaned over bac kwards to be fair . Each defendant was allowed 
to tes t ify for himself, a right denied by Cont inental law , 
hence German law. At the end of the tr ial, each defendant 
was allowed to address the Tr ibunal at length--a thing den ied 
by Anglo -Amer ican law . Counsel were pa id, fed, sheltered, and 
transpor ted at the expense of the Uni ted Nat ions , and were 
furnished office space and c ler ical ass is tanc e .  The defense 
had full ac cess to all doc uments , with every attempt made to 
produce des ired witnesses  when the Tr ibunal be lieved their 
55 Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It ( New York : Due ll, 
Sloan , and Pearc e ,  1946 ) ,  pp .-ra�9:-- --
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tes t imony to be relevant .  In summing up the case the defens e 
had twenty days and the prosecution three . Thus every effort 
was made by the Tribunal to be fa ir . 
As regards the third requirement of fair judgment by the 
evidence produced, the Tr ibunal found only e ight defendants 
guilty of count one . As  regards count two , only in the case 
of Hes s ,  sentenced to life impri s onment, is the punishment 
of any defendant based s olely on the count of aggre s s ive war . 
All of those receiving a capital sentence were convicted of 
war cr imes or cr imes aga inst humanity, and thus no innocent 
live s were lost on the charge that aggre s s ive war has not been 
established as criminal in international law .  The fact that 
there were three acquittals--Sehacht , von Papen, and Fritzsche-­
shows that the Tribunal did not believe in the Rus s ian c onception 
of a trial--merely a sentenc ing procedure . 56 
Opponents of the Nuremberg tr ial can advanc e a strong 
case also .  As regards the fir s t  requirement of a just trial ,  
thi s group argue s that Nuremberg was an i11-s tarred attempt 
to handle judic ially a matter that was es sent ially non­
jus t ic iable . 57 Charges of making aggress ive war and conspiracy 
were crimes set down at London in 1945 , and applied retroact ively 
to the defendant s ,  not by the states or the world in agreement , 
56 St 1mson,  �· �· � PP • 179-88. 
57 "The Nuremberg Confus ion, " Fortune, December , 1946, p .  120. 
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but by �our victorious allies ,  impos ing the ir will on a van­
quished people . Even the Charter which de�ined the cr imes was 
not a treaty--the pr inc ipal source o� international law--in 
the United State s ,  but merely an execut ive agreement ,  prescribed 
to meet  an emergency quickly and e�fect ively .  As proof of the 
contenti on regarding the legal ity o� the trial, this group 
gave the Moscow Dec larat ion, which said that these men would 
be punished--not tried, but punished--and the method was to  
be determined by a j oint dec i s ion o� the governments in the 
coalit ion . They argue too , that there i s  no customary criminal 
law, as St ims on suggests . True , aggressive war�are was condemned , 
but never did the s tate smen who after World War I so often 
talked ab out it provide for the trial or those sus pec ted o� 
conspiracy or the planning of such war , or the pun is�nt o� 
those convic ted o� waging it,  i .  � no internat ional cr iminal 
code existed .  Aggre s s ion, as Jac ks on admitted, was not pre­
vious ly treated as a cr 1me tor which an individual who was the 
head of a state could be given spec ified punishment . As regards 
war crime a and cr ime a against humanity, the argument is that 
many things classed as crimes under -certain international docu­
ments are outmoded because of modern technological development s 
and the conception of "total war, " as Goering mainta ined in 
his defense . St imson, hi�elf, says that America employed 
unrestricted submarine warfare against the Japanese--the main 
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reason £or our entry into World War I .  An ar gument that the 
use of the atomic bomb agains t Japanese civilians was the great­
est  cr ime agains t humanity that has been commit ted could be 
sus tained . 58 
In the name o£ c ount £our, the Indic tment charged the 
Germans with exploiting occupied terr itor ies and of mis treat ing 
the c ivilian population . But even s ince the close of World 
War II the so-called "liberat ors " of Europe have caused ne edle ss  
-
dis tre s s  along economic line a among local populations . The 
Nuremberg judgment "c onvicted" the vanquished of deporting 
. . 
civilian populat ions and employing slave labor, yet one of. the 
vic tors engages in this hateful prac t ice . The vanquished were 
charged with keeping political opponents in concentration c amps , 
but in the vast camps of the USSR today, are con£ined many a 
former leader of a liberated territory whose  only crime was 
political oppos ition to Stalin. The vanquished were charged 
with requisitioning property and of letting the ir armies live 
off occupied areas,  but in Eastern Europe , one victor proceeds 
in the same manner . Where is the law? It seems that the Big 
Four were applying a double standard in dealing wi th a defeat ed 
power . Woe to the Vanquished l 
To the claim that the Nazis  had adequate means of de£enae,  
' 
cr itic s  say the Nazi leaders , in the eyes _of the United Nations , 
58 St imaon, �· �. , p .  189 . 
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were already condemned criminals , and there£ore nothing said 
or shown in the ir defense would have any meaning. 
As regards the third step of fair j udgment, the defend­
ants must be tr ied before a properly cons t ituted author ity. 
Antagonists pounc e upon this and challenge the competenc e  ot 
the court . The Tribunal was composed of £our j udges from £our 
states--late enemies of Germany--and there was not a neutral 
nor a German judge connec ted in any way with the Tr ibunal . 
What ruled in the se mat ters was not international law but 
international p olitic s ,  and a victor could di spense anything 
from mercy t o  vindic tivenes s ;  the only thing tha t a victor 
cannot give i s  justice,  as the j udge at a £air tr ial ia  sub ject 
to  the same law as the accused . Law can inspire jus t ic e  but 
overwhelming power canno t . 59 
What may we safely conclude ?  One author ity argues for 
the tr ial and another e qually good authority argues against 
i t .  Convinc ing proof is produced for the legality of Nuremberg, 
while equally convincing proof £or the illegal nature or the 
tr ial can be brought for th. Who knows what the effec t of the 
Nuremberg trial can mean to the world in gener al and international 
law in part icular ? Will it be the c ornerstone of world peac e ?  
Will the man who make or plans t o  make aggre s s ive warfare be 
59 Fortune , £2• £!!. ,  p .  256 .  
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regarded as cr iminal ? Wi ll internat i onal law always be l imi ted 
by internat ional polit ic s ?  Only future his t ory holds the 
answers to the se pr e s s ing pr ob lems of the present . 
CHAPTER IV 
NUREMBERG 
On November 20, 1945 , the Nuremberg Trial began. On 
October 1 ,  1946 the Op inion and Judgment of the Trib unal was 
rendered. The sessions were held in the Palace of Justice , 
which wa s largely intact and out s ide the de vasta ted area of 
the city of Nuremb erg . 
The de fendant s were brought fr om the Nuremb erg jail to 
the sess ions by American mi litary poli ce , and seated in their 
b ox. Through a door opening directly on to the bench, the 
members of the Trib unal entered- -the Bri tish member, Pres ident 
of the Trib unal ,  Sir Jeffrey Lawrence , and his alternate , Mr . 
Jus tice Birket� ; the Ameri can member , Mr .  Francis Biddle , and 
hi s alterna te , Judge John J. Parker; the French memb er, M .  Le 
Profe ss eur Donnedieu de Vabres , and his alternate ,  M .  Le . 
Conseiller R .  Falco ; and the Rus s ians , Ma j or General I .  T .  
Niki tchenko , and his alterna te , Lieutenant Colone l A ·  F.  Volchkov. 
The Prose cution Counsel was made up of the following : 
for the Uni ted States ,  Jus tice Robert H. Jacks on; for the Uni ted 
Kingdom, Attorney-General Sir Hartley Shaworos s ;  for the French 
RepUbl i c ,  M.  Francois de Menthon, and M .  Augus te Champetier de 
Ribes ; and for the Soviet Union, General R .  A· Rudenko . l 
1 Na zi Conspiracy and Aggress ion-·Opinion and Ju�ent 
( Washington:- United States Gove rnment Printing O??!ce , 47),  
P •  v. 
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Defendant Robert Ley had c ommitted suic ide in pr ison 
on October 25, 1945 . On November 15, 1945 , the Tribunal d ec ided 
that defendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach could not 
then be tr ied because of his phys ical and mental condition, 
but that the charges against him in the indic tment should be 
reta ined for trial thereaft er ,  if his condition should permi t .  
on November 17 , 1945, the Tr ibunal dec ided t o  try Martin Bormann 
in absent ia under the provisions of Art icle 12 of the Charter • 
...... 
After .argument and cons iderati on of the reports of medical 
examiners,  and a s tatement from the defendant hims elf, the 
Tr ibunal dec ided on Dec ember 1,  1945 , that no grounds existed 
for a postponemen t  of Hes s • trial because of his mental con­
dition .  A s imilar dec is ion was reached in regard to Stre icher . 
In ac c ordanc e with Art icles 16 and 23 of the Charter , 
attorneys were ei ther chosen by the defendants thema elve s ,  or 
at their reque s t  were appo inted by the Tribunal . In his absence 
counsel wa s appointed for Bormann, and lawyers were selected 
to repre sent the indicted groups or organ izat ions . The tr ial 
was conducted in four language s --English, French, Rus s ian, 
and German . Pleas or "Not gui lty" were made by all the defend­
an ts present . The hear ing of evidence and the spe eche s  of 
counsel conc luded on August 31, 1946 . 
Four hundred and three open s e s s ions of the Tribunal 
were he ld . Thirty-three witnesses  tes tified orally for the 
prosecut ion against the �ndividual defe ndant s ,  and s ixty-one 
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witne s s e s ,  in addition to nineteen of the de fendants , te s t ified 
for the defens e .  A further one hundred and forty-three wi t­
ne sses gave depos it ions for the defense . 
The Tr ibunal appo inted commiss ioners to hear evidence 
relating to  the organization s ,  and one hundred and one wi t­
ne sses  were heard for the defense before these  commi s sioners , 
and one thousand e ight hundred and nine affadav its from other 
witnesses  were s ubmitted . Six reports were also submi tted, 
s ummariz ing the contents of a great number of further affadavits . 
Thirty-eight thousand affadavits , s i gned by one hundred 
and fifty-five thousand people , were submitted on behalf of the 
political leaders , one hundred thirty-s ix thousand two hundred 
and thirteen on behalf of the SS, ten thousand on behalf of 
the SA, seven thousand on behalf of the SD, three thousand on 
behalf of the General Staff and OKW, and two thousand on behalf 
of the Ge s tapo . The Tr ibunal itself heard twenty-two witne s se s  
for the organizat ions . 
The doc uments tendered in evidence for the prosecution 
of the individual defendants and the organizations numbered 
several thousands . A complete stenographic record of every­
thing said in court was made , as well as an electr ical rec o_rding 
ot all the proceedings . Copies  of all the documents put in 
evidenc e by the prosecut ion were supplied to the defens e in 
the German language . The applicat ions made by the defendant s  
for the produc tion of witnesses  and documents rai sed ser ious 
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problems in some ins tances 1  on acc ount o£ the uns e ttled s tate 
o£ the country. 
It was nec e s sary to limit the number o£ witnesses  called 1 
in order to expedite the hearing in ac cordance wi th Art icle 
lSc o£ the Charter . The Tr ibunal 1 a£ter examination1 granted 
all those applications which in i t s  opinion were re levant to 
the de£ense o£ any defendant or named group or organization, 
and were not cumulative . Fac ili ties were provided £or obtain­
ing those witnesses and documents granted through the o££ic e 
o£ the General Secretary established by the Tribunal . 
Much o£ the evidence presented to t he Tr ibunal on behalf 
of the prosecut ion was o£ a documentary nature1 captured by 
the Allied armies in German Army headquarter s 1  government bui ld­
ings1 and elsewhere . Some o£ the documents were £ound in  
salt mine s 1  buried in the ground1 hidden behind £ala e walls , 
and in other places which were thought to be s a£e £rom finding. 
The cas e 1  there£ore 1 agains t the de£endants re s ted in large 
measure on German documents 1 the authentic ity of which was not 
even challenged except in two case s . 2 
The opening s tatement £or the prosecution was made by 
Jus t ice  Jacks on 1 who dec lared that if the de£endant s were the 
first war leaders to be prosecuted in the name o£ law1 they 
were als o the f irst to be  given a chance t o  plead for their 
2 �. , pp . 2-3.  
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lives in the name of the law . He asked for convict ions only 
when the crime was proved, and not only on the tes t imony of 
foes . No count of the indic tment that could not be proved by 
books ,  rec orda , films , and other proof which the ,Germans them­
selve s made ,  was to be c ons idered . He further stated that i t  
was not the purpose of the trial t o  incr imi nate the whole German 
people , as it was realized that the Naz i  Party, the c entral 
core of the aggress ive ac t ions ,  did not repres ent a ma jority 
of the German people . 3 
And now let us turn t o  the f indi ngs of the Tr ibunal as 
s e t  down in the Judgment and Opinion of �ha t body . The Tr ibunal 
dec lared that Art icle 6 of the Charter c onta ined the law t o  
b e  applied in the case . 4 As t o  counts one and two, the Judgment 
stated that it would be c onven ient to c ons ider the ques t ion 
of the exis tenc e of a c ommon plan and the que s t ion of aggre s s ive 
war together . War was declared to be an es sent ially evil thing, 
and therefore to  init iate a war of aggres s ion was not only an 
internat ional cr ime ; it was the supreme internat ional crime 
differing only from other war crime s  in that i t  contained wi thin 
itself the accumulated evil of the whole . 
The first ac ts  of aggres si on referred t o  were the se izure 
of Aus tr ia and C zechoslovakia, and the first war of aggres s ion 
3 Robert H .  Jackson, The Case Against the Nazi War 
Criminals ( New York : Knopf,�4�PP • 8-9. --- ---- ---
4 !!!! Conapiracz � Aggres s ion--Judgment � Opinion, 
�· �. , P • 4 .  
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was the Pol ish War begun on Septembe r  1, 1939 . Before examining 
the se charge s it was neces sary to look at s ome of the event s 
prec.oding the s e  ac ts . The war aga inst Poland did not suddenly 
c ome out of a clear sky . The evidence presented made i t  c l ear 
that thi s ,  as we ll as the Austrian and C z ech s e i zure s ,  was 
premedi tated and ca�efully planned, and was not undertaken 
unt il the opportune moment for it to be carr i ed through acc ord­
ing to plan . The aggres s ive designs of Naz i  Germany were no t 
acc idents aris ing out of the immediate pol i t ic al s ituation 
in Europe and the world--they were an e s sential part of Nazi 
foreign policy. 
From the beginning, the Naz is had claimed that their 
ob j ect was to  unite Ge�many in the c onsc iousness of i t a  mi ss ion 
. and des t i ny. For this achievement , two things were deemed 
e s sent ial:  ( 1 ) the disruption of the European order as it had 
existed s ince the Versailles Treaty, and ( 2 )  the creation of 
a Greater Germany beyo�d the front iers of 1914 , which nece ssar ily 
involved the se izure of fore ign terri tory. In � Kampf, thi s  
view was made qui te clear b y  Hitler . Over and over, Hitler 
asserted his bel ief in forc e as the only means of s olving inter­
nat ional ·que s t ions . The f ir s t  page of the b ook as serts that 
German-Austria must be res tored to Germany no t on economic 
grounds , but because people of the same rac e  should be under 
the same governme n t . As to t errit ory not rac ially German, 
Hitler looked toward the eas t as a means of ga ining "Lebensraum, " 
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and on thi s ,  � Kampf was quite explic i t ,  s tating that only 
in Russ ia and the border ing states could Germany ' s  terr itor ial 
appe tite be satisfied. 5 
Evidence from captured documents revealed that Hitler 
held tour secret meetings to which the Tribunal made spec ific 
referenc e because of the light they shed upon the quest ions 
ot the common plan and aggre ss ive war . These meetings were 
held on November 5 , 1937 ; May 23, 1939; August 22 , 1939; and 
November 231 1939 . At these mee tings important declarati ons 
were made by Hi tler as to his purposes,  which were qui te 
unmis takable .  These document s have been sub j ected to critic ism 
at the hands of the defending counsel; the ir es sent ial authen­
t icity was not denied, but it was said that they were not 
verbatim transcripts of the speeches they purpor ted to rec ord . 
Making the fullest allowance for cr itic i sm of thi s kind, t he 
Tribunal was of the opinion that the document s  wer e of the 
highest value , and that the ir authentic ity and substantial 
truth were es tablished . The doc uments were c oncerned with 
plans for ac tion against Aus tria, C zecho slovakia, and Poland, 
and showed premeditated preparat ion, the only que s t ions were 
as to the opportune times . The meeting of November 5 , 1937 , 
was attended by Lieutenant Colonel Hossbach, Hitler ' s  personal 
adjutant,  who compiled a long list of the proceedings , which 
5 Ib id. , PP • 16-7 • 
........... 
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he dated November 10, 1937 , and s igned . This do cument showed 
plainly the intent ion to seize Aus tria and C zechoslovakia. 
The mee t ing of May 23, 1939, was concerned with Hitler ' s  
dec is ion to attac k Poland in violation of the Arb itrati on Treaty 
of 1925 and the Non-Aggres s ion Treaty of 1934, and repeated 
as surances of friendship by Hitler and other Germans . Among 
the per sons present at this conference were Goering, Raeder , 
and Keite l .  The adjutant on duty that day was Lieutenant Colonel 
Schmundt , and he made a rec ord of what happened, cert ifying 
it with hi s· s ignatur e .  In thi s  document,  Hitler said : "There 
is therefore no que stion of sparing Poland, and we are left 
with the dec is ion to attack Poland at the first  suitable oppor­
tunity. We cannot expect repetition of the C zech affair . 
There will be war . Our task is to is olate Poland . The suc c e s s  
of the isolation will b e  dec isive • • • •  The i s olation of 
Poland is a matter of skillful politics . "  
� 
The two documents of Augus t 22 , 1939, further showed 
the planning for aggre s s ive war.  One is  called "The Fuehrer ' s  
Speech to the Commander s in Chi ef on the 22nd August 1939 
• • •  " and was for the purpo se of announc ing the dec is ion to 
make war on Poland at onc e .  The other document i s  headed, 
" Second Speech by the Fuehrer on the 22nd Augus t 1939, " and 
it was in the form of notes on the main points made by Hitle.r . 
In spite of its being described as a second speech, there is  
enough s imilarity between the two to make it appear very probable 
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that this was an account of the f irst speech . Both these 
doc uments were uns igned , and closely res emb led one of the 
documents put in evidence on behalf of the defendant Raeder . 
This  lat ter document cons isted of a summary of the same speech , 
c ompiled on the day it was made by one Admiral Boehm, from 
notes he had taken during the mee t ing . In subs tanc e 1 t  said 
that the t ime had come to  settle the Polish dispute by mili-
tary invas ion . 
The document relat ing to  November 23, 1939 , contained 
a review of pas t  events . Hitler informed his commanders that 
the purpos e  of the conference wa s to  give them an idea of the 
world of his thought s ,  and to tell them his dec is ions . He 
reviewed his political task s ince 1919, and referred to the 
secess ion of Germany from the League ot Nat ions , the denun­
c iat ion of the Disarmament C onferenc e ,  the order tor rearmament , 
the re introduc t ion of c ompulsory mi li tary s ervic e ,  the Rhine­
land occupat ion, the seizure of Austria and C zechoslovakia . 
He declared : 
One year later,  Aus tria came • • • •  It brought about 
a cons iderable re inforcement of the Re ich. The next 
step was Bohemia , Morav ia , and Poland • • • •  It was 
not poss ible to reach the goal in one effort . It 
was clear to me from the f irst  moment that I could 
not be satisfied with the Sudeten Ge rman terr itory . 
That was only a part ial s olut ion . The dec is ion to  
march into Bohemia was made . Then followed the 
ere c t ion of the Pr otectorate and with that the bas is 
for the ac t �on again s t  Poland was laid, but I wa sn ' t  
quite clear at that t ime whether I should start firs t 
aga ins t the eas t  and then in the wes t  or vic e  versa.  
• • . Bas ically I did not organize the armed forc es in 
order not to s trike . The dec is ion to strike was always 
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in me . Earlier or later I want ed to s olve the prob lem. 
Under pre s sure it wa s dec ided that the east was to be 
attacked firs t .  
This addre s s , which reviewed pa st events and reaffirmed the 
aggres s ive i n tent i ons pre sent from the beginning, t o gether 
with the above me n t i oned doc uments , plac ed beyond any que s t ion 
of doubt the charac ter of the ac t ions aga i n s t  Aus tr ia and 
C z e chos l ovakia , and the war aga ins t Poland, for they had all 
been accomplished according to plan . 6 
In the opin ion of the Tr ibunal , the events of the days 
immediately prec eding September l, 1939 , demons trated the de ter­
mina t i on of H i t ler and his a s soc ia tes to carry out the de c lared 
intent ion of invading Po land at all cos ts . With the ever 
increas ing evide nce before h1m that this inten t i on would lead 
to war with Great Br i tain and France as we l l ,  Hit ler was re­
s o lved not t o  depart from the course he had s e t  for himse lf . 
The Tribunal was tully satisf ied by the evidence that the war 
init iated by Germany against Poland on Sept ember 1 ,  1939 ,  was 
most plainly an aggre s s ive war , which wa s t o  deve lop in due 
c ourse into a war that embrac ed almo s t  the whole world, and 
resulted in the c ommi s s ion of countle s s  cr imes , both against 
the laws and cus toms of war and against human i t y .  
The aggres s ive war again s t  Po land was merely the b e gin­
n ing . The next two countr i e s  to s uffer were De nmark and Norway, 
6�. ,  PP • 18-34 .  
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in violation or non-aggre s s ion pac ts and solemn as surance s . 
The idea or this attack seems to  have or iginated with Raeder 
and Rosenberg as early as Oc tober 3, 1939 . Conspir ing with 
Vidkun Quis ling, a Norwegian Naz i ,  Raeder and Rosenberg, to­
gether with the naval s t aff , and with Ke itel and Jodl, showed 
Hitler the adv i s ibility or securing bases in Norway as a "pre ­
caut ionary measure . " A s  a res ult , Hitler is sued a d irect ive 
on March l, 1940, for the attack on Denmark and Norway, s t ating 
that the ope rat ion " should prevent Brit ish enc roachment on 
Scandinavia and the Balt ic , " s ince there was ample cause to 
believe that England would occupy Norway with the tac it consent 
of the Norwegian Governme nt . The German Embas sy in O s lo refuted 
this as be ing unfounded. The defense argued that Germany alone 
c ould dec ide , in accordanc e with the reservat ions made by many 
of the Signatory Powers at the t ime or the c onclus ion or the 
Ke llogg-Briand Pac t ,  whether prevent ive ac t ion was a nece s s ity, 
and that in making her dec i s ion her act ion was c onclus ive . 
But whe ther action take n  under the claim or self-defense was 
in fact aggre s s ive or defens ive must  ultimately be sub j ect to 
inve s t igat ion and adjudicat ion in internat ionallaw is ever 
to be enforced . No sugges t ion wa s made by the defendan ts  that 
there was any plan· of any belligerent, other than Germany, to  
occupy Denmark, in  c ontrast t o  the ease of Norway . No  excuse 
for that aggre s s ion was offered . On thi s ac t ion agains t Norway 
and Denmark, the Tribunal dec lared that in the light of all 
ava ilable evide nc e ,  it was imposs ible to accept the content ion 
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that these invas ions were defens ive , and in its  opin ion, they 
were ac t s  of aggress ive war . 7 
The plan to  seize Be lgium and the Netherlands was con­
s idered in Augus t,  1938 , with particular empha s i s  be ing placed 
on the use of these countr ies as air bases  in case of war wi th 
England and Franc e .  In May, 1939 , Hitler told his mi litary 
commanders that in event of a war with the wes t that "Dutch 
and Be lgian air bases mus t be occupied • • • •  Declarations of 
neutral ity must be ignored . "  Later in the year he declared 
hi s be lief that England and France would respect the integrity 
ot the Low Countr ies ,  thus giving Germany no earthly excuse for 
ac t ing as she did . No evidence was presented before the Tri­
bunal to justify the content ion that the se invas ions were 
just ified . They were carried out in pursuance of polic ies 
long cons idered and prepared, and were plainly act s  of aggre s s ion . 
The res olve to invade was made wi thout any other c ons ideration 
that the advanc ement of Germany ' s  aggres s ive policies . 8 
In the spr ing of 1941 , German forces invaded Yugos lavia 
and Greece in violation of repeated as surances . As early as 
August 12 , 1939 this plan was contemplated, for on that date , 
Hitler, in convers ing with Count Ciano of Ibay and von 
Ribbentrop, sugge sted this . I� was clear, therefore , 
7 Ibid . ' pp . 34-8� 
8 
�. , pp . 39-40. 
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that aggre s s ive war aga inst these two s tates had long be en 
planned . On thi s  charge , Germany pleaded that Great Br i ta in 
had come to the a id of the Greeks , and might b e  in a po s it ion 
to infl ic t grea t  damage upon German interes ts --the old doc trine 
ot prevent ive ac t i on again . 9 
On June 22 , 1941,  Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 
violat ion of the Non-Aggress ion Pac t of Augus t  23, 1939 . 
"Case Barbarossa , " a s  thi s operat ion was called, wa s planned 
-
as early a s  September, 1940 . No evidence was introduced to 
uphold the c ontent ion of the defendants tha t the attack on the 
USSR wa s jus t if ied because the Soviet Union was contemplat ing 
an a ttack on Germany. As late a s  June 6 ,  1941 ,  the German 
Amba ssador in Mos c ow informed his Governme nt that the Soviet 
Uniori would go to war only it at tac ked by Germany.  Thus the 
10 Tribunal called this act ion a case of pla in aggres sion.  
The last aggres s ive war of which the Tr ibunal found the 
Naz is to be guilty was that aga in s t  the Uni ted Sta te s . Through 
conspir ing with Japan and Italy, Germany dec lared war on the 
United States four days after Pearl Harb or . Although it was 
true that Hitler and his colleagues originally did not cons ider 
that a war with the Uni ted States would be beneficial, it is 
apparen t that in the course ot 1941 that view wa s re versed ,  
9 Ib id . 1 pp . 40-� • 
lOib td .  I pp . 43-6: • •  
and Japan was given every enc ourageme nt to  adopt a policy 
which would almost certainly bring the Uni ted State s into 
11 the war . 
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The next matters which the Tribunal cons idered were the 
violat ions of internat ional treat ie s . The Charter defined as 
a cr ime the planning or waging of war that i s  a war of aggres ­
s ion or a war in violat ion of internat ional treatie s . The 
Tribunal dec ided that certain of the defendants pla nned and 
waged aggre s s ive wars against ten nations , and were therefore 
guilty of this s eries of cr ime s . According to the Tribunal 
this made i t  unnece s s ary to cons ider the sub j ect in further 
detail , or even to cons ider at any length the extent to which 
these aggre s s ive wars were als o  "wars in violation of inter­
national treat ie s ,  agreeme nts , or as suranc e s . "  The s e  treat ies  
. 
are set down in Appendix C of the Indictment , and the pr in-
c ipal ones are lis ted in the previous chapter . 12 
The Tr ibunal pas sed on the law of the Charter , and reached 
this conclus i on c oncerning the legality of the tr ial . The 
making of the Charter was the exerc ise of the sovere ign legis­
lat ive power of the countr ies to  wh1ch the Third Re ich uncon­
ditionally surrendered ; and the undoubted right of these 
countr ies to  legislate for the occupied countr i e s  had bee n  
recogn i zed by the c ivilized world . The Charter was not the 
result of an arb itrary exerc ise of power on the part of the 
11 1£!g . ,  PP · 45-e• 
12 �. , pp . 46 . 
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vic tor ious nat ions , but in the view of the Tr ibunal, it was 
the express ion of internat ional law exist ing a t  the t ime of 
its  creation . The Signatory Powers , in creat ing the Tr ibunal , 
defined the law it was to administer and made regulat ions for 
the tr ial to be properly c onduc ted . In s o  do ing, they did 
together what one could have done singly ; t or it  was not to 
be doub ted that any nat ion has the right to s et up spec ial 
courts to  administer law . In regard to the const itut ion or 
the court , it was held all that the defe ndants were ent itled 
to  ask was to  rece ive a fair trial on the fac ts  and the law . 13 
It was urged on behalf of the defendants that a funda­
mental pr inc iple of all law--internat ional as we ll as domest ic-­
is  that there can be no pun i shment of an act as a cr ime with­
out pre existing law so defining 1t . I� was argued that � 
po st fac to punishment is abhorrent to the law of all c ivil ized 
nat ions , and that no s overeign state had made aggres s iv e  war 
a cr ime at the t ime the al leged cr iminal ac ts  were committed ,  
that n o  statute had def ined aggress ive war , that n o  penalty 
had been f ixed for its commis s i on, · and no court had been c reat­
ed to try and punish offenders . 
The Tribunal answered that it mus t  be  seen tha t nullem 
cr imen � lege is not a limitat ion on sovere ignty, but i s  
in general, a princ iple of jus tice . To hold that it  is un just 
13 � • •  pp . 48 · 
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to punish those who have defied treaties and attacked ne igh­
boring s tate s  without warning is false , for in suoh cases the 
aggres s or mus t  kn ow that he is do ing wrong, and therefore it 
would be unj us t if this wrong went unpuni shed . Occupying the 
pos it ions in the government of Germany, the defendants must 
have known tha t they were act ing in contravent ion of interna­
t ional law when in complete deliberat ion they carried out the ir 
de signs of invas ion and aggre s s ion . . On this view of the case 
alone , it seemed to the Tr ibunal that this pr inc iple of just ice 
had no application to  the matter under cons iderat ion . 
The legal meaning of the Pact of Par is was then di scussed 
with this conc lus ion . Since the nat ions adher ing to the Pac t 
condemned war as an ins trument of nat ional policy, the Tr i ­
bunal was of the opinion that such a war i s  illegal in inter­
national law ; and that those who plan and wage such a war are 
committ ing a crime in so do ing. War for the s olut ion of inter­
nat ional controvers ies undertaken as an ins trument of nat ional 
policy certainly include s a war of aggre s s ion,  and such a war 
is therefore outlawed by the Pac t .  
The defense argued , however,  that the Pac t does not 
expres s ly say that such wars are cr ime s or set up courts to 
try those who make such war . But this fac t was als o  true ot 
the Hague C onvent ion with regard to  the laws of war , s ince 
nowhere in the Convent ion are violators called cr iminal, nor 
� any s e ntence pre scribed, nor any ment ion made of a court 
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to try and punish offenders .  In the opinion of the Tr ibunal , 
those who wage aggre ss ive war are do ing that which is equally 
illegal , and of much greater moment than a breach ot one ot the 
Hague Convent ion regulations . In interpreting the words ot the 
Pac t ,  it should be bourne in mind that internat ional law is 
not made by an internat ional legi slature, and that such treaties 
as the Par is Pact deal only wi th general principles of law, 
and not with adminis trative matters of procedure . 
The view which the Tr ibunal took as to the interpre tat ion 
of the Pac t was supported by other movements which prec eded 
it . Such agreements as the 1923 Treaty of Mutual As s istance, 
the Geneva Pro tocol, Resolution ot the Eighth League As sembly 
ot 1927 , Res olution ot the Sixth Pan-Americ an Conference were 
all expres s ions of opinion reintorc 1ng the construc t ion which 
was placed on the Pact of Paris,  that re sort to a war of aggres­
sion 1s not merely illegal, it is cr imina1 . 14 
It was also important to remember that �ticle 227 ot the 
Versailles Treaty provided for the cons ti tut ion of a special tri­
bunal to try the former German Kaiser "tor a supreme offence 
against internat ional morality and the sanc t ity of treat ie s . " 
The purpose of this tr ial was expre ssed to be " to vindicate the 
-
so lemn obligat ions ot internat ional undertakings , and the valid-
ity ot international morality. " In Article 228 , the government 
. 
ot Germany expressly recognized the right ot the Allied Powers 
14 Ibid . , PP • 49-52 . 
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" t o  br ing before military tr ibunals pers on s accused of having 
c ommitted acts in violat ion of the laws and cus toms of war . " 
Thus the provis ions of this Art icle illus trate the view of 
individual re spons ib ility. The pr inc iple of internat ional law, 
which under certain circums t ances protec ts the representat ive s 
of a state , cannot be  appl ied to ac t a  which are c ondemned as 
criminal by international law . The author s of these ac t s  cannot 
shelter thems elves behind the ir offic ial pos it ion in order t o  
be freed from punishment . I n  other words , he who violates 
the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while ac t ing in pur­
s uanc e of the author ity of the s tate if the s tate in author­
i z ing act ion goes beyond its c ompetence under internat ional 
law . However , the Charter was generous in that whi le not fre e ­
ing a defendant from respons ib ility ar is ing out of superior 
orders , such a fac t might be c ons idered in mit igat ion of punish­
ment . 15 
In the previous rec ital of the fac ts  relat ing t o  aggres­
sive war , it was clear that planning and preparation had been 
carr ied out in the mos t  sys temat ic way at every s tage . Planning 
and preparat ion are necessary elements of waging war . In the 
opinion of the Tr ibunal aggre s s ive war is a cr ime unde r inter­
nat ional law .  The Indictment followed the definition set down 
in  the Charter . Count one charged the common plan or consp iracy, 
15 �. , pp . 52-3. 
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count two charged the plann ing and waging of war . The s ame 
evidence was in troduced to support both c ount s ,  and s o  b o th 
counts were d i scus sed t oge ther, as they were 1n sub s t anc e the 
s ame . 
In the opinion of the Tribunal the evidence e s tab l i shed 
the common plann ing to prepare and wage war by c ertain of the 
defendant s .  The argument that such c ommo n plann ing i s  impos ­
s ible under dic tat orship was held to be unsound .  A plan in 
the execut ion of which a number of pers ons par t ic ipate i s  
s t ill a plan , even though conc e ived by only one o f  them; and 
tho s e  who execute the plan do not avo id re spons ib i l i ty by 
showing that they ac ted under the direc t i on of the one who 
conc e ived i t . Hitler c ould not make aggres s ive war by himself .  
He had t o  have the c o operat ion of s tate sme n ,  mi l i t ary leaders , 
I 
d iplomat s ,  and bus ine s sme n .  When they, wi th knowledge of his 
aims ,  gave him the ir cooperation, they made thems e lves par t i e s  
to the plan he had init iated . They are not b e  de emed innoc ent 
becaus e Hitler made use of them, it they knew what they were 
do ing . That they were a s s igned to the ir tas ks by a d ic t ator 
d o e s  not abs o lve them from re spons ib ility for the ir ac ts . The 
re lation of leader to f o llower do es not prec lude �e spons ib il ity 
here anymore than it doe s  in the c omparab le tyranny of organ­
i z ed dome s t ic cr ime . 
C o unt one charged not only consp iracy t o  c ommit aggre s s ive 
war , but also to c ommit war crime s against human ity . But the 
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Charter did not def ine as a separa te cr ime any c onspiracy ex­
c ept the one t o  c ommi t ac t s  or aggre s s ive war . The Tr ibunal 
therero re disregarded the c harges i n  c oun t one tha t the de­
fenda nts conspired to c ommi t war cr ime s and c r ime s again s t  
human ity, and only cons idered the common plan to prepare , in­
it iate , and wage aggre s s ive war . l6 
As to the c ounts on war cr imes and c r ime s agains t human­
ity the Tr ibunal dec lared that the evidence re l ating to the s e 
c r ime s was overwhelming in volume and de t a i l . War cr imes were 
. 
c ommi tted on a vas t scale , b e i ng perpe trated in a ll c oun tries 
occup i ed by Germany and on the high seas , and were at tended 
by every c once ivab l e  c irc ums tance of crue lty and horror . The 
ma j or i ty of them arose rrom the Naz 1 c oncept ion of "t otal 
war , " for in thi s c o ncept ion , the moral ideas underlying the 
c onven t i on s  which s e e k  to make war mor e  humane are no longer 
re garded as having f orc e or va lidity . Rule s and regula t i ons 
have no import , and freed rrom the r e s train ing i nflue nce of 
in ternat ional law , aggr e s s ive war was c onduc ted by the Na z i s  
i n  the mo s t  barbar ic way . l7 
The Tr ibunal, bound by the Char t e r  1n i t s  definit ion 
ot war c r ime s and cr imes aga i n s t  human ity, dec lared that the 
prov is ions of Art ic les 46,  50, 52 , and 56 of the Hague C onven t i on 
1 6  Ib id. , pp . 54 -6. 
17 
Ibid. , p .  56 . 
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of 1907 , and Articles 2 ,  3, 4 , 46 ,  and 51 of the Geneva Con­
ve nt ion of 1929 were in effect , and that violations of these 
provis ions constituted cr ime s for which the guilty individuals 
were punishable . However , it  was argued by the defense that 
the Hague Convent ion did not apply in this cas e ,  because of 
the "gene�al partic ipation" clause in Article II  of the Hague 
Convent ion of 1907, as several of the belligerents in the late 
war were not part ies to thi s  convention. In the op inion of 
the Tribunal it was unnecessary to dec ide thi s quest ion, for 
the Convent ion s t ated that it was an at tempt "to �evise the 
general laws and cus toms of war, " which it thus recognized to 
be then existing. By 1939 these rules were rec ognized by all 
c ivilized nations , and were regarded as be ing dec laratory of the 
laws and cus toms of war . A further defense was made that 
Germany was no longer bound by these rules ,  because many ot 
the terr itories in which the crimes were committed had been 
completely conquered and incorporated wi thin the German Re ich, 
a fac t which gave Germany authority to deal with the oooupied 
territories as if they were integral parts of Germany . The 
Tribunal dec lared that it was unneces sary to dec ide whe ther 
the doctrine of subjugat ion had any applicat ion where it was 
the result of a cr ime of aggre ss ive war . Thi s  doctrine was 
never c ons idered applicable as long as there was an army in 
the field attempting to res t ore the occupied countries to their 
true owners , and in this case the doc trine could not apply to 
any s tate occupied afte� September 1, 1939 . As to war cr imes 
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committed in Bohemia-Moravia, i t  was suff ic ient to say that 
the s e  terr itories were never added to Germany, with a mere 
protec torate be ing established over them. 
As regards cr imes aga ins t humanity, the Tr ibunal held 
that there was no doubt whatever that polit ical opponents were 
murdered in Germany before the war, and that many of them were 
kept in c oncentrat ion camps under c ondit ions of great crue lty 
and horror . The pol icy of terror was carr ied out on a vas t  
s c ale , systematic and organized . The persecut ion o f  the Jews 
in this period was established beyond que s t ion.  To cons t itute 
crime s against human ity, the ac ts  re l ied on before the out­
break of war must have been in execution or in connection with, 
any cr ime within the jur isdic t ion of the Tr ibunal . The Tr i­
bunal was of the op inion . that revolt ing and horr ible as many 
of these cr ime s were , it was not satisfactor ily proved that 
they were done in  execut ion of, or in connec t ion with, any 
such cr ime . The Tribunal therefore made a general dec larat ion 
that the ac ta before 1939 were cr imes aga ins t humanity within 
the mean ing of the Charter, but from th� beginning of the 
war in 1939 , war cr ime s were c ommitted on a vast ac ale which 
were also cr ime a aga ins t humani ty; and insofar as the inhumane 
ac t s  charged in the Indictment,  and committed after the begin­
ning of the war, did no t cons t itute war cr ime s ,  they were all 
c ommitted in execution of , or in c onnec t ion with, the aggres­
s ive war , and therefore constituted crime a  against  humanity. 18 
18 �· , pp . 83-1� 
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The Charter provided for the tr ial of Naz i organizat ion s , 
and a s  a r e sul t ,  the Indic tment arraigned the fo llowing : the 
Le adership Corps of the Naz i Party, the Ge s tapo ,  the Sicher ­
he i t sdiens t ,  Schut z s taffeln, St urmab t e i lunge n ,  the Re ich Cab­
ine t ,  and the General Staff and High C ommand of the German 
Armed Forc e s . In effec t ,  therefor e ,  a member of an organ i z a t io n  
whi ch the Tr ibunal dec lared to be cr iminal c ould be sub s equently 
c onv ic ted o f  the cr ime of membership and be puni shed for that 
cr ime by death . This was not to as s ume that mil i tary or int er­
nat ional c o�ts which try the s e  individuals , howeve r ,  would 
not exerc i s e  appropr iate s tandards of j us t ic e .  Art icle 9 of 
the Charter used the words , "The Tribunal may dec lare " the 
-
organi zat ions c r iminal , s o  that the Tr ibunal c ould us e i t s  
discre t ion as to whe the r it would do s o . This discretion was 
a j udic ial one , and did not permi t arb i trary ac t ion, but was 
to be exerc is ed in acc ord wi th legal princ iple s ,  a foremo s t  
one be ing that gu ilt is pers onal , and mas s pun i shment should 
be avo ided . 
The Tr ibunal he ld that a cr iminal organ i za t ion was 
analogous to a cr im�nal consp ir acy in that the purp o s e of both 
i s  c ooperat ion f or c r iminal purpos e s . Since dec larations of 
cr iminal ity which the Tr ibunal made wo uld be us ed by other 
c ourts in the tr ial of ind iv iduals o n  acc ount of the ir member-
ship in the organ izat ions found t o  be cr iminal , the Tr ibunal 
made the tollow1ng recommendat ions : 
1 .  That so far as poss ible throughout the four zones 
of occupat ion in Germany the class ificat ions , 
sanct ions , and penalt ies be standardized .  Uni­
formity of treatment as far as pract ical should 
be a basic princ iple . This does not ,  of course,  
mean that discret ion in sentenc ing should not be 
ves ted in the court ; but the di scret ion should be 
within fixed limits appropriate to  the nature of 
the cr ime . 
2 .  Law No . 1019 • • •  leaves punishment entirely i n  the 
discret ion of the tr ial court even to  the extent 
of inflict ing the death penalty. • • • 
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3. The Tr ibunal recommends to the Control Counc il that 
Law No . 10 be amended to prescribe limitat ions of 
the punishment which may be imposed for membership 
in a criminal group or organizat ion so that such 
puni shment shall not exceed the punishment pre­
scribed by the de-Nazification law. 20 
The Leadership Corps of !h! Nazi  Party 
The Indictment named this body as an organizat ion which 
should be declared criminal . The C orps consisted, in effec t,  
19 Law No . 10 of the Control Counc il of Germany con­
tained the following provis ions : . Each of the following ac ts 
is recognized as a crime : • • •  ( d )  Membership in categor ies of 
a cr iminal group or organ izat ion declared cr iminal by the 
Internat ional Military Tr ibunal • • • • 
( 3 ) Any person found guilty of any of the cr ime s above mentioned 
may upon convic tion be punished as shall be determined by 
the Tribunal to be jus t . Such punishment may cons ist of 
one or more of the following : ( a )  De ath . ( b ) Imprisonment 
for 11fe or a term of years , with or wi thout hard labor . 
( c ) Fine , and impr isonment wi th or without hard labor, !n 
� thereof. 
20 �. , pp . 84-86 . The de-Nazific ation law mentioned 
was that of . March 5 ,  1946 , passed for Bavaria,  Greater-Hesse , 
and Wuerttemberg-Baden , which provided definite sentences for 
punishment in e ach type of offense . 
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o� the offic ial organizat ion of the Nazi Party, with Hitler 
as Fuehrer at its head . The actual work of running this group 
was carr ied out by the chief of the Party Chancellery, He s s  
later succe eded b y  Bormann, as s i s ted by the Re ichsle itung 
or Re ich Directorate , which was composed of the Re ichsle iters , 
the heads of the func tional organ izat ions of the Party, as 
we ll as the heads o� the var ious ma in departments  and offices 
which were attached to the Par ty Re ich Directorate . Under 
the Chief of the Party Chanc e llery was a hierarchy of offic ials 
of five different ranks . Membership in the Leadership Corps 
was wholly voluntary, and this group cons i s t ed of s ix hundred 
thousand persons . 
The primary purpose o� the Leadership C orps was to  
ass ist the Naz i s  in  obtain ing and in  retain ing c ontrol of 
Germany .  The machinery of the Corps was used for the wide ­
spread disseminat ion of Naz i  propaganda , and to keep a de tailed 
check on the poli t ical att itudes of the German people . As to 
cr iminal ac t ivities , the Corps played its part in the Jewish 
pers ecut ions , in the adminis trat ion of the s lave labor program 
under the direc t ions of Sauckel,  and was directly concerned 
with pr isoners of war . The machinery of the Corps was als o 
used in attempts made to  deprive All ied airmen of the protec t i on 
to which they were ent itled under the Geneva Convention . 
Wi th all the se dec is ions , overwhe lming evidence was produced 
to show that the charges were we ll-�ounded . 
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The Tr ibunal found that the Leadership Corps was us ed 
for purpos es which were criminal under the Charter, and involved 
the German izat ion of inc orporated territory as we ll as the 
other cr iminal ac tivit ies mentioned above . The defendant s ,  
Sauckel and Bormann ,  who were members of this organization , 
were among those who us ed it for said purpose s . The various 
grades of offic ials partic ipated , in one way or another, in 
these cr iminal ac tivities . The Re ichsleitung as the staff 
organizat ion of the Party was als o held re spons ible for the s e  
criminal programs , a s  we ll a s  the heads of the var ious staff 
organizat ions of the Gauleiters and Kre i a lei ters . The decis ion 
of the Tribunal on these staff organizat ions included only the 
Amt s leiters who were heads of offices on the staffs of the 
Re ichsle itung, Gaule itung, and Kre i ale 1tung . With regard to 
other staff off icers and party organizat ions attached to the 
Leadership Corps other than the Amt aleiters referred to above , 
the Tribunal excluded them from the declarat ion . 
The Tr ibunal dec lared to be cr iminal within the mean ing 
of the Charter the group composed of tho se members of the Lead­
ership Corps holding the pos it ions ment ioned above who became 
or remained members of the organ izat ion with knowledge that 
it was be ing us ed for the commiss ion of ac ta  dec lared criminal 
by Article 6 ot the Charter , or who were personally implic ated 
as members of the organizat ion in the commiss ion of such crime s . 
The bas is of this finding was the partic ipat ion of the organ­
izat ion 1n war crime a and cr ime s against human ity connected 
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with the war . The group declared criminal could not inc lude 
persona who had ce ased t o  hold any of the pos i tions menti oned 
above prior to September 1, 1939 . 21 
Ge s tapo � � 
The prosecut ion named Die Gehe lme Staatapol 1ze1  ( Gestapo ) 
and Die Sioherhe ltsdlens t de s Re ichsfuehrer SS ( SD )  as organ­
i zat ions which should be  dec lared or 1m1nal . The prosecut ion 
pre sented the oases aga inst them toge ther , s tat ing that this 
was neces sary because of the close worki ng relat ionship between 
them. The Tr ibunal permitted the SO to pre s ent lts  defense 
separately because of a cla im of conflict ing interes ts , but 
after examining the evidenc e ,  dec ided to cons ider the ir cases 
together.  The Ge s tapo and the SD were first l inked t ogether 
on June 26 , 1936 , by the appointment of Re inhardt Heydrich, 
who was chief of the SD, to  the pos i t ion of chief of the secur­
ity pollee , which was defined to inc lude both the Ge s tapo and 
criminal police . Before that t lme ,  the SD had been an inte ll­
igence agency, fir s t  of the ss, and after June 4, 1934, of the 
ent ire Nazi Party. The Ges tapo had been composed of the various 
pol i t ical pollee  forces of the var ious German Federal States 
which had been unified under the pers onal leaders hip of Rimmler 
wi th the aid of Goering. Thi s  consolidation dnder the lead­
ership of Heydrich or the police and the SD was formalized 
21 �. , pp . 87-91 . 
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by a decree of Sept embe r, 1939 . During the per iod with which 
the Tr ibunal was pr imar ily c oncerned , appl ic ant s tor po s i t ions 
in the security pol ice and the SD rece ived train ing in all its 
c ompone nt part s - - the Ge s t apo ,  c r iminal polic e ,  and SD. The s e  
gr oups were both volunt ary organ izat ions . 
The Ge s tapo and the SD were used tor purposes which 
were criminal under the Charter , involv ing the pe rsecut ion 
and exterminat ion of the Jews , brutalit ie s and killings in 
c once ntrat ion camps , exc e s ses in the admin is trat ion of the 
occupied countr ies , the administrat ion of the s lave lab or program, 
and the ill-tr eatment and murder of pr isoners of war . In 
dealing with the Ge s tapo the Tribunal inc luded all execut ive 
and admin istrat ive offic ials of Amt IV, the head offic e of 
the Ge s t apo , or conc erned with Ge s tapo admin i s trat ion in other 
departments ot the RSHA ( Re ichs Se cur ity He ad Amt or office ) 
and all local Ge s t apo offic ials serving both ins ide and out s ide 
of Germany, includi ng the members of the front ier po l ic e ,  but 
not inc luding the members of the borde r and cus toms protec t ion 
or the secret field po lice . At the sugge s t ion of the pro s e ­
cut ion the Tr ibunal did not inc lude per s ons employed by the 
Ge stapo for purely unoffic ial routine ta sks s uch as cler ical 
work . In deal ing wi th the SD the Tribunal inc luded Amte� III , 
head office for SD act i vitie s  within Germany ; VI , head off ic e  
for SD ac t ivit ies outs ide Germany ; and VII ,  the office for 
ide ological res earch ; ot the RSHA and all other members of 
the SD . 
. 
The Tr ibunal dec lared to be criminal within the mean ing 
of the Charter the group composed of tho s e  members holding the 
po s i t ions me nti oned ab ove who became or remai ned members of the 
organizat ions with knowledge that they were be ing used tor the 
c ommi s s ion of cr iminal acts , or who were personally imp licated 
as members or the organ i zat ions in the c ommi s s ion of such crimes . 
The bas i s  for thi s f inding wa s the partic ipat ion of the organ­
izat ions in war cr imes and crime s against humani ty in c onnec t ion 
wi th the war . The group dec lared criminal could not include 
those members who had ceased to hold the p o s i t ions men tioned 
b efore September 1, 1939 . 22 
The prosecut ion named Die Schut z s t affeln Der Nat ional­
soc ial i s t ischen Deut sche n Arbe iterparte i ,  commonly called the 
SS, as an organ i zat ion that should be declared crimina l .  The 
part of the Ind ic tme nt dealing with the SS also inc luded the 
SD, but thi s  organizat i on lat er bec ame an 1mportan t  part of 
the s ecur i ty polic e , and was dealt with in connec t ion with 
the Ges tapo . 
The SS was or iginally e s tablished by Hi tler in 1925 
as an e l ite sect ion of the SA for polit ical purposes of pro­
tect ing speakers at public me etings of the Nazi Party .  Aft er 
22 " �. , pp . 91·» • 
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the Naz i s  had gained power the SS was us ed to maintain order 
a nd control audienc es at ma s s  me et ings and was given the added 
duty or " internal s ecurity" by an Hitlerian decree . The SS 
played an impor tan t  part in the Roehm purge or 1934 , and as a 
reward , was so on made an independent un it of the Nazi Par t y .  
Until 1940 the S S  was a purely voluntary organizat i on .  After 
the format ion or the Wafren SS, organ ized as an armed un i t  to 
to used with the army in case of mob i l izat i o n ,  there was a grad­
ually incr eas ing numbe r or conscr ipted men taken into this 
group . It se emed that about one -third of the to tal number of 
me n j o in ing the warren SS were c onscripted , the number being 
higher at the end or the war than at the beginning, but there 
continued to be a high proport ion of volunteer s unt il t�e end 
of the war . 
SS un its were ac t ive part ic ipants in the s t eps leading 
up to aggre s s ive war . They were used in the occupat ion of the 
Sudeten land, of Bohemia-Moravia, and of Meme l .  But t his or­
gan ization was even more a general partic ipant in the commi s s ion 
of war cr ime s and crimes aga i n s t  human ity. There was evide nc e 
that the shoot ing of unarmed pr i s oners of war was a general 
pr ac t ic e  in some Waffe n SS divis ions . The rac e  and s e ttle-
ment office of the SS was ac t ive in c arrying out scheme s for 
German izat ion of occupied terr i tor ies . The s e  un i t s  were al so 
involved in the wide -spread murde r and ill-treatment of the 
c ivi lian population s  of occup ied countr i e s . Under the rus e 
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or fight ing partisan units , the SS exterminated Jews and other 
peoples thought politically undes irable , and the ir reports 
record the execution of count less numbers or people . Waffen 
SS divis i ons were respons ible ror many mas s acres and atroc i t ies 
in occup ied countries,  s uch as Oradour and Lidic e .  
The Tr ibunal found that knowledge or these cr iminal 
ac t ivit ies was suffic iently general to jus t ify dec lar ing that 
the SS was a cr iminal organi zat ion and that those members or 
the organizat ion who became or remained members with knowledge 
that i t  was being used tor the commiss ion of act s  declared 
criminal by Art ic le 6 of the Charter , or who were personally 
impl icated as members of the organizat ion i n  the commi s s ion 
of such crimes , we re crimi nals . Tho s e  were exc luded from res­
ponsib ility who were drafted into membership by the s tate 1n 
such a way as to  give them no choice in the matter, and who 
had committed no such cr imes . War crime s and c r imes against 
humanity were the bas is of these findings , and those persons 
who had ceased to  hold membership in the organiz at i on by Sep­
t ember 1, 1939, were not held respons ible . 23 
Another organ izat ion which the pros ecut ion wished t o  
be named criminal was Die Sturmab teilungen der Nat ionalaoc ial-
23 Ib id . , pp . 9?-102. 
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i s t i schen Deut schen Arbe iterparte i ,  commonly known as the 
SA . Thi s  organizat i on was founded in 1921 for polit ical pur­
poses , and was organ ized along mi litary lines . Unt i l  1933 the 
membership was purely vo luntary, , but in that year c ivil servants 
we re put under cer tain poli tical and economic pre s sure to 
j o in the SA . At the beginning of the war , the SA was composed 
of one and one -half mi llion me n, a great dec rease s ince the 
famous Roehm purge of 1934 . 
Atter the Naz i advent t o  power in 1933, the SA played 
an important role in e s tabl ishing a Nazi re ign of terror . 
Ac cording to the de c is i on ot the Tribuna l ,  unt il the 1934 
purge the SA was a group compo sed in large part of ruff ians 
and bullies who part ic ipated in the Naz i outrage s  of that 
period . It wa s not shown however , that the s e  atroc'ities were 
part of a spec ific plan t o  wage aggre ss ive war , and the Tri­
bunal therefore could not hold that the s e  ac t ivi t ie s  were 
criminal under the Charter . After the purge , the SA was re­
duced t o  the s t atus of a gr oup of un- important Naz i hangers­
on . Although in spec if ic ins tances some un i t s  of the SA we re 
used for the commis s ion of war cr ime a and cr ime s aga in st human­
ity, it could not be held that all its members part ic ipat ed 
in or e ven knew of the criminal ac ts . For the s e  reasons , the 
24 Tr ibunal did not dec lare theSA to be a criminal organiz at ion . 
24 Ib id . , pp . 102-4 • 
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� Re ich Cabinet 
Die Re icharegierung or the Re ich Cabinet was another 
organization which the Tr ibunal was asked to adjudge criminal. 
It cons isted of members of the ordinary cabinet after January 
30, 1933, members of the counc il of ministers for the defense 
of the Re ich and members of the secret cabinet counc i l .  The 
Tribunal was of the opinion that no declarat ion of criminality 
should be made , tor two reas ons : ( 1 )  because it was not shown 
that after 1937 it ever really ac ted as a group or organizat ion, 
and { 2 )  because the group of pers ons here charged was so small 
that members could be conven iently tr ied in proper cases without 
re sort to a declarat ion that the Cab ine t of which they were 
members was cr iminal . 
It was estimated that there had been forty-e ight members 
of this group . Eight of these were dead , and seventeen on 
trial before this Tr ibunal, leaving only twenty-three to whom 
the dec larat ion of criminality could have any importance . 
Where an organization wi th a large membership was us ed for 
criminal purposes , a declarat ion ot criminality save s much t ime 
and trouble as to the necess ity of inquiring into every individual 
cas e ,  but in the case of a small group such as the Re ich Cabinet 
. 
there was no such advantage to be gained , and therefore the 
Tr ibunal dec ided that no thing would be acc ompli shed by such 
a declarat 1on . 25 
25 � . ,  pp . 104-5 . 
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General St aff � ]1gh Command 
In dealing with this group ,  the Tribunal dec ided that 
no declarat ion of criminality should be made . The number of 
persons charged, while larger than that of the Re ich Cabinet , 
was still so small that individual tr ials of these officers 
would accompl ish the sought purpose be t ter than a dec laration 
would do . But a more compelling reason in the opinion of the 
Tribunal was that the Ge neral Staff and High Command, some t ime s 
referred to as the OKW, was ne ither an "organizat ion" nor a 
"group" within the mean ing of those terms as set down by the 
Charter . 
According to the evidence ,  the planning of this group 
at staff level,  conferences , and operat ional technique in the 
field and at headquarters was s imilar to that of the armed forces 
of other countr ies . The over-all effort of OKW at coordinat ing 
and direct ing, could be compared to the Anglo-American Combined 
Chiefs of Starr . On such bas i s ,  the top commanders of every 
other nat ion oould be put in the same category- -an as soc iat ion 
rather than an aggregation of mi li tary men .  
Many of the se mi litary leaders it was held were a dis­
grac e to  the profess ion of arma , and where the facta  warranted 
i t ,  they should be brought to trial for cr imes in which they 
act ively partic ipated, or pas s ive ly acquiesced. But the 
Tribunal did not consider this body as a group to be a criminal 
26 organizat ion . 
26 Ibid . , pp . 105-7 . 
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The Accused Individuals 
Artic le 20 of the Charter provided that the judgment 
qf the Tr ibunal as to the guilt or innocence of any defendant 
mus t  give the reas ons on which it was baaed . 
Goer ing 
Hermann Goer ing was indic ted on all tour c ounts . The 
evidenc e showed that after Hitler he was the mo a t  prominent 
man in the Naz i hierarchy. From the moment he j o ined the 
Party in 1922 and took c ommand of the SA, Goering wa s the 
adviser and ac t ive agent of Hi tler . He was largely ins tru­
me ntal in bringing the Nazis  to  power in 19331 and was respon­
s ible for c ons olidat ing this power by s trengthening the German 
armed forc es , creat ing the firs t c oncentrat ion camps and the 
Ge stapo , c onduct ing the Roehm purge , and becoming virtually 
the ec onomic dic tator of Germany . 
Goer ing was one �t the five important leaders pre s e nt 
at the Ros sbach Conference ( that· c onference at whic h  Ros sbach, 
Hitler ' s  adjutant to ok notes ) of Novemb er 5,  1937 ,  and he 
attended all the other important c onferences already discus sed . 
In the se izures of Austria, the Sudetenland , and Bohemia-Moravia, 
he was a pr ime ringleader, as he admit ted in his own tes t imony .  
He commanded the Luftwaffe i n  the at tack o n  Polahd and 
t�oughout the aggress ive wars which followed . Even if he 
oppqsed Hitler ' s  plans agains t Norway and the Soviet Union, 
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as he alleged, it was clear that this was only for strategic 
reasons . Onc e Hi tler had dec ided on a c ours e  of ac t ion , Goer ing 
followed without hes itation . He was ac t ive in prepar ing and 
execut ing the Yugos lavian and Greek aggress ions , and te s t ified 
that "Plan Mar i ta, " the at tack on Greec e ,  had been prepared 
long beforehand . His only ob jec t ion to the war again s t  the 
Soviet Union was ita  t iming ; he wi shed for s trategic reasons 
to pos tpone this war unt il Great Britain fell . He test ified 
that thi s point of view was dec ided by polit ical and mi litary 
reas ons only, believing that the USSR was the "most threatening 
menace to  Germany . "  
After hi s own admi s s ions to the Tr ibunal, l it tle doubt 
remained that Goering was the moving force for aggre s s ive war 
sec ond only to  Hitler . He was the planner and pr ime figure 
in the diplomatic and military preparat ions which the Third 
Re ich made for aggress ive war . 
As to war cr ime s  and cr ime s aga in s t  humani ty, Goering 
by his tes t imony admi tted his complicity in the use of slave 
lab or ,  in the spo iliation of c onquered terr itory, and in per­
secution of the Jews , par t ic ularly after the November , 1938 , 
riot s .  On some spec if ic points there was confl ic t of test imony, 
but in general hi s own admiss ions were more than suffic ient-
ly wide to be  conclus ive of his guilt , which has been held 
"unique in its  enormi ty . " The rec ord disclo sed no excuses tor 
Go ering, and as a result the Tr ibunal found him gu ilty on 
all four counts of the Indic tme nt . 27 
Rudolf Hes s  was indic ted under all fo ur count s . He 
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j o ined the Nazi Party in 1920, and partic ipated in the Munich 
Put sch on November 9,  1923. He became Hi tler ' s  closest  per-
sonal c onf idan t ,  a relat ionship which lasted unt il his flight 
to Br itain in 1941.  As Deputy Fuehrer, He s s  was the he ad of 
the Nazi Party with re spons ib ility for handling all party 
matters , and author ity to make dec is ions in Hi tler ' s  name on 
all que s tions of party leadership . As Re ichs Mini ster wi thout 
Por tfolio he had the author ity to approve all 'legi s lat ion 
sugges ted by the different Reichs Ministers before it could be 
enacted into law . In these pos it ions He s s  was an ac t ive sup­
porter of preparat ions for war . He was an informed and wi lling 
partic ipant in German aggre s s ion against Aus tria, C zechos lovakia, 
and Poland . He was in touch with Aus trian Nat ional Soc ial i s t s  
throughout the entire period between the murder o f  Chancellor 
Dollfus s and the Anschlus s ,  and gave ins truc t ions to it during 
that per iod . In the summer or 1938 He s s  was in act ive touch 
I 
with Konrad Henle in, chief of the Sudeten Germans ,  and at  the 
t ime of the Mun ich cr i s i s  of 1938, he arranged wi th Ke itel to  
c arry out the instruct ions of Hitler to make the machinery of 
the Naz i  Party available for a secret mobilization .  After 
27 lB!£. , pp . 108-10 . 
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the Pol i sh invas ion He s s  s i gned decrees  inc orporating Danz ig 
and certain Poli sh territor ie s  into the Re ich, and s e tt ing 
up the Government Gene ral . 
As t o  war crime s  and cr imes aga inst human ity, there 
was evidence showing the participat ion of the Par ty Chance l­
lery, under He s s ,  in the di stribut ion of order s connected 
with the commiss ion of war crimes ; that He s s  may have had 
knowledge of, even if he did not par t ic ipate in the crime s  
that were be ing commit ted i n  the eas t ,  and of proposed laws 
discriminating against Jews and Pole s ; and that he s igned 
decree s forc ing certain groups of Poles t o  acc ept German cit­
izenship . The Tribunal, however , did not  find suffic ient evi­
denc e to connec t  He ss with these cr imes to sustain a finding of 
gui lt . 
He was found guilty on counts one and two , and not 
guilty on counts three and four . 28 
YQn Ribbentrop 
Joachim von Ribbentrop was indi c ted under all four 
counts . Whi le not pres ent at the Hos sback Conferenc e ,  he 
sent a memorandum on January 2 , 1938, while s t ill Ambas sador 
to England, indic at ing hi s op inion that a change in the s tatus 
quo in the eas t could only be carried out by force and sugges ted 
methods to prevent England and France fr om interven ing in a 
28 Ib id . , pp . 111-3 . 
European war fought to br ing about such a change . Von 
Ribbentrop attended conferenc e s  at which aggre s s ive ac t ion 
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was planned agains t Austr ia,  Czechos lovakia, and Poland, and 
was advised in advance of the at tack on Norway, Denmark, and 
the Low Countries , prepar ing the off ic ial Fore ign Offic e mem­
oranda attempt ing to jus t ify these  aggres s ions . He further 
par t ic ipated in plots of aggres s ion against Gr eece ,  Yugo slavia , 
and the USSR . 
Under counts  thre e and four, Ribbentrop part ic ipated 
in a mee t ing of June 6, 1944 , at which it was agreed that 
Allied aviat ors c arrying out machine-gun attacks on c ivilian 
populat ion should be lynched. He also played an important 
part in Hit ler ' s  11 final s olut ion" � � total exterminat ion 
of the Jews . In September, 1942,  he ordered the German dip­
lomats to the various Axis satellites to has ten the deportat ion 
of the Jews to  the east . 
Von Ribbentrop' s defense was that Hit ler made all the 
important dec i s ions and that he was such a great admirer and 
faithful follower of Hitler that he never questi oned Hitle r ' s  
repe ated as sertions that he wanted pe ace , or the truth of the 
reas ons  Hi t ler gave in explaining aggre s s ive ac t ions . The 
Tribunal did not cons ider thi s explanat ion to  be  tr ue,  and 
found him guilty on all four counts of the Indic tment . 29 
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Keitel 
Wilhelm Ke itel was indic ted on all four count s . He 
attended the Schuschnigg conference in February, 1938 , and 
together with Ki tler put pres s ure on Aus tr ia with fals e rumors , 
broadcas ts , and troop manuevera . Ke itel als o part icipated in 
the rape of C zechoslovakia, and was pre sent on May 23, 1939 , 
when Hitler announced his dec is ion to attack Poland . He was 
in charge of the Norway and De nmark invas ions , and played an 
important part in the ac t ions involving Greec e ,  Yugoslavia, 
and the Soviet Uni on .  He testifi ed that he oppos ed the invas ion 
or Rus sia tor mi litary re asons , and also because it cons t ituted 
a violat ion of the Non-Aggre s s ion Pac t ,  but never theless he 
init ialed "case Barbaros aa, " the Rus s ian invas ion plan , signed 
by Hitler as early as December 18, 1940 . He issued hi s time­
table for the invas ion on June 6, 1941, and was present at the 
briefing of �une 14 , when the ge nerals gave their final reports 
before attack.  
Under counts three and rour , Ke itel was charged with 
the following . He issued a direc tive that paratroopers were 
t o  be turned over to the so .  After the land ing in Normandy, 
he reaffirmed it , and later extended it to Allied mis s ions 
fight ing with partisans . He admitted that he did not believe 
the order was legal, but claimed he could not at op Hitler from 
ordering it . 
Ke itel was further charged with playing a leading role 
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in the ill-treatment and exterminat i on of Jews , Soviet pr isoners 
of war , and the Polish inte llige nt s ia and nobility .  The s o­
called •Nacht und Nebel" decre e ,  wi th Ke i te l ' s  signature ,  pr o­
vided that in oc cup ied terr itor ie s  c ivilians who had been ac cus ed 
of cr ime s  of res i s tanc e aga ins t  the army of occupat ion would 
be tried only if a death sentence were likely; otherwise they 
would be handed over to the Ge s tapo for transpor tat ion to 
Germany . 
In the face o f  the evidence Keitel d id not deny his 
connec tion with the se  acts .  Rather, hi s defens e relied on the 
claim that he was a soldier,  and on the doc trine o f  " superior 
or�ers , " prohibi ted by Art icle 8 of the Charter as a defens e .  
There was nothing offered in mit igation .  Superior orders , 
even to a soldi er,  could not be con s idered where cri�s as 
shocking and extens ive were commi tted consc iously, ruthles s ly, 
and wi thout military excuse or justificat ion ,  and so the 
Tr ibunal found him guilty on all counts of the Indictment . 30 
Kaltenbrunner 
Ernst Kaltenbrunner was indic ted under counts  one , 
three,  and four . He j o ined the Aus trian Naz i Party and the 
SS in 1932 , and as a leader of the SS 1n Aus tria, he was act ive 
in Naz i intr igue aga inst the Schuschnigg Government . But 
no evidence was produc ed c onnect ing him with plans to  wage 
30 � • •  pp . 116- 9 . 
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aggres s i ve war on any other front . While it was true that 
the Anschlus s was an aggres s ive ac t ,  it was not charged as 
an aggre s s ive war , and the e vide nce aga ins t  him under count 
one did no t ,  in the op inion of the Tr ibunal, show his direc t 
par t ic ipat ion in any plan to wage s uch a war . 
As t o  war cr ime s and cr ime s  agains t humanity, his part 
as chief of the s e c urity police and SD , and head of the RSHA, 
was bro ught forth. Ka ltenbrunner thus took charge o f  an or­
ganizat ion which inc luded the mai n  offic e s  of the Ge s t apo ,  SD , 
and the cr iminal polic e .  As chi ef o f  the RSHA , he had author ity 
t o  order pro t e c t ive cus t ody and r e lease from c oncentrat ion 
camps . He was undoubtedly aware , therefore , o f  the cond i t i ons 
i n  s uch camps , and witne s s e s  t e s t i f ied that he had s e e n  pris­
oners ki lled by the var i ous me thods of exe cut ion, hanging, 
shoot ing in the back of the neck, and gas s i ng, as part of a 
demons tr at ion . Kalt enbrunner, himself, ordered the exec ut ion 
of pr is oners in tho s e  c amps , and his off ice was us ed to tran s -
mi t t o  the camps orders of execut i on which or i ginat ed in Rimmler ' s  
o ff ice . At the end of the war he part ic ipated in arr angeme n t s  
for the evacuat i on o f  inmate s  o f  c onc entrat ion camp s ,  and the 
l iquida t ion of many of them to preve nt the ir l ib e rat ion b y  
the Allied armi e s . 
Kaltenbrunner claimed that , whe n he took office as 
chief of the police forces and head of the RSHA, he d id s o  
pur s uant to an unders tanding w i th Rimmler under which he was 
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to confine his ac t iv ities to matters involving foreign inte ll­
igenc e ,  and not to as sume over-all control over the ac t ivities 
of the RSHA . The Tr ibunal ac knowledged that he showed a spec ial 
intere st in matters involving foreign intelligenc e , but ma in­
tained that he also exercised control over the ac tivi t ie s  of the 
RSHA, was aware of the cr imes it  was committ ing, and wa s an 
act ive part ic ipant in many of them. And s o ,  while declared 
innocent of count one , Kaltenbrunner was found guilty on coun t s  
three and four . 31 
Rosenberg 
Alfred Rosenberg, termed the ideologist of the Naz i 
Par ty, was indicted on all four counts . As head of the APA, 
( the off ic e of for e i gn affair s of the Naz i  Party ) he was in 
charge of an organ i zat ion whose agen ts were ac t ive in Nazi 
intrigue throughout the world. Hi s part in br inging Roumania 
into the war , and the attack on N orway were shown by hi s own 
reports . He al so bore a maj or respons ib ility for the formulat i on 
and execut ion of occupat ion polic ie s in the occupied eas tern 
territor i e s  after July 17 , 1941 . 
As regards counts three and four, Ro senberg was held 
respons ible for a sys tem of organ ized plunder of both publ ic 
and pr ivate pr operty throughout the invaded countries of Europe . 
He organized the "Einsatz stab Rosenberg, " which plundered 
31 Ib id . ,  pp . 119-21 . 
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mus eums and l ibrar i e s , and p i l l aged pr iva te ho us e s .  As head 
of the e a s tern territor ie s ,  Ros e nberg helped to fo�mulate the 
polic i e s  of Germanizat ion , explo ita t i on ,  forc ed labor , and 
the ext ermination of Jews and opponents of Na z i  rule . He 
wa s fo und guilty on all four counts . 32 
Frank 
Hans Frank was indic ted unde� counts one , thre e ,  and 
four . He �o ined the Naz i  Par ty in 1927 , but a s  to hi s guilt 
under c o unt one , the Tr ibunal was not s a t i s f ied wi th the evi­
dence tha t he was s uffic iently connected with the c ommon plan 
to allow his c onvic t ion on thi s charge . 
As t o  the o ther charge s ,  Fr ank ' s  role in the occupat ion 
of Poland was portrayed . On Oc t ober 12 , 1939 , he was made 
Governor Ge neral of the occup ied Po l i sh terr i t ory, and carr ied 
out a policy which led to the ec onomic explo itation of that 
land in a way which led to the de ath by s t arvat ion of a large 
number of people ; in the de por t a t i on to Ge�many as s l ave lab orers 
of over a mil l ion Pol e s ; and in a pro gr am that i nvo lved the mur­
der of at l e a s t  thr e e  mi ll ion Jews . He was found guilty on 
co un ts thr e e  and tour . 33 
Fr ick 
Wi lhelm Fr ic k ,  recogn i z ed as the chief Mazi adminis trat ive 
32 
lQ1g. , pp . 121- 3 .  
33 
1£1g. , PP • 123-6 . 
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spec ial i s t  and bureaucrat , was indic ted on all ro ur coun t s . 
An av id Na z i ,  he was lar gely re spons ible for br inging the 
German Nat i o n  under the complete c on trol of the Party . Before 
the date of the An schlus s ,  Fr ick was concerned only with dome s t i c  
admini s trat ion w i thi n the Re ich. The ev idenc e did not show 
that he par t ic ipated in any of the conferenc e s  at which Hi tler 
out lined hi s aggre s s ive intent ions . Cons equently, the Tri-
. 
bun al took the view that Fr ick was not a member of t he c ommon 
plan as def ined. in the judgment of the Tribuna l . 
As t o  cr ime s  aga inst pe ace , Fri ck s i gned many laws which 
incorporated many occup ied ter r i tor ies into the Re ich. As he ad 
of the central orf i c e s  for Bohemi a-Mor av ia, the Governmen t 
General ( Poland ) , and Norway , he wa s charged w i t h  ob taining 
close co operat ion between the German offi c ials in the s e  occup i ed 
terr itor ies , and the supreme author i t i es of Germany . 
As t o  war c r ime s an d cr ime s aga i n s t  human i ty ,  Fr ick was 
always a rab id ant i -Semi te , and played a large role in the 
exterminat i on of Jews both before and aft er 1939 . He was 
als o in charge or the German izat ion pol icy in certain oc cup ied 
terr itor ie s , and dur ing the war , hi s c ontrol was extended to 
nurs ing home s ,  hos p i tals , and asylums in which euthan as ia was 
prac t ic ed .  He was found guilty on c ounts two , three , and four . 34 
34 Ib id. , pp . 126-9 . 
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Str e iche r 
Thi s Jew-baiter wa s ind i c t ed on c ount s one and four . 
One of the ear l ie s t  memb e rs of the Nazi Party, Stre icher was 
a staunch supporter ot Hitle r ' s  main p o l i c i e s . But there was 
no evide nc e  to s how that he was ever w ithin Hit ler ' s  inner 
c ircle ot advisers ; nor during hi s c areer was he closely c on­
ne c ted wi th the fo rmulat ion of the polic ies which led to war . 
In the opin i on of the Tr ibunal, the ev ide nc e fa i led t o  e s t ab l i sh 
hi s c onnect i on with the c ommon plan or consp iracy t o  wage 
aggr e s s ive war , and so was dec lared innoce nt on this charge . 
On count four , Stre iche r ' s  part in Jew i s h  pers e cut i on s  
was emphas i zed. His in c it emen �  t o  murde r and exterminat ion 
at the t ime whe n Jews in the eas t were be ing killed under the 
mo st horr ible condi t ions clear ly cons t i tuted persecut ion on 
polit ical and r ac ial grounds in c onne c t ion w i th war cr ime s as 
defined by the Charter, and con s t i tuted a cr ime again s t  human­
ity . He was found guilty on c ount four . 35 
Wal ter Funk, one of H 1 t �er 1 s  c lo s e s t  economic advis ers , 
was indicted under all tour c ount s .  He became act ive in the 
e c on omic f i e ld after the N a z i  plan to wage aggre s s i ve war had 
been clearly de fined . For thi s reas on ,  he was f ound innocent 
on coun t one . Aft er the beginn ing ot war , Funk took an a c t ive 
35 1Q!Q. , p p . 12 9-31 . 
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part in the economi c aspect of the c onflict . He part i c ip ated 
in the ec onomic preparat ion ror the wars against Po land and 
the Sov ie t Un ion , and made plans for the ec onomic explo i ta­
t ion of the "vas t territol'ie s of the Sovie t Un ion " which we re 
to be used as a s ource ot raw materials for Europe . 
As to  counts thre e and four , Funk act ively partic ipated 
in the ant i-Jewish program, and advoc ated the ir c omple te eli­
mi nat ion from economic as well as pol it i cal l ife . He also 
partic ipated in the exploitation of the occupied c ountries 
and in the s lave labor program. In spite  of the tact that he 
occupied certain important off ic ial pad tions , Funk was never 
a dominant figure in the vari ous pr ograms in whi ch he part i ­
c ipated, and this was a mit igat ing factor o f  whi ch the Tribunal 
took notic e . He was found gui lty under counts two , three ,  and 
four . 36 
Schacht 
Hjalmar Schacht was indi c ted under c ount s  one and two . 
He sel'ved as Commiss ioner or Currency and pres i dent ot t he 
Re i chsbank, and was an act ive supporter of the Naz i  Party be­
fore its acce s s i on to power, and supported the appo intme nt of 
Hi tler to  the post or Chancellor . Atter this he played an im­
portant role in the vigorous rearmament pr ogram which was adopt­
ed, us ing the fac ilitie s  of the Re ichsbank to the fulle s t  
extent in the German rearmament erfort . 
36 � • •  pp . 131-4 . 
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As Min i s t er of Economi c s  and Plen ipot ent iary General 
for War Economic s  he was ac t ive in organ i z ing the Ge rman economy 
tor war . But by Apr i l ,  1936 , he began to los e  his influence 
as the central figur e  in Ge rman rearmame n t ,  when Goering was 
appointed C oordina t or for Raw Ma ter ials and Fore ign Exchange . 
While i t  was cle ar that Schacht was an important leader 
of German rearmament , rearmament i t s e lf was not cr iminal under 
the Chart e r .  To be a cr ime aga inst peace i t  had to be shown 
tha t he carried out this policy as part ot the Na z i  plans to 
wage aggr e s s ive war . As early as 1936 , he began to advocate 
a limitat ion o� the rearmame nt program tor financ ial r e a s on s . 
Had the polic ies advoca ted by him been put into etfe c t ,  Ge rmany 
would not have prepared t or a ge neral European war .  As a 
re sult of thi s , he was dismi s sed fr om all pos i t ion s  of e c onomic 
s ign ificance i n  Germany . 
He was not involved in the p lann ing o.f any o� the ag­
gre s s ive war s in count two . His par t i c ipat ion in the oc cupa t ion 
ot Aus tria and the Sude tenland- -ne i ther of wh ich was clas sed 
as aggre a s i!� war- -was so l imited that i t  did not amount to 
partic ipat ion in the c ommon plan charge in c oun t one . As a 
re sult of thi s evide nce produced, Schacht was .found not gu ilty 
ot all charge s made aga ins t him, and the Tribunal ordered .!..his 
discharge . 37 
· 37 �. , pp . 134-7 .  
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Karl Doeni t z ,  who on January 30, 1943 , wa s commander 
in chief of the Ge rman Navy , was indi cted on count s ,  one , two , 
and three . Although he bu ilt and tra ined the German U-boat 
arm, the evidenc e did not show that he wa s a part or the con­
sp iracy to wage aggre s s ive wars or that he prepared or init iated 
such wars , thus not guilty on c oun t one . Doe n i t z  wa s no me re 
army or divis ion commander , however ; the U·boat was the pr in­
cipal arm or the German fle e t ,  and Doenitz was i t s  leader . 
The High Se as Fle et made a few minor ra ids dur ing the early 
years or the wa r ,  but the real damage was done a lmos t  exc lus ive­
ly by hi a submar i ne s . Doe n i t z  was aolely in charge of thi s 
warfare . His importance to the German war efror t was so elo ­
quently proved that Raeder rec ommended him as h i s  succes s or .  
In the view of the Tribuna l ,  the ev idence showed that Doe n i t z  
was ac t ive i n  wag ing aggre s s ive war ; thus guilty o n  count two . 
As to war cr imes , Doe n i t z  was charged with wag ing un­
re stricted submar ine warrare contrary to the Naval Pro tocol 
or 1936 to whi ch Germany was a party, and whi ch rearrirmed the 
rule s of submar ine warrare la id down in the London Naval Agre e ­
me nt o r  1930 . The defense proved, howe ver , that in the ca se 
or Brit i s h armed merchant ships , Doenitz wa s not gu ilty or 
unre str icted s i nkinga , because or the ins truct ions or the 
Br it ish Admiralty to ram U-boats if pos s ible . This waa the 
view to which the Tr ibunal held . 
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However,· the order of Doenitz proclaimi ng operat ional 
zone s and the s inking ot neutral ships wi thout warning when 
found within these  zone s were vi olat ions of the Protocol in 
the op inion ot the Tribunal . 
The Tribunal was of the belief that Doeni t z  kept Germany 
from denounc ing the Geneva Convention, and proof was produced 
that Brit ish naval pri soners of war in camps under his jur i s ­
dict ion were treated s trictly acc ording to  this Convent i on ;  
thi s was regarded as a mit igat ing c ircums tance in his behalf .  
He was found guilty o n  count s two and three o f  the 
Indictment . 38 
Raeder 
Erich Raeder was indicted on count s one , two , and thre e . 
He was a member of the Re ich Defense Counc il, appo inted Grand 
Admiral in 1939 , and in Ja nuary, 1943, he was replaced by 
Doenitz at his own request . 
In the fifteen year s tha t he commanded i t ,  Raeder built 
and dire cted the German Navy ; in that per iod he accepted full 
re spons ib ility tor it . He admit ted that the building of the 
German Navy was in violat ion of the Treaty of Versailles ,  
and ins i s ted that it was "a mat ter of honor tor every man" to  
do so.  Raeder was one of the few pre sent at  both the Hos sbach 
Conference of November 5 ,  1937 , and the conferences of May 
23, and Augus t  22 , 1939 . 
38 �. , PP • 137 -41 . 
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The concept ion ot the invas ion ot Norway was Raeder ' s  
a nd not Hi t ler ' s .  The de s irab i l i ty ot naval bas e s  there was 
poi nted out to Hitler by Raeder ,  who jus t i f i ed thi s act ion 
by saying i t  was a move to for e s tall the Br i t i sh .  I n  a letter 
to the Navy , Raede � s a id ,  "The operat ions ot the Navy in t he 
occupat ion ot Norway will tor all t ime remai n  the gre at con­
tribut ion ot the Navy to this war . " 
From the evidenc e the Tr ibunal de termined that Raeder 
was guil ty on count s one and two . 
Raeder wa s  charged wi th war crime s on the high seas . 
The Atben ia was given as an example of thi s , but the mos t  
s er i ous charge agai n s t  him was tha t  he carr ied out unre s tr i ct­
ed submarine warfare , including si nking of unarmed merchant 
ships ot neutra ls , nonrea cue and machine -gunning ot s ur vi vor s , 
contrary to the London Pro t ocol . The Tr ibunal made the s ame 
finding on Raede r as it did on Doe n i t z  as to thi s charge , a nd 




Baldur von Schirach was indicted unde r counts one and 
four . He j o i ned the Na z i  Party and the SA in 1925 , and in 
1931 he wa s placed in c ontrol ot a ll Na z i  youth organ izat i ons . 
Atter the Na z i s  had c ome to p ower von-Schirach, u s ing both 
phys ical vi olence and official pre s s ure , e i ther drove out of 
39 
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exis tence or took over all youth groups which competed. with the 
Hi tler Jugend . He used thi s organ ization to educ ate Ge rman 
youth " in the spirit of Nat ional Soc ial ism, " and als o for 
pre-military training. The Hitler Jugend placed part icular 
emphas is on the mi litary spir i t ,  and its training program 
s tres sed the importance of re turn of the c olonies , the nece s ­
s i ty for Lebensraum, and the noble de stiny of German youth t o  
d i e  for Hit ler . But despite the warlike nature o f  the ac ti­
vities of the Hitler Jugend , it  dti not seem that von Schirach 
was involved in the development of Hitler ' s  plan for terr itorial 
expans ion through aggres s ive war , or that he part ic ipated in 
the plann ing or preparat ion of any or the wars of aggress ion . 
As to count four , in July, 1940, von Schirach was appo int­
ed Gaule iter of Vienna , and at the same t ime Re ich Governor 
for Vienna and Re ich Defense Commiss i oner for Mili tary Di str ict 
17 , inc luding the Gaue of Vienna, Upper and Lower Danube , and 
after November 17 , 1942 , for the Gaue or Vienna alone . Von 
Schirach was not charged with the commiss i on of war cr imes in 
Vienna , but only with the commi s s ion of cr ime s a.gains t human­
ity. As Aus tria was occupied pursuant to a common plan of 
aggres s ion, its occupat ion was therefore a "crime wi thin the 
juri sdict ion of the Tribunal " as that term was s e t  down in 
Art icle 6c of the Charter . As a res ult , "murder,  exterminat ion , 
ens lavement , deportat ion ,  and other inhumane acts " and "pers e­
cut ions on polit ical, racial,  or religious grounds , "  in con­
nect ion with this occupat ion cons t i tuted a cr ime against human ity 
156 
under thi s Art i cle . 
Whe n von Schirach became Gaule it er of Vi e nna the de• 
por tat i o n  of the Jews had a lready b e gun , and only s ixty thous and, 
out of Vienna ' s  or iginal one hundre d  and n i n e t y  thous and , Jews 
remained . On Oc tober 2 ,  1940, he a t tended a c o nfer e nc e in 
Hi t ler ' s  off ice and t o ld Frank that he had fifty thous and 
Jews in Vi enna which the Government General would have t o  t ake 
over fr om him . The Tr ibunal found that von Schirach, whi le 
he did not originate the pol icy of depor t ing Jews from Vienna , 
par t ic ipated in thi s deportat i on aft e r  he became Gaule iter of 
Vienna . He knew that the be s t  the Jews c ould hope for was a 
mis erab le exi s t e nce in the ghe t t oe s  of the eas t ,  as bul le t i n s  
de s cribing the Jewish exte rminat ion were in h i s  offi ce . 
He was found innocent on c ount one , but . gui l ty on c ount 
four . 40 
Saucke l 
Fr i t z  Saucke l was indic ted under all four counts . He 
j o ined the Na z i  Party in 1923, and became Gaule iter of Thur­
ingia in 1927 . He he ld a high po s i t i on i n  both the SA and 
the SS . The evide nce did not s a t i s fy the Tribunal that Sauckel 
was s uff i c ien tly c onne ct ed with the c ommon plan or involved in 
the plann ing or waging of the aggr e s s ive war s to convi c t  him 
on c ount s  one and two . 
40 �. , PP • 144-6 . 
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His part in war crime s  and crimes _ agains t humanity was 
shown , with spe c ial reference to hi s labor pol ic ies . On March 
21 , 1942 , Hit ler appointed him Plenipotent iary General for the 
Ut i lizat i on of Labor, with authority to put under un iform 
control "the ut ilizat ion of all available manpower , including 
that of workers recruited abroad and of pr is oners of war . " 
By virtue of hi s pos i tion,  Sauckel set  up a program for 
the mob il i zation of the labor res ources available to the Re ich. 
One of the important part s  of this mobilizat i on was the system­
at ic exploitat ion , by force, of the lab or re s ources of the 
occupied territor ie s . He des cribed so called "voluntary re­
cruit ing" as nothing more than shanghai ing, and made the s tate ­
ment o n  March 1,  1944 , that " out of 5, 000, 000 fore ign workers 
who arr ived in Germany not even 200, 00 came voluntarily. " The 
Tribunal dec ided that Sauckel had over-all responsib ility for 
the s lave labor program . His re gulat ion s  provided that his 
commiss ioners should have author i ty for ob taining labor ,  and 
he was cons tantly in the field supervis ing the s teps which 
were be ing take n .  He was aware of ruthles s  me thods be ing 
taken to obtain laborers , and vigorously supported them on 
the ground that they were nece s s ary to  fill the quota• � He 
was found gui lty on the last two counts . 41 
Alfred Jodl was indicted on all four coun t s .  From 
41 Ib id. , PP • 146-8 . 
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1935 to 1938 he was chi er of the Nat ional De fe n s e  Se c t i on ln 
the High Command . Art er a year in c ommand of troops , i n  Augus t ,  
1939, he became chief of the Operat ions St aff of the High 
C ommand of t he Armed Force s .  Although Ke i t e l  was hi s immedi ate 
super i o r ,  he repor ted direc t ly to Hitler on ope rat ional matt e rs . 
In the s tr ic t  mi li tary s e ns e , Jodl was the ac tual planner of 
the war and respons ible in large me a s ur e  for the s t rategy and 
conduc t or opera t i on s . 
His defe nse was that he was a s o ldier sworn to obedienc e ,  
and not a pol i t ic ian ; and that his s t arr and planning work left 
him no t ime tor other matt ers . Though he c la imed that as a 
s oldier he had to obey Hitler , he s aid that he ort e n  tr ied t o  
ob s truct certain measur e s  b y  delay . 
En tries i n  Jodl ' s  diary, the Schmundt note s ,  e t c . , s how­
ed that Jodl was act ive in the Aus tr i an and C z e c h  aggres s ions . 
He also par t i c ipated in the aggr e s s ions against Denmark, Norway , 
and the Low Countr ies , and wa s act ive in the plann ing aga i n s t  
Greece and Yugos la via . Many o r  the order s t o r  t he s e  i nvas ions 
we re s i gned by Jodl , who was pr e s e nt at var i ous conre renc e s  with 
Hitler, whe n the s e  invas ions were planned . Jodl t e s t ir ied that 
Hi t ler feared an attack by Rus s i a  and s o  attacked fir s t . This 
preparat ion be gan almos t a year before the invas i o n .  Jodl 
i n i t ialed "Case Barbaros s a "  and othe r direct ive s concerned wi th 
the Rus s ian invas ion . 
As t o  c ount s  three and tour , Jodl was ac t i ve in the 
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Hitler order to treat commandos as spie s .  Early drafts of the 
order were made by Jodl ' s  staff with his knowledge . Jodl 
testified that he was s trongly opposed on moral and legal 
grounds , but could not refuse to pas s on it . Also a plan t o  
eliminate Soviet Commissars was in the direct ive for "Case 
Barbaross a. " The decis ion whether they should be ki lled without 
tr ial was to  be made by an officer , .  and a draft containing 
Jodl 1 s  handwr it ing sugge s t ing that this should be handled as 
retaliation was pr oduced as evidence .  
There was little evidence t o  connect Jodl wi th the 
slave labor program, but in his speech of November 7,  1943, 
to the Gaule iter s he said it was nece ssary to act "with remorse­
less  vigor and res olut ion" in Denmark, France , and the Low 
Countr ies to  compel work on the Atlantic Wall. 
Jodl ' s  part in the evacuat ion of all pers ons in northern 
Norway, and the burning of their hous es , as we ll as the order 
that Hoscow and Leningrad were to be completely des troyed, 
was brought out . His defense , in brief was the same as that 
used for Ke itel, that of"superior orders . "  Nothing could be 
s a id in mit igat ion for Jodl , and he was found guilty on all 
four counts . 42 
12n Papen 
42 !Q!g. , pp . 148-51 . 
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Franz von Papen was indic ted under coun t s  one and two . 
He was ac t ive in 1932 and 1933 in prepar ing the way for Hi tler 
and a ide d him in forming his c oalit ion c ab ine t .  As Vice Chancel­
lor in that cab in e t  he par t i c ipat ed in the Nazi c on s o l idat ion 
of c ontrol in 1933 . On June 16, 1934 ,  howe ver ,  von Papen made 
a speech at Marburg whi ch contained a de nunc iat i on of the 
Naz i at temp t s  to suppr e s s  the free pre s s  and the church, of the 
ex is tence of a re ign ot terror , and of " 150 percent Naz i s "  who 
were mis taking "bruta l i ty for vital i ty . " In the Roehm purge , 
he was taken into cus tody by the SS on June 30, 1934 , but 
was released on July 3 ,  1934 ; hi s as soc i at e s  in office were 
murdere d .  
Regardle s s  o f  thi s ,  von Papen accepted the pos it ion of 
Mi n i s ter to Aus tr ia on July 26, 1934 , the day afte r  the Do llfu s s  
murder . The evidence left n o  doub t that hi s pr imary purpose 
in this capac ity was to unde rmi ne the Schuschnigg regime and 
stre ngthen the Aus tr ian Naz i s  for the purpo s e  of br inging 
ab out Ans chlus s ,  but the Charter did not cons ider thi s c r iminal . 
There was no evidence that he was a p arty in the plan under 
which the occupat ion of Aus tria was a st ep in the dire c t ion 
of further aggr e s s ive act i on, or that he part i c ipa ted in plan s  
to occupy Aus tr ia by aggre s s ive war i f  ne c e s sary . Since i t  was 
not e s tap l i s hed beyond a reasonab le doub t that thi s was the 
purpose ot hi s activity, therefore the Tr ibunal could not hold 
that he was a par ty to the c ommon plan charged in c ount one 
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or partic ipated in the planning ot the aggres s ive war s under 
count two . 
Von Papen was found not guilty under the Indictment . 43 
Seyss-Inguart 
Ar thur Seys s -Inquart was indicted under all four counts . 
He had been as soc iated with the Aus tr ian Naz i Party s ince 1931 , 
but had often had difficulties with i t ,  and did not actually 
j oin the Par ty unt il March 13, 1938 . He part ic ipated in the 
last s tage s of the Naz i intrigue which preeeded German oc cupat ion 
ot Austr ia, a nd  became Re icha Governor ot Austria att er the 
Ansc hluss . In this capac ity he began a program ot c onfiscating 
Jewish property, and sub j ect ing Jews to pers ecut ion. 
In September,  1939 , Seyss-Inquart was appointed Chief 
of C ivil Administrat ion of South Poland, and la ter Deputy 
Gove rnor General . The following ye ar he was appo inted Re ich 
Commis s ioner for the oc cupied Ne therlands . In the s e  pot it ions 
he assumed re sponsib ility for govern ing territory which had 
been oc cupied by aggres s ive wars and the administration of which 
was vital in the aggres s ive war then be ing wage d by Germany . 
In the s e  pos it ions to which he was appointed, Seyss-Inquart 
was a supporter of harsh occupat ion polic ies which were put 
in to effect . He advoc ated the persecut i on o f  b oth Pol ish and 
Dut ch Jews , and was informed of the action which involved the 
43 Ib id . , pp . 151-3 . 
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murder of many Polish inte llec tuals . 
Seys s -Inquart carr ied out the economic administration 
ot the Netherlands without regard for rules of the Hague Con­
ve nt ion which he described as obs olete . There was wide spread 
pillage of public and pr ivate property under his direction,  
with small regard paid to the effe ct on the Dutch people . He 
was ac t ive in sending forced labor to Germany, and dur ing his 
oc cupat ion over 500, 000 were s ent from the Ne therlands to 
Germany tor this purpose . 
The Tribunal found him gu�lty on counts two , three, and 
four , but innocent on count one . 44 
Speer 
Albert Speer was indicted under all four counts . He 
joined the Nazi  Party in 1932, and held pos itions of importance 
in the German Labor Front and in the armaments program. But 
as to counts one and two,  the Tr ibunal was of the opinion that 
Speer ' s  ac t ivities did not amount to  initiating or planning 
wars of aggres s ion,  or of conspir ing to that end .  He became 
the head of the armaments industry we ll after all the war s had 
been c ommenced and were under way . His ac t iv i t ies in charge 
of German armament produc t ion were ln aid of the war effort 
in the same way that other produc tive enterpr ises aid in waging 
war ; but the Tr ibunal was not prepared to find that s uch ac ti-
44 �. , pp . 153-6 . 
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vities  involved engaging in the common plan as charged under 
count one , or waging aggres s ive war as charged under count 
two . 
As to counts  thre e  and four , the evidence int�oduced 
against Speer related ent irely to hi s participat ion in the slave 
labor program. Speer himself had no direct admi nis trat ive 
respons ib ility for thi s program. As Re ich Minister of Armaments 
and Munit ions , he had extens ive author ity over produc t ion, and 
as the domi nant member ot the Central Planning Board, Speer took 
the pos i t i on that the Board had authority to ins truc t Sauckel 
to provide laborers tor industries under its con trol . Speer 
knew that when he made his demands on Saucke l that they would 
be supplied by fore ign lab orers serv ing under compuls ion, 
as Sauckel cont inually informed him that fore ign l aborers 
were be ing ob tained by torce . He was also involved in  the 
use of prisoners ot war in armament industries , but contended 
that he utilized Soviet pr is oners ot war only in indus tr ie s  
permitted by the Geneva Convention.  
Spe er ' s  pos it ion was such that he wa s not directly 
re spons ible for the cruelty in the admini stration of the slave 
labor program, although he knew or its  exis tence . In mi tigat ion , 
the Tribunal recognized the tac t that Speer ' s  es tab lishment 
or "blocked industri es"  did keep many lab orers in the ir home s 
and that in the c lo s ing stages of the war , he was one of the 
few men who had the courage to tell Hitler that the war was 
los t ,  and took s teps to pr eve nt the sensele ss de struct ion 
ot production facilities , both in occupied terr itories and 
in Germany . 
He was found guilty on counts three and tour , but 
innocent on counts one and two . 45 
Von Neurath 
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Kons tantin von Neurath was indicted under all four 
counts . He was a career diplomat , who he ld impor tant pos t s ,  
culminating i n  the posit ion of Re ichs Protector of Bohemia­
Moravia, and served in thi s capac ity until September 27 , 1941.  
As Minister of Fore ign Affairs , von Neurath advised 
Hitler in connect ion with German wi thdrawal from the Disarma­
ment Conference and the League of Nat ions ; the institution 
ot rearmament ; the pas sage of laws concerning universal mili­
tary training and the secret Reich Defense Law . He played an 
important part in the reoccupat ion of the Rhineland, and was 
pre s ent at the Hossbaoh Conference of November 5 , 1937 . Short ­
ly after that, he res igned, but with knowledge of Hitler ' s  
aggres s ive polic ies . He retained a formal relat ionship with 
the Nazi regime as Re ich Minister without Portfolio, Pre s ident 
or the Secret Cabinet Counc il,  and a member of the Re ich De ­
fense Counc i l .  At the time of the Anschlus s ,  von Neurath was 
in charge of the foreign office , and assured the C zech Minister 
45 1£!g. , pp . 156-9 . 
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t hat Germany intended to abide by i t s  arb i trat ion c onve nt i on 
with Czecho sl ovakia . He par t i c ipat ed in the las t phase of 
the negot iat i ons pre ceding MUn i ch, but he c on tended that he 
entered t he s e  discus s i ons only t o  urge Hitler t o  s e t t le the 
i s s ues peacefully . 
As Re ich Protector of Bohemia-Morav ia, von Neurath 
in s t ituted an admi n i s trat ion there s imi lar t o  that in effe c t  
in Germany . A s  the chief German offic ial in the Pro t e c t orate 
when the admi n i s trat ion ot that terr i t ory played an important 
par t in Ge rmany ' s  aggre s s ive war s in the eas t ,  von Neurath 
. 
knew that war cr ime s and cr ime s  again s t  human ity were be i ng 
c ommi tted under his author ity. 
In mi tiga t i on i t  was shown tha t  von Neurath intervened 
with the secur ity police and the SD for the release ot many 
of the C z echo s lovaks who were arre s t ed on Sep t ember 1 ,  1939 , 
and for s tudents arres ted later that s ame aut umn .  O n  September 
23, 194 1 ,  he was summoned before Hi tler and t old that he was 
too lenient , and as a r e s ult Heydr i ch wa s be ing s e nt to the 
Pr otectorate t o  c omb at C zech re s i s tance gr oup s . Von Neurath 
tr ied in vain t o  di s s uade Hi tler from s e nding Heydr i ch, and 
whe n he was uns uc ce s sful , offered to res ign . When hi s res ig­
nat ion was not ac cepted , he wen t  on l e ave on September 27 , 
1941 ,  and refused t o  act as Protector after that date . 
He was found gui lty on all four count s . 46 
46 1Q!g. , pp . 159-61 . 
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Fr i t z s che 
Hans Fri t z s che was indic ted on counts one , three , and 
four . He was b e s t  known as a radio commentator ,  be c oming 
i n  November , 1942, head of the Radi o Divi s i on of the Pr opaganda 
Min is try and Plenipotent iary for the Polit ical Organ i zat ion 
of the Gre ater German Radi o ,  and earlier he was head of the 
Home Pr e s s  Division of the Min i s try, and later Min is terial 
Director . 
As he ad of the Home Pre s s  Divis ion, Fri t z s che s uper vi s ed 
the Ge rman pre s s  of twenty- three hundred da ily newspapers .  
In pur suance of thi s fun c t i o n ,  he held dai ly pr e s s  c onferences 
to del iver the directi ve s of the Propaganda Min i s try to the s e  
papers . He was , howe ver , subord inate to Di etr ich, the Re ich 
pr e s s  chief, who was in turn , s ubordinate to Goebbe l s . It 
wa s Die tri ch who rece ive d  the d irec t ive s tor the pre s s  trom 
Goebela and othe r Re ich Min is ters , and prepared them as 1n-
' 
s truo t ions , whic h  he the n hande d to Fr i t z s che , who di sper sed 
them . Never did Fr i t z s che achie ve s uff i c i e n t  s tature to attend 
the plann ing confer enc e s  which led t o  aggres s ive war ; indeed 
ac cordi ng to hi s own uncon tradic ted tes timony he never even had 
a convers ation wi th Hit l e r .  Nor was there any showing tha t 
he was informed of the de c i s ions taken at the s e  conferences . 
Hi s activi t i e s  coul� not be s aid to be tho s e  tha t fell wi thin 
the def in i t i on of the common plan to wage aggr e s s ive war . 
Coun ts thre e and four were concerned pr imarily with the 
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charge that he inc i ted and enc ouraged the German people thr ough 
the pre s s ,  to commit atroc i t i e s  on conque red people s ,  e s pe c i ­
ally the Jews . The Tribunal held, though, that his aim through 
propaganda was to popular ize Hi tler and t he German war effort , 
rather than' t o  s t ir up hatred of other peopl es . In his broad­
cas t s ,  Fr itzs che s ome t ime s spre ad fal se news , but it was not 
proved that he knew it to be false , as in the c as e  of the 
Athenia, whe n  he reported that at the t ime of s ink ing, no 
German U-boat s were in the vic inity. He received thi s report 
from the German Navy , and had no reason to believe it untrue . 
He was found innoc ent of al l charges . 47 
Bormann 
Martin Bormann was indic ted on count s one , three , and 
four . He jo ined the Nazi Party in 1925 and ro se to po s i t ions 
of importance . After He s s ' flight to Br i t a in ,  he became head 
of the Party Chancellery . On April 12 , 1943, he became Hit ler ' s  
secretary, and was poli t ic al and organiza t i onal head of the 
Vo lkss turm and a ge neral in the ss . 
In the beginning, Bormann was a minor Naz i ,  and the 
evidenc e did not show that he knew of Hi tler ' s  plana for 
aggress ive war . He attended none of the· impor tant c onferenc e s  
when the s e  plans tor aggre s s ion were revealed . Sinc e he came 
int o pos i t ions of Lmp ortance only after 1941 , the Tribunal was 
of the opinion that there was not s uffic ient evidence to bring 
him wi thin the scope of count one .  
47 �. , pp . 161-3.  
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As to coun t s  three and four �  Bormann , after the departure 
of He s s ,  was r e s pons ible tor both the off ic e s  and p ower s  held 
by He s s ,  and later he was given c ontrol over all laws and 
direct ives � s a ued by Hit ler . The charge s proved aga inst him 
we re the following : he contr olled the ruthle s s  exploitat ion 
of the sub j ected populace ;  he was extreme ly ac t i ve in the per­
se cut ion of the Jews ; he was prominent in the s lave l abor pr o­
gr am; he i s sued orders call ing for har sh treatme nt o f  pr is oners 
of war ; he was respons ible for the lynching of Allied a irmen . 
Hi s c ouns e l ,  lab oring unde r difficult ie s because ot 
Bormann ' s  ab sence , was unable t o  refute thi s evidenc e . But in 
the face of the documents pre s e nted it wouid have been diff1� ul t 
to s ee how he c o uld have done s o  had the de fe ndant been pr e• 
s e nt . The Tr ibunal decreed that it Bormann i s  not dead and 
later apprehended , the C ontrol Coun c i l  for Germany may , under 
Art i c le 29 of the Charter , c ons ider any fac t s  in mit igat ion, 
and alter or reduce the sentence , if it s e e s  f i t . · 
Bormann was found gui lty on coun t s  three and four . 48 
!h! Se ntenc e s  
I n  accordance with Ar t i cle 27 of the Char t er , the Pre s i ­
de nt of the Internat ional Mi litary Tr ibunal , at tts conc luding 
48 lQ!g. , pp . 164- 6 .  
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s e s s i on on October 1 ,  1946, pr onounced se ntence on t he defendants 
c onvicted on the Indic tme nt . 
Goer ing, von Ribb e ntrop , Ke i t e l ,  Ka lte nbrunne r ,  Rosen­
berg, Frank ,  Fr ick, Stre iche r ,  Saucke l ,  Jodl , Seys s -Inquart , 
and Bormann were s e nte nced to death by hanging. He s s ,  Funk , 
and Raeder were sentenced for impr i s onme nt for l i fe . Vo n 
Schirach and Spe er rece ived a s e nte nce of twenty year s  impr is on­
me nt , while von Neurath drew fifte e n  ye ars , and Doenitz ten 
. 49 years impr i s onme nt . 
Di-s s e nt i ng Opi n ion . 
The Soviet judge , I .  T .  N i k i t che nko , gave a d i s s e n ti ng 
opinion with regard to the ac quittals of Schacht , von Pape n ,  
and � it z s che ; the s e ntence on Rudolf He s s ;  and the non-de • 
clarat ion of cr iminal ity of the Re ich Cab i net , Ge neral Staff 
and OKW . 
As to Schacht , the So viet j udge s t ated that the fol­
lowing points were i ndis putably e s t ablished : ( 1 ) Schacht 
ac t i vely as s i s t ed i n  the Na zi s e i z ure of powe r ,  ( 2 )  for twe lve 
years he closely collaborated with Hitler , ( 3 )  he provided the 
ec onomic and t1nancial bas i s  for the creat ion ot Hi tler ' s  
mi li tary machine , ( 4 ) he prepared Germany ' s  economy for waging 
aggre s s ive war , ( 5 )  he partic ipated in pers ecut ing the Jews 
49 1£1g. , pp . 189-90. 
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and plunder ing territories occup ied by Germany . "There�or e ,  
Schacht ' s  leading part i n  the prep arat ion and execut ion of 
the common cr imi nal plan is prove d, " and Nikitche nko tho ught 
that the de c is ion to ac quit him was in ob vious contradict ion 
to the exis t i ng evidenc e . 
As t o  von Papen , he gave the following points as e s ­
tablished evidence ; ( 1 ) von Papen ac t ively a ide d the Naz is 
in the ir s e i zure o� power , ( 2 )  he us ed both his effor ts and 
his co nnect ions to s olidify and s trengthen Hitler ' s  terror 
regime in Ge rmany , ( 3 )  he a c t ively par t ic ipated in Nazi ag­
gre s s i on against Aus tr ia,  (5 ) he faithfully s e rved Hitler up 
to the very end ( referring to hi s pos t as Ge rman Ambas sador 
t o  Turkey ) ,  aiding bo th with his ab i l ity and hi s diplomatic 
skill . It therefore , followed, to Nikitchenko , that von Papen 
bore c o ns iderab le respons ib ility tor the cr ime o� the Hi tler 
re gime , and he could no t c onsent to this acqui ttal, us ing 
the ab ove po ints as his ba s i s . 
The acqui ttal o� Fr i t z s che , on the bas i s  that he had 
no t reached the o�fic ial p o s i t i on mak ing him re spons ib le �or 
the cr1m1nal ac t ions of the Hit ler re gime , did not to Nikit• 
che nko agre e with the fact s  of the c ase . He pointed out that 
the verdic t did not take into c on s i derat i on that it was Fr itz­
sche who until 1942 was the direc t or � fac to of the Reich 
pre s s  and that ,  ac �ord1ng to hi s own admi s s i on ,  sub s eque nt 
to 1942 he became the "c ommander in chief of the �erman radio . �  
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As Fr itzsche was the polit ical direc tor of the German radio,  
it therefore s tood to reason,  or s o  thought Nikitchenko , that 
he bore respons ib ility for the false and provacat ive broadcas t s  
during the war years . For the s e  reas ons , N ikitche nko cons idered 
Fr itzsche ' s  re sponsibil ity tully proved, and his acqui t tal 
highly out of order . 
As regards the sentenc e  ot Rudolf He s s , the Soviet judge 
thought that becaus e of the importance of Hes s ' offic ial posi­
t ion as Hit ler ' s  deputy, life impris onment was t oo l ight , and 
death should have been the sentence j us t ified by his act ions . 
As the third Nazi  in importance,  He s s  played a predominant 
role , not only in quest ions of par ty leader ship but as co� 
creator with Rimmler of the SS which afterwards commi tted 
horr ible cr tme s agains t  humanity . The role of Hess in the 
occupation of Poland, in which he gave Frank the power of 
dictator , to  Niki tchenko meant that he was partly respons ible 
tor the cr imes c ommitted there . 
The verdic t of the Tr ibunal in re j e c t ing criminality 
on the part of the Reich Cabine t was als o a point which Nikit­
chenko challenged . He thought it untenable and rat ionally 
i ncorrect that this group , the direct ing organ of the State 
with a direct and ac tive role in the working out ot the crim­
inal enterpr ises , should not be declared cr iminal . The members 
ot thi s  directing staff had great power, eac h  heading an appro­
pr iate government agency and each participat ing in prepari ng 
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and real iz ing the Nazi program. He argued that certainly 
Hi tler had an unusual measure of power, but thi s  in no way 
freed the members of his cabinet who were his convinced fol-
lowers and the ac tual executors ot the Nazi plana from reapon-
s ibility. 
As to the General Staff and OKW, Nikitchenko gave these 
arguments tor a declarat ion ot cr iminality; ( 1 )  The leading 
representative s ot· the General Staff and OKW were c alled upon 
by the conspirators to partic ipate in the development and 
realizat ion ot the plans ot aggre s s i on, not as passive func­
tionaries , but as active participants in the conspiracy against 
peace and humanity, ' ( 2 ) OKW and the General Staff i s sued the 
most brutal decrees and orders for relentless  measures against 
the unarmed peaceful populat ion and the prisoners ot war, ( 3 )  
the High Command, along with the SS and pol ice , was guilty ot 
the mos t  brutal police actions in occupied territor i e s ,  and 
(4 ) the representat ive s ot the High Command acted in. all the 
echelons ot the army as members ot a criminal group . 50 
50
Ibid. , pp . 172-88 
CHAPTER V 
C ONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM NUREMBERG 
"The defendant s  a t  Nur emberg were le aders or the most 
highly organ i zed and extens ive wi ckedne s s  in his tory . It was 
not a trick of the law whi ch brought them to the bar ;  it was 
the ' mas s ed angered forces ot c ommo n humani ty . • " l The rec ord 
ot Nuremberg will prevent Germany from whitewashing her leaders 
with t he defe nse that atroc i ty s tories were so much Allied 
propaganda , invented in the hour of tota l  vi c t ory . The evidence 
dealing with war crime s and cr ime s agai nst humanity was over­
whe lming . Captured German documents prove beyond the shadow 
of a doubt that as Stims on s a id, the Naz i s  were le aders of the 
greate s t  wickedne s s  1n hi story . "All our s tandards of i nter­
nat ional e thics would have crumbled, if s c i e nt ifically planned 
mas s  murder of c ivilians , ens laving of mi llion s  of fore i gn 
work ingmen, crue l  mi s treatme nt of war prisoners , and b oastful 
loot ing on a grand scale could have gone unharmed in the long 
run . "2 In Jacks on ' s  words : "We have do cumented from German 
s ourc e s  that Nasi aggre s s ions , perse cut ions , and atroc i t ies 
with s uch authe n t ic i ty and in such de tail that there can b e  no 
re spons ible den i al of the s e  cr imes 1n the future • • • •  "3 
1 Henry L. St imson, "The Nuremberg Trial : Landmark 
in Law, " Fore ign Affairs , XXV, January , 1947 , p .  179 . 
2 F. E. Hirsch, "Le s s ons of Nuremberg, " Current His t orx, 
XI, Oc t ober, 1946 , p .  316 . 
3 Robert H .  Jackson, . "Prosecut ion o f  Ma j or Nazl War 
Criminal s , " Departme nt ot State Bulle t i n ,  XV, October 27 , 1946, 
p .  772 . 
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In de aling w ith the Naz i s ,  the Big Four Power s --Rus s ia, 
Fr anc e, the United Kingdom, and the United States --showed the ir 
var ious frame s  of mind . The Rus s ian point of view was exem-
plitied by Stali n  when he said that punishment 1n the form ot 
execut ion should be meted out to at least ti ty tbousand Germans . 
All through the negotiat i ons leading up to Nuremberg and even 
in the final judgment the Rus s ians displayed a great de s ire 
tor vengeanc e .  Punishment not jus t ice was the ir concern. 
The French interes t i n  the trial of German indus tr ial-
ists i s  easily understood when one c ons iders that twic e within 
twenty-tive year s ,  Pranc e has be en subjected to the at tac ks 
on her c it ies and people ot produc t s  of German indus try. It 
was the Prench who wer e ins trumental in the i ndic tment against 
Krupp . When he was unable to s t and trial , the United States 
proposed to try Altr ied Krupp in the place ot the elder Krupp , 
and several other indus tr ialis t s  and cartel off ic ials as well . 
This proposal was defeated by the unan imous vote of the other 
Power s .  Later the Rus s ians and Fre nch j o ined in a mot ion to 
i nclude Alfr ied Krupp , but it was de nied by the Tr ibunal . A 
tuture trial of industr ialists seems very unl ikely because of 
the ac quittals of Schacht and von Papen . Careful analys is is 
be ing made to determine what effect the acquit tals of these two 
will have upon the plan of pros ecut ion ot industr iali s ts and 
f inanc iers who would be sub j e c t  to trial on such spe cific charges 
as the use of s lave labor . 4 Since the Tribunal made the ruling 
that it did in the se cases , what po int is there in trying 
other German industr ial leaders ? 
175 
The Br it ish judge , Sir Jeffrey Lawrence , who was als o 
pres ident of the Tribunal, exemplified in his conduc t the 
Br itish balance, dignity and pass ion for law and order . 
Nuremberg was l�gely an American show . The tr ial 
was held in the American occupat ion zone , the count or con­
sp iracy to wage aggres s ive war was who lly Amer ic an in or igin, 
Jackson made the opening speech tor the prosecut ion, and had 
it not been tor Amer ican perseveranc e ,  it i s  likely the trial 
would not have been held . It was Jackson who secured Big 
FOur adherenc e  to promulgat ion or the Charter , and by compromise , 
ot framing the Indic tment . 
The itatfs ot all nat ions , the pres s ,  and visitors were 
provided for by the Uni ted States Army • • • •  The Army 
provided air and rail transportation , operated a motor 
pool tor local transportat ion, set up local and long 
distance communicat ions service tor all de legat ions 
and the press , and billeted all engaged in the work.  
It  operated messes and furnished food ror all . • • • 
The United States  als o provided security tor pr is oner s ,  
judges , and prosecut ion, furnished a�niatrat ive 
services ,  and provided such fac ilities as photostat ,  
mimeograph, and sound recording • • • •  The Army a lso 
met indirect requirement s  such as di spensary and hos­
pital, shipp ing, postal ,  post ezchange , and other 
servic ing. • • , 5  
In spite ot the diligent efforts ot Justic e  Jac kson, 
we conclude that his was not the mo st br illiant legal mind in 
� Nuremberg courtroom. Quincy Wr ight and Herbert Weschler , 
5 �. , p .  772 . 
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members ot the American staff , have 1n var i ous art icle s  shown 
much ke ener ins ight int o the legal i s sue s  involved and demon­
s t rated greater powers tor e luc idat ing them. If newspaper 
reports are to be accepted, Goer ing gave Jac kson two bad days 
whe n Jac kson attempted to cr o s s -examine h1m . The edi tor ot 
For tune i n  the December , 1946 issue fe lt that Goering played 
with Jac ks on as a fiend with a mouse . In the Uni ted State s ,  
former Secre tary ot St ate Henry L. Stimson has pres en ted a 
much be t ter case tor the legal ity ot the count termed wars 
aga inst the pe ace or aggres s ive wars . Jackson did not c on­
cern himaelt too much with denying the charge that � po st 
fac to law had been used to convic t those charged wi th mak ing 
aggre s s ive war . At t ime s he was almost fl ippant in regard to 
legal issues . 
- The trial had to be fair tor any las t ing good to come 
ot it . As we have said ab ove , the Tr ibunal bent over back­
wards in dealing wi th the defendant s .  It American leaders 
ar e guilty ot mak i ng aggres s ive war 1n the tuture they should 
be puni shed as the Germans were . It they ar e wro ngly c harged 
with such a crime ,  we only hope they will be given as fair 
a trial as we thi nk Nuremberg was . As t o  the compo s i tion of 
the Tribunal, it i s  deplorable that neutral j udge s ,  judge s 
from small state s ,  or even ant i-Nazi German judge s could not 
have been added to the judge s ot the tour Great Powers . For 
tour powerful , vi ctorious nat i ons to s i t  in j udgment over the 
177 
leaders of a defeated s tate has the aroma ot vic tors wreak­
ing vengeanc e upon vanquished. It judges trom neutral s tates,  
or even Germany itself had been included, history would pro• 
bably deal more kindly with the. trial than otherwise . 
The tr ial has yet a chance of becoming the corner stone 
ot world peace . It is a step in the direct ion of a real world 
government , as i t  shows that a l imitat ion on sovere ignty i s  
nece ssary and proper it law i a  ever to b e  substituted tor 
force in set t ling international disputes . Goer ing was right 
when he said that the Hague Convent ions were outmoded in the 
waging of "total " war . The problem i s  not the humanizat ion 
ot warfare--how can mass murder ever be humanized--but the 
elimination ot the caus es ot war itself, and the discovery of 
some suitable means tor peaceful change in which s tate s and 
individuals of states can appeal t o  internat ional judic ial 
bodies tor settling the ir differences without recour s e  to 
war . The defendant Speer rose to the occas ion when he said 
in his f inal plea that his personal fate was or lit tle import 
contras ted with the terrible catastrophes to mankind which 
modern technological invent ions might bring : "Should there 
ar ise yet another s tate which will use a modern technique to 
support a dic tatorship and conque s t ,  then the world must go 
under: This trial should therefore serve as a means of finding 
a method tor cooperat ion between human be1ngs . "6 
6 Hirsch, �, �. , p .  318 . 
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The impact of the trial on the German mentality is 
interes t ing. The pr oceedings were channe led to Germans through 
every medium of informat ion ; the pre s s .  radio ,  newsreels were 
us ed . Selected Germans such as teachers and clergyme n  were 
invited to attend the s e s s ions of the tr ial . One or the invited 
was Pastor N i emoeller . There came a flow ot letters to Nuremberg 
trom all zones . Several thous ands were direc ted to Jackson 
and others to the Tribunal in general . Naturally. s ince Ger­
many was defeated and occupied, seventy-five per cent or the 
letters favored the tr ial . It is of intere s t  that German 
cri t ic i sm or the trial paralleled almo s t  exac tly Amer ican 
cr i t ic i sm. There were the same charge s :  (1) There exis ted 
in 1939 no international law which made a war of aggress ion 
an internati onal cr 1me ; ( 2 )  vic tors are not qualified to judge 
the vanquished; ( 3 ) the Rus s ian governme nt als o  made aggres s ive 
war and commit ted numerous war cr imes . 
According to Robert M. w. Kempner . a member or the 
American prosecut ing staff, the trial will have a las t ing 
effec t  on the German people as be ing full, fair , and we ll 
documented : 
I had further personal opportunities to observe German 
reac t ions when invited to lecture on the tr ial at the 
Univer s i t ies of He idelberg. Frankfor t ,  and Erlange n .  
Somewhat t o  my surpris e ,  the majority o f  German law 
stude nt s agreed with the prosecut ion ' s  convic tion :  
that the defe ndants had conspired to wage aggress ive 
war . I found professors lectur ing o n  the legal aspec ts 
of the trial in the ir courses and group s  formed among 
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university and high school students to di scuss i t . 7 
Germans who had been loath to admit it have been rorced 
to acknowledge that atroc ities were committed by the 
leaders of the ir country . Such Germans have been tilled 
wi th horror that these things by which they fee l  that 
they, too, were victimized, should have been done in 
their name ; with disgust and revuls ion not only against 
the individuals who commi tted, but against the system 
that permit ted these things . 8 
Of course there remain large bodies of Germans on whom the 
tr ial will have no effect whatsoever , but the above quotat ion 
shows that a number of Germans, espec ially the thinking, 
articulate Germans showed a keen interest in the outcome ot 
the trial and its underlying ph1loaopb7. In this connect ion 
we might ment ion that many Amer icans seem so concerned that 
the German people tail to show a sense ot guilt and respon­
s ibility tor German atrocit ies . Regardless of the justice 
or injus t ice ot the cause,  when did. any people ever , atter 
making the supreme effor t ,  have a sense of collective guilt 
when the cause tor which they had sacr ificed failedt To ex­
pect the German people to feel guilty is to ask a higher ethical 
standard ot them than has ever been shown by any other nat ion . 
As to the holding or future trials� Jaekaon expre ssed 
the opinion that the type held at Nuremberg was the slowest  
and mo at  costly method of procedure, and tar the sake or speed 
7 R .  M.  W. Kempner, "Impact ot Nuremberg on the German 
Mind, " New York Times Magazine, October 6,  1946, p.  8. 
8 �. , P •  66 . 
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he advocated each occupying power to  ass�e the respons ib ility 
tor other tr ials wi thin i ts own zone . "Most of the se defend­
ants can be charged with s ingle and spec ific crimea which will 
not involve a repetition ot the whole hi story of the Nazi 
conspiracy, " according to Jackaon. 9 
"The Nazi leaders are not the only ones who have re­
nounced and denied the princ iples ot we s tern c ivilization. 
They are unique only in the degree and violence ot their of­
tenses . n10 It the claim were made that only these leaders 
were guilty, then Nuremberg would have no earthly meaning. 
The four prosecut ing nat ions , and the nineteen others sub­
scribing to the Charter ot the Internat ional Military fr i­
bunal have t1rmly bound themselves to the pr1nc1ple that ag­
gress ive war is  a personal and punishable crime . Henceforward, 
the leaders ot the United States,  or tho se of any other country 
that �ke_ aggres s ive war may be call$d to the pr 1sQner • a  dock 
to answer charges . We cannot go backward . The only course 
is to find the solut ion ot the central problem, which is war . 
In the atomic age , it thi s problem is not solved, then wes tern 
c ivilization as we know it,  with its primary concept ot the 
dignity ot the individual , may perish from the face ot the 
earth. 
9 Jackson, 2e• �. , p. 773. 
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